



## Macroeconomic Theory (8107)

### Spring 2007, Mini 1

#### Problem set 3

Due Thursday, Feb 13, in class.

1) Consider a small open economy in which preferences of the representative agent are given by

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t \pi(s^t | s_0) \frac{c^{1-\sigma}(s^t)}{1-\sigma}$$

In each period the agent receives a stochastic and exogenous endowment  $e^{y(s^t)}$ ,  $y(s^t) = \rho y(s^{t-1}) + \varepsilon(s^t)$ ,  $\varepsilon \rightarrow N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$ .

- Assume that the representative agent in the economy has initial wealth 0 and that she can trade internationally in each state  $s^t$  (including the initial state before her initial income realization is observed) a full set of AD securities with state contingent prices given by  $\beta\pi(s^{t+1}|s^t)$ . Solve exactly (i.e. without log-linearizing) for the equilibrium allocation.
- Log-linearize the economy above and solve for the log-linearized allocation. How is it different from the exact one? Explain
- Consider now the case in which the representative agent can only trade a non contingent bond  $b(s^t)$  so its budget constraint is given by

$$c(s^t) + \bar{q}b(s^t) = b(s^{t-1}) + e^{y(s^t)}$$

and  $\bar{q} = \beta$  is its exogenous price. Write down the log-linearized equilibrium conditions around the point  $b = 0$ . Solve analytically for the parameters  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3$  and  $\alpha_4$  which characterize the decision rules

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{c}(s^t) &= \alpha_1 y(s^t) + \alpha_2 b(s^{t-1}) \\ \hat{b}(s^t) &= \alpha_3 y(s^t) + \alpha_4 b(s^{t-1})\end{aligned}$$

- Consider the polar cases of  $\rho = 1$  and  $\rho = 0$ . Characterize the equilibrium statistical processes for bonds and consumption under these two cases. Compare the allocations with those under complete markets. Under which case is the bond a better instrument to share risk? Explain why.
- Now focus on the case  $\rho = 1$ . Compute the log-linearized equilibrium allocation. In the space  $\sigma, \sigma_\varepsilon^2$  compare the ex-ante welfare from the log-linearized complete markets allocation with the welfare from the log-linearized bond allocation. Comment your results

2) There are two countries US and Italy. US is endowed with cheese ( $X$ ) while Italy is only endowed with pasta ( $Y$ ) but Italian and Americans like to eat both. American consumers' utility is given by

$$c(s^t) = G(x(s^t), y(s^t))$$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t \pi(s^t | s_0) \frac{c^{1-\sigma}(s^t)}{1-\sigma}$$

where  $x(s^t)$  and  $y(s^t)$  is their consumption of cheese and pasta and  $G(x, y) = (\omega x^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} + (1-\omega)y^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}})^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}}$

Italian consumers are denoted by a star and their utility is given by

$$c^*(s^t) = G(x^*(s^t), y^*(s^t))$$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t \pi(s^t | s_0) \frac{c^{*1-\sigma}(s^t)}{1-\sigma}$$

The endowment of cheese and pasta are random and given by  $X(s^t), Y(s^t)$ . Assume that Italians and Americans can only trade cheese and pasta and let  $p(s^t)$  be the price of pasta in terms of cheese. Also assume that there is no trade in financial assets (financial autarky).

- Define an equilibrium for this economy and write down the equations that characterize it.
- Solve analytically for equilibrium allocations and prices
- Show that if  $\gamma < 1$ , US consumption falls relative to Italian consumption when the endowment of cheese (the American good) increases. Explain
- Show that if  $\gamma = 1$  (so that  $G(x, y) = x^\omega y^{1-\omega}$ ) the equilibrium allocation under financial autarky is Pareto efficient. Explain the economic intuition behind this result.