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Curriculum Vitae
Fall 2007

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Major Fields of Concentration

Macroeconomics, Monetary Economics, International Finance

Education

Degree	*Field*	*Institution*	*Year*
Ph.D.	Economics	University of Minnesota (expected)	2008
M.S.	Applied Economics	University of Texas at Dallas	2001
M.A. (w/ distinction)	Applied Mathematics	National Technical University of Ukraine	1997

Dissertation

Title: "Essays on Optimal Policy Design in Macroeconomics"
Dissertation Advisors: Professor Patrick Kehoe and Professor V. V. Chari
Expected Completion: Summer 2008

References

Professor Patrick Kehoe	(612) 624-1978 (612) 204-5525 pkehoe@res.mpls.frb.fed.us	Department of Economics University of Minnesota 1035 Heller Hall 271 - 19th Avenue South Minneapolis, MN 55455
Professor V. V. Chari	(612) 626-7151 (612) 204-5518 chari@econ.umn.edu	
Dr. Simran Sahi	(612) 625-6353 ssahi@econ.umn.edu	
Professor Marco Bassetto	(312) 322-5909 bassetto@frbchi.org	Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 230 S. LaSalle Street Chicago, IL 60604

Honors and Awards

2003 - 2005 Graduate School Block Grant, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
2001 - 2002 Graduate School Scholarship, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1999 - 2001 Freedom Support Act Graduate Fellowship in Economics.
1996 - 1997 Glushko Scholarship, National Technical University of Ukraine.
1996 - 1997 Kiev City Administration Scholarship.

Teaching Experience

2005 - Present *Instructor*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Taught undergraduate *Principles of Microeconomics* and *Money and Banking*.

2001 - 2003 *Teaching Assistant*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Led recitation sections for undergraduate level *Principles of Microeconomics* and *Principles of Macroeconomics*, and for graduate level *Applied Econometrics*.

1999 - 2001 *Teaching Assistant,* School of Social Science, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, Texas. Led recitation sections for graduate level *Policy Data Analysis* and *Econometrics*.

Research Experience

2003 - Present *Visiting Scholar*, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

2003 - 2007 *Research Assistant*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Research Assistant to Professor Marco Bassetto. Worked on numerical evaluations of political-economic equilibrium under balanced budget rule.

Summer 2001 *Research Assistant*, Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Research Assistant to Professor Paul Jargowsky for econometric estimates for the Consequences of Inequality Project.

Summer 2000 *Intern*, Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Program, New York, New York. Assisted Statistical Advisor Dr. Haishan Fu with 2001 Human Development Index Computations.

1997 - 1998 *Research Assistant*, Center for Social and Economic Research, Harvard Institute for International Development, Kiev, Ukraine. Developed and maintained monthly and quarterly econometric models of Ukrainian economic, did short- and medium-term macroeconomic analyses and forecasts of inflation, wrote macroeconomic outlooks for the Ukrainian Government and NGOs.

Publications

"Possible Consequences of Administrative Controls over Communal Services Prices," *Macroeconomic Reforms*, 1/99, Harvard Institute for International Development, Kiev, Ukraine, February 1999.

"The Roots and Consequences of Financial Crisis in Ukraine," (with M.Dabrowski, P.Kovalev, M.Makrewitz), *Vestnik of the National Bank of Ukraine*, #12/98, National Bank of Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine, December 1998.

"Development of Treasury Bills Market in Ukraine," *Financial Markets and Strategies for Regional Development in the Face of European Integration*, School of Business, Nowy Sącz, Poland, October 1998.

"Application of a Discrete Multirate Model in Macroeconomic Forecasting," (with V. Romanenko), *Automation*, 1998, National Technical University of Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine, May 1998.

"Forecasting Real GDP and Current Account in a Transition Economy," (with R. Ahrend), *Studies & Analyses*, #134, Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland, June 1998.

Papers

"Government Investment and the European Stability and Growth Pact," with Marco Bassetto, NBER working paper 13200, June 2007
"Voluntary Risk Sharing and Optimal Precision of Policy Announcements," with Christian Stoltenberg; 2007.
"Time Consistency Problem in a Monetary Union," University of Minnesota, September 2006.

Professional Affiliations

American Economic Association, Canadian Economic Association

Dissertation Abstract

Essay 1: "Policy Announcements and Welfare," with Christian Stoltenberg (job market paper)

In this paper we highlight the welfare effects of policy announcements. We consider an environment in which households voluntary engage in risk sharing, a fraction of firms sets prices in advance, and monetary policy has real effects captured by a cash-in advance constraint. We show that providing more precise information has two opposite effects. Higher precision of common public signals increases the variance of the optimal consumption allocation, affecting social welfare negatively. The risk-sharing effect can be compensated by an increase in aggregate resources due to more accurate pricing decisions of firms. We provide conditions under which more precise policy announcements will diminish welfare.

Essay 2: "Government Investment and the European Stability and Growth Pact," with Marco Bassetto

We consider the effect of excluding government investment from the deficit subject to the limits of the European Stability and Growth Pact. In the model we consider, residents of a given country discount future costs and benefits of government spending more than efficiency would dictate, because they fail to take into account the portion that will accrue to people that have not yet been born or immigrated into the country. It is thus in principle desirable to design budget rules that favor long-term investment (by allowing more borrowing) over other government spending that only carries short-term benefits. However, given the low rates of population growth, mortality, and mobility across European countries, we find that the distortions arising from treating all government spending equally are likely to be modest. We also show that these modest distortions can be alleviated only if net government investment is excluded from the deficit computation; excluding gross investment may even be counterproductive, as it promotes overspending in government capital.

Essay 3: "Time Consistency Problem in a Monetary Union"

We study a monetary union with a monetary authority that lacks commitment and adopts monetary decisions collectively. The lack of commitment implies that the governments of the union countries tend to overissue the nominal debt knowing that the monetary authority would inflate the debt. We show that under the majority rule there are multiple noncooperative equilibria. In all of the equilibria only the majority of the union countries takes directly into account the actions of the noncommitted monetary authority. The minority free-rides on the majority and obtains higher welfare. Remarkably, the best noncooperative majority equilibrium provides higher welfare than a symmetric cooperative equilibrium. Fiscal constraints, if binding, shrink the set of the noncooperative equilibria, which calls into question the desirability of the fiscal constraints as a tool to combat the lack of commitment.