Associate Professor Ichiro Obara received his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania in 2001. His areas of teaching are microeconomics and game theory. Professor Obara's current area of research is about the properties of equilibrium outcomes in dynamic games. Office: 1154 Heller Hall Telephone: (612) 625-4347 E-mail: obara@umn.edu Personal Web Page Current CV
Recent publications include: "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games," (joint with M. Kandori) International Journal of Game Theory 34 (2006): 475-493. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: the Role of Private Strategies," (joint with M. Kandori) Econometrica 74 (2006): 499-519. "The Maximum Efficient Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," (joint with G. Mailath and T. Sekiguchi) Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002): 99-122. Belief Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," (joint with V. Bhaskar) Journal of Economic Theory 102 (2002): 40-69.