

# Business Cycle Dynamics under Rational Inattention\*

Bartosz Maćkowiak

Mirko Wiederholt

European Central Bank and CEPR

Northwestern University

First draft: June 2007. This draft: April 2009

Preliminary Version

## Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with rational inattention. Households and decisionmakers in firms have limited attention and decide how to allocate their attention. We study the implications of rational inattention for business cycle dynamics. We find that the impulse responses of prices under rational inattention have several properties of empirical impulse responses: (i) prices respond slowly to monetary policy shocks, (ii) prices respond faster to aggregate TFP shocks, and (iii) prices respond very fast to disaggregate shocks. As a result, profit losses due to deviations of the actual price from the profit-maximizing price are an order of magnitude smaller than in the Calvo model that generates the same real effects. We also find that consumption responds slowly to monetary policy shocks. For standard parameter values, deviations from the consumption Euler equation are cheap in utility terms, implying that households devote little attention to the consumption-saving decision.

---

\*We thank for helpful comments: Paco Buera, Larry Christiano, James Costain, Martin Eichenbaum, Christian Hellwig, Giorgio Primiceri, Bruno Strulovici as well as seminar and conference participants at Bank of Canada, Chicago Fed, Columbia, DePaul, Duke, European Central Bank, ESSIM 2008, EUI, Harvard, MIT, Minneapolis Fed, NBER summer institute 2008, NAWMES 2008, Princeton, Richmond Fed, Riksbank, SED 2008, Stony Brook, Toronto, UCSD, University of Chicago and University of Hong Kong. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank. E-mail: bartosz.mackowiak@ecb.int and m-wiederholt@northwestern.edu.

# 1 Introduction

This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with rational inattention. We model the idea that agents cannot attend perfectly to all available information. Therefore, the mapping between economic conditions and the price and quantity decisions taken by agents is not perfect. Decision-makers make mistakes, but decision-makers try to minimize those mistakes.

The economy consists of households, firms and a government. Households supply differentiated types of labor, consume a variety of goods, and hold nominal government bonds. Households take wage setting and consumption decisions. Firms supply differentiated goods that are produced with the different varieties of labor. Firms take price setting and factor mix decisions. The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor rule. In the model, prices and wages are physically fully flexible. The only source of inertia is decision-makers' limited attention. We compute the impulse responses of all variables to monetary policy shocks, aggregate technology shocks and micro-level shocks under rational inattention.

Following Sims (2003), we model attention as a flow of information and we model limited attention as a constraint on the flow of information. Rational inattention means that we let agents choose the level and the allocation of information flow. In particular, agents decide how much attention they devote to their different decision problems; and for each decision problem, agents decide how much attention they devote to the different factors that determine the optimal decision.

We find that in our model rational inattention by decision-makers in firms has the following implications. For our parameter values, rational inattention on the side of decision-makers in firms implies that the impulse response of the price level to monetary policy shocks resembles the impulse response in a Calvo model with an average price duration of 7.5 months. In other words, the price level responds slowly to monetary policy shocks. At the same time, the price level responds fairly quickly to aggregate technology shocks, and prices respond very quickly to micro-level shocks. The reason is the optimal allocation of attention. Decision-makers in firms decide to pay little attention to monetary policy disturbances, about twice as much attention to the state of aggregate technology, and a lot

of attention to firm-specific conditions. Therefore, prices respond slowly to monetary policy shocks, but fairly quickly to aggregate technology shocks, and very quickly to micro-level shocks. Furthermore, losses in profits due to deviations of the actual price from the profit-maximizing price are an order of magnitude smaller than in the Calvo model that generates the same real effects. Specifically, losses in profits due to sub-optimal price responses to aggregate conditions are 23 times smaller than in the Calvo model; and losses in profits due to sub-optimal price responses to firm-specific conditions are 57 times smaller than in the Calvo model that generates the same real effects. The main reason for this result is the optimal allocation of attention, which implies that prices respond slowly to monetary policy shocks, but fairly quickly to aggregate technology shocks, and very quickly to micro-level shocks. In the Calvo model, prices respond slowly to all those shocks. The other reason for this result is that under rational inattention on the side of decision-makers in firms deviations of the actual price from the profit-maximizing price are less likely to be extreme than in the Calvo model.

When we add rational inattention on the side of households, we find that, for standard parameter values, households devote little attention to the consumption-saving decision because deviations from the consumption Euler equation are cheap in utility terms. As a result, consumption responds slowly to shocks. The impulse responses of consumption to shocks look similar to the impulse responses of consumption in a model with habit formation.

This paper is related to two strands of literature: (i) the literature on rational inattention (e.g. Sims (2003, 2006), Luo (2008), Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2008), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008), and Woodford (2008)), and (ii) the literature on business cycle models with imperfect information (e.g. Lucas (1972), Woodford (2002), Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Lorenzoni (2008)). The main innovation with respect to the existing literature on rational inattention is that we solve a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The main difference to the existing literature on business cycle models with imperfect information is that in the model presented below agents choose the information structure.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes all features of the economy apart from the information structure. Section 3 describes the steady state of the non-stochastic version of the economy. In Section 4 we derive the objective that decision-makers in firms

maximize when they choose the allocation of attention. In Section 5 we derive the objective that households maximize when they choose the allocation of attention. Section 6 describes issues related to aggregation. Section 7 characterizes the solution of the model under perfect information. Section 8 shows numerical solutions of the model under rational inattention on the side of decision-makers in firms. Section 9 shows numerical solutions of the model under rational inattention on the side of firms and households. Section 10 concludes.

## 2 Model

In this section, we describe all features of the economy apart from the information structure. Afterwards, we solve the model for alternative assumptions about the information structure: (i) perfect information, and (ii) rational inattention.

### 2.1 Households

There are  $J$  households. Households supply differentiated types of labor, consume a variety of goods, and hold nominal government bonds.

Each household seeks to maximize the expected discounted sum of period utility. The discount factor is  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ . The period utility function is

$$U(C_{jt}, L_{jt}) = \frac{C_{jt}^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} - \varphi \frac{L_{jt}^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi}, \quad (1)$$

where

$$C_{jt} = \left( \sum_{i=1}^I C_{ijt}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}. \quad (2)$$

Here  $C_{jt}$  is composite consumption and  $L_{jt}$  is labor supply of household  $j$  in period  $t$ . The parameter  $\gamma > 0$  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and the parameters  $\varphi > 0$  and  $\psi \geq 0$  affect the disutility of labor supply. The variable  $C_{ijt}$  denotes consumption of good  $i$  by household  $j$  in period  $t$ . There are  $I$  different consumption goods, and the parameter  $\theta > 1$  is the elasticity of substitution between those consumption goods.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>The assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution between consumption goods is only for ease of exposition. One could use a general constant returns-to-scale aggregator.

The flow budget constraint of household  $j$  in period  $t$  reads

$$\sum_{i=1}^I P_{it} C_{ijt} + B_{jt} = R_{t-1} B_{jt-1} + (1 + \tau_w) W_{jt} L_{jt} + \frac{D_t}{J} - \frac{T_t}{J}, \quad (3)$$

where  $P_{it}$  is the price of good  $i$  in period  $t$ ,  $B_{jt}$  are bond holdings by household  $j$  between period  $t$  and period  $t + 1$ ,  $R_t$  is the nominal gross interest rate on those bond holdings,  $W_{jt}$  is the nominal wage rate for labor supplied by household  $j$  in period  $t$ ,  $\tau_w$  is a wage subsidy paid by the government,  $(D_t/J)$  is a pro-rata share of nominal aggregate profits, and  $(T_t/J)$  is a pro-rata share of nominal lump-sum taxes. We assume that all households have the same initial bond holdings  $B_{j,-1} > 0$ . We also assume that bond holdings have to be positive in every period,  $B_{jt} > 0$ . We have to make some assumption to rule out Ponzi schemes. We choose this particular assumption because it allows us to rewrite the model in terms of logs of all variables. One can think of households having an account. The account holds only nominal government bonds, and the balance on the account has to be positive.

In every period, each household chooses a consumption vector,  $(C_{1jt}, \dots, C_{Ijt})$ , and a wage rate,  $W_{jt}$ . Each household commits to supply any quantity of labor at that wage rate.

Each household takes as given: all prices set by firms, all wage rates set by other households, the nominal interest rate and all aggregate quantities.

## 2.2 Firms

There are  $I$  firms in the economy. Firms supply differentiated consumption goods that are produced with the different varieties of labor.

Firm  $i$  supplies consumption good  $i$ . The production function of firm  $i$  is

$$Y_{it} = e^{at} e^{a_{it}} L_{it}^\alpha, \quad (4)$$

where

$$L_{it} = \left( \sum_{j=1}^J L_{ij t}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right)^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}. \quad (5)$$

Here  $Y_{it}$  is output and  $L_{it}$  is composite labor input of firm  $i$  in period  $t$ . Total factor productivity,  $(e^{at} e^{a_{it}})$ , has an aggregate component,  $e^{at}$ , and a firm-specific component,  $e^{a_{it}}$ . The parameter  $\alpha \in (0, 1]$  is the elasticity of output with respect to composite labor.

The variable  $L_{ijt}$  is firm  $i$ 's input of the type of labor supplied by household  $j$ . There are  $J$  types of labor, and the parameter  $\eta > 1$  is the elasticity of substitution between those types of labor.

Nominal profits of firm  $i$  in period  $t$  equal

$$(1 + \tau_p) P_{it} Y_{it} - \sum_{j=1}^J W_{jt} L_{ijt}, \quad (6)$$

where  $\tau_p$  is a production subsidy paid by the government.

In every period, each firm sets a price,  $P_{it}$ , and chooses a factor mix,  $(\hat{L}_{i1t}, \dots, \hat{L}_{i(J-1)t})$ . The variable  $\hat{L}_{ijt} = (L_{ijt}/L_{it})$  denotes firm  $i$ 's relative input of type  $j$  labor in period  $t$ . Each firm commits to supply any quantity of the good at that price. Each firm then produces the good with the chosen factor mix.

Each firm takes as given: all prices set by other firms, all wage rates set by households, the nominal interest rate and all aggregate quantities.

### 2.3 Government

There is a monetary authority and a fiscal authority. The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to the rule

$$\frac{R_t}{R} = \left( \frac{R_{t-1}}{R} \right)^{\rho_R} \left[ \left( \frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi} \right)^{\phi_\pi} \left( \frac{Y_t}{Y} \right)^{\phi_y} \right]^{1-\rho_R} e^{\varepsilon_t^R}, \quad (7)$$

where  $\Pi_t = (P_t/P_{t-1})$  is inflation of a price index  $P_t$  that will be defined later,  $Y_t$  is aggregate output defined as

$$Y_t = \sum_{i=1}^I Y_{it}, \quad (8)$$

and  $\varepsilon_t^R$  is a monetary policy shock. Furthermore,  $R$ ,  $\Pi$  and  $Y$  denote the values of the nominal interest rate, inflation and aggregate output in the non-stochastic steady state.

The policy parameters satisfy  $\rho_R \in [0, 1)$ ,  $\phi_\pi > 1$  and  $\phi_y \geq 0$ .

The government budget constraint in period  $t$  reads

$$T_t + (B_t - B_{t-1}) = (R_{t-1} - 1) B_{t-1} + \tau_w \left( \sum_{j=1}^J W_{jt} L_{jt} \right) + \tau_p \left( \sum_{i=1}^I P_{it} Y_{it} \right). \quad (9)$$

The government has to finance interest on nominal government bonds, the wage subsidy and the production subsidy. The government can collect lump-sum taxes or issue new government bonds.

We assume that the government sets the production subsidy,  $\tau_p$ , and the wage subsidy,  $\tau_w$ , so as to correct the distortions arising from firms' market power in the goods market and households' market power in the labor market. In particular, we assume that

$$\tau_p = \frac{\vartheta}{\vartheta - 1} - 1, \quad (10)$$

where  $\vartheta$  denotes the price elasticity of demand, and

$$\tau_w = \frac{\zeta}{\zeta - 1} - 1, \quad (11)$$

where  $\zeta$  denotes the wage elasticity of labor demand.<sup>2</sup> We make this assumption to abstract from the level distortions arising from monopolistic competition.

## 2.4 Shocks

There are three types of shocks in the economy: monetary policy shocks, aggregate technology shocks and firm-specific productivity shocks. We assume that, for all  $i = 1, \dots, I$ , the stochastic processes  $\{\varepsilon_t^R\}$ ,  $\{a_t\}$  and  $\{a_{it}\}$  are independent. Furthermore, we assume that the firm-specific productivity processes,  $\{a_{it}\}$ , are independent across firms. In addition, we assume that the number of firms  $I$  is sufficiently large so that

$$\frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I a_{it} = 0. \quad (12)$$

Finally, we assume that  $\varepsilon_t^R$  follows a Gaussian white noise process,  $a_t$  follows a stationary Gaussian first-order autoregressive process with mean zero, and each  $a_{it}$  follows a stationary Gaussian first-order autoregressive process with mean zero. In the following, we denote the period  $t$  innovation to  $a_t$  and  $a_{it}$  by  $\varepsilon_t^A$  and  $\varepsilon_{it}^I$ , respectively.

---

<sup>2</sup>When households have perfect information then  $\vartheta = \theta$ . By contrast, when households have imperfect information, the variable  $\vartheta$  (the price elasticity of demand) may differ from the parameter  $\theta$ . Therefore, the value of the production subsidy (10) may vary across information structures. For the same reason, the value of the wage subsidy (11) may vary across information structures.

## 2.5 Notation

Throughout the paper,  $C_t$  will denote aggregate composite consumption

$$C_t = \sum_{j=1}^J C_{jt}, \quad (13)$$

and  $L_t$  will denote aggregate composite labor input

$$L_t = \sum_{i=1}^I L_{it}. \quad (14)$$

Furthermore,  $\hat{P}_{it}$  will denote the relative price of good  $i$

$$\hat{P}_{it} = \frac{P_{it}}{P_t}, \quad (15)$$

and  $\hat{W}_{jt}$  will denote the relative wage rate for type  $j$  labor

$$\hat{W}_{jt} = \frac{W_{jt}}{W_t}. \quad (16)$$

In addition,  $\tilde{W}_{jt}$  will denote the real wage rate for type  $j$  labor

$$\tilde{W}_{jt} = \frac{W_{jt}}{P_t}, \quad (17)$$

and  $\tilde{W}_t$  will denote the real wage index

$$\tilde{W}_t = \frac{W_t}{P_t}. \quad (18)$$

In each section, we will specify the definition of  $P_t$  and  $W_t$ .

## 3 Non-stochastic steady state

We begin by characterizing the non-stochastic steady state of the economy described in the previous section. A non-stochastic steady state is a solution of the non-stochastic version of the economy with the property that real quantities, relative prices, the nominal interest rate and inflation are constant over time. In the following, variables without the subscript  $t$  denote values in the non-stochastic steady state.

In this section,  $P_t$  denotes the following price index

$$P_t = \left( \sum_{i=1}^I P_{it}^{1-\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \quad (19)$$

and  $W_t$  denotes the following wage index

$$W_t = \left( \sum_{j=1}^J W_{jt}^{1-\eta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}. \quad (20)$$

In the non-stochastic steady state, the households' first-order conditions read

$$\frac{R}{\Pi} = \frac{1}{\beta}, \quad (21)$$

$$\frac{C_{ij}}{C_j} = \hat{P}_i^{-\theta}, \quad (22)$$

and

$$\tilde{W}_j = \varphi \left( \hat{W}_j^{-\eta} L \right)^\psi C_j^\gamma, \quad (23)$$

and the firms' first-order conditions read

$$\hat{P}_i = \tilde{W} \frac{1}{\alpha} \left( \hat{P}_i^{-\theta} C \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}-1}, \quad (24)$$

and

$$\hat{L}_{ij} = \hat{W}_j^{-\eta}. \quad (25)$$

Since all households face the same decision problem and have the same information in the non-stochastic version of the economy, all households choose the same level of composite consumption in the non-stochastic steady state. The definition of aggregate composite consumption (13) then implies that

$$\frac{C_j}{C} = \frac{1}{J}. \quad (26)$$

Furthermore, the households' wage setting equation (23), equation (26) and  $\hat{W}_j = \left( \tilde{W}_j / \tilde{W} \right)$  imply that all households set the same wage rate. Thus firms hire the different types of labor in equal amounts. It follows from the labor aggregator (5) and the definition of the wage index (20) that

$$\hat{L}_{ij}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} = \hat{W}_j^{1-\eta} = \frac{1}{J}. \quad (27)$$

Similarly, the firms' price setting equation (24) implies that all firms set the same price. Thus households consume the different consumption goods in equal amounts, implying that all firms produce the same amount. Since all firms also have the same technology, all firms have the same composite labor input. It follows from the consumption aggregator (2), the

definition of aggregate output (8), the definition of aggregate composite labor input (14) and the definition of the price index (19) that

$$\left(\frac{C_{ij}}{C_j}\right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} = \hat{P}_i^{1-\theta} = \frac{Y_i}{Y} = \frac{L_i}{L} = \frac{1}{I}. \quad (28)$$

We will use equations (21)-(28) below.

Note that, in the non-stochastic steady state, the real interest rate,  $(R/\Pi)$ , is determined, but the nominal interest rate,  $R$ , and inflation,  $\Pi$ , are not determined. For ease of exposition, we will assume that  $\Pi = 1$ . Furthermore, in the non-stochastic steady state, the initial price level,  $P_{-1}$ , is not determined. We will assume that  $P_{-1}$  equals some value  $\bar{P}_{-1}$ .

For given initial real bond holdings  $(B_{j,-1}/\bar{P}_{-1})$ , fiscal variables in the non-stochastic steady state are determined by the requirement that real quantities are constant over time. This is because real bond holdings are constant over time if and only if the government runs a balanced budget in real terms (i.e. real lump-sum taxes equal the sum of real interest payments and real subsidy payments).

## 4 Derivation of the firms' objective

In this section, we derive a log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of profits. We will use this expression below when we assume that decision-makers in firms choose the allocation of attention so as to maximize the expected discounted sum of profits. To derive the log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of profits, we proceed in four steps. First, we make a guess concerning the demand function that a firm faces. Second, we derive the profit function by substituting the production function and the demand function into the expression for profits. Third, we make an assumption about how decision-makers in firms value profits in different states of the world. Fourth, we compute a log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of profits around the non-stochastic steady state.

First, we guess that the demand function for good  $i$  has the form

$$C_{it} = \varsigma \left(\frac{P_{it}}{P_t}\right)^{-\vartheta} C_t, \quad (29)$$

where  $\varsigma > 0$  and  $\vartheta > 1$  are undetermined coefficients satisfying

$$\varsigma \hat{P}_i^{-\vartheta} = \hat{P}_i^{-\theta}, \quad (30)$$

$C_t$  is aggregate composite consumption, and  $P_t$  is a price index satisfying the following equation for some twice continuously differentiable function  $d$

$$1 = \sum_{i=1}^I d\left(\frac{P_{it}}{P_t}\right). \quad (31)$$

When we solve the model for alternative assumptions about the information structure below, we always verify that the guess (29)-(31) concerning the demand function is correct.<sup>3</sup>

Second, we derive the profit function by substituting the production function (4)-(5) and the demand function (29) into the expression for nominal profits (6). We start by rewriting the expression for nominal profits:

$$(1 + \tau_p) P_{it} Y_{it} - \sum_{j=1}^J W_{jt} L_{ijt} = (1 + \tau_p) P_{it} Y_{it} - L_{it} \left( \sum_{j=1}^J W_{jt} \hat{L}_{ijt} \right). \quad (32)$$

The term in brackets is the wage bill per unit of composite labor input. Afterwards, we rearrange equation (4)

$$L_{it} = \left( \frac{Y_{it}}{e^{a_{it}} e^{a_{it}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}, \quad (33)$$

and equation (5)

$$1 = \sum_{j=1}^J \hat{L}_{ijt}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}}. \quad (34)$$

Substituting equation (29) and equations (33)-(34) into the expression for nominal profits (32) yields the profit function

$$(1 + \tau_p) P_{it} \varsigma \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{-\vartheta} C_t - \left[ \frac{\varsigma \left( \frac{P_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{-\vartheta} C_t}{e^{a_{it}} e^{a_{it}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} W_{jt} \hat{L}_{ijt} + W_{Jt} \left( 1 - \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} \hat{L}_{ijt}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right)^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} \right]. \quad (35)$$

---

<sup>3</sup>To give the simplest example, when households have perfect information,  $\varsigma = 1$ ,  $\vartheta = \theta$  and  $P_t$  is given by equation (19). In this case,  $d(x) = x^{1-\theta}$ .

Nominal profits of firm  $i$  in period  $t$  depend on variables that the decision-maker in the firm chooses  $(P_{it}, \hat{L}_{i1t}, \dots, \hat{L}_{i(J-1)t})$  and variables that the decision-maker in the firm takes as given  $(P_t, a_t, a_{it}, C_t, W_{1t}, \dots, W_{Jt})$ .

Third, we assume that, in period  $-1$ , decision-makers in firms value nominal profits in period  $t$  using the following stochastic discount factor:

$$Q_{-1,t} = \beta^t \lambda(C_{1t}, \dots, C_{Jt}) \frac{1}{P_t}, \quad (36)$$

where  $\lambda$  is a twice continuously differentiable function with the property

$$\lambda(C_1, \dots, C_J) = C_j^{-\gamma}, \quad (37)$$

and  $P_t$  is the price index appearing in the demand function (29).<sup>4</sup> Then, in period  $-1$ , the expected discounted sum of profits equals

$$E_{i,-1} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t F \left( \hat{P}_{it}, \hat{L}_{i1t}, \dots, \hat{L}_{i(J-1)t}, a_t, a_{it}, C_{1t}, \dots, C_{Jt}, \tilde{W}_{1t}, \dots, \tilde{W}_{Jt} \right), \quad (38)$$

where  $E_{i,-1}$  is the expectation operator conditioned on the information of the decision-maker in firm  $i$  in period  $-1$ , and

$$\begin{aligned} & F \left( \hat{P}_{it}, \hat{L}_{i1t}, \dots, \hat{L}_{i(J-1)t}, a_t, a_{it}, C_{1t}, \dots, C_{Jt}, \tilde{W}_{1t}, \dots, \tilde{W}_{Jt} \right) \\ &= \lambda(C_{1t}, \dots, C_{Jt}) (1 + \tau_p) \varsigma \hat{P}_{it}^{1-\vartheta} \left( \sum_{j=1}^J C_{jt} \right) \\ & \quad - \lambda(C_{1t}, \dots, C_{Jt}) \left[ \frac{\varsigma \hat{P}_{it}^{-\vartheta} \left( \sum_{j=1}^J C_{jt} \right)}{e^{at} e^{a_{it}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} \tilde{W}_{jt} \hat{L}_{ijt} + \tilde{W}_{Jt} \left( 1 - \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} \hat{L}_{ijt}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right)^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} \right] \end{aligned} \quad (39)$$

In the following, we call the function  $F$  the real profit function.

Fourth, we compute a log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of profits (38) around the non-stochastic steady state. In the following, small variables

---

<sup>4</sup>For example, if the function  $\lambda$  is a weighted average of the marginal utilities of the different households (i.e.  $\lambda(C_{1t}, \dots, C_{Jt}) = \sum_{j=1}^J \lambda_j C_{jt}^{-\gamma}$  with  $\lambda_j \geq 0$  and  $\sum_{j=1}^J \lambda_j = 1$ ), equation (37) is satisfied because all households have the same marginal utility in the non-stochastic steady state.

denote log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. For example,  $c_{jt} = \ln(C_{jt}/C_j)$ . Expressing the real profit function  $F$  in terms of log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state and using equations (4), (10), (24), (25), (26), (27), (30) and  $C_i = \hat{P}_i^{-\theta} C$  yields the following expression for the expected discounted sum of profits

$$E_{i,-1} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t f \left( \hat{p}_{it}, \hat{l}_{i1t}, \dots, \hat{l}_{i(J-1)t}, a_t, a_{it}, c_{1t}, \dots, c_{Jt}, \tilde{w}_{1t}, \dots, \tilde{w}_{Jt} \right), \quad (40)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} & f \left( \hat{p}_{it}, \hat{l}_{i1t}, \dots, \hat{l}_{i(J-1)t}, a_t, a_{it}, c_{1t}, \dots, c_{Jt}, \tilde{w}_{1t}, \dots, \tilde{w}_{Jt} \right) \\ = & \lambda (C_1 e^{c_{1t}}, \dots, C_J e^{c_{Jt}}) \frac{\vartheta}{\vartheta - 1} \frac{1}{\alpha} \frac{\tilde{W} L_i}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J e^{(1-\vartheta)\hat{p}_{it} + c_{jt}} \\ & - \lambda (C_1 e^{c_{1t}}, \dots, C_J e^{c_{Jt}}) e^{-\frac{\vartheta}{\alpha}\hat{p}_{it} - \frac{1}{\alpha}(a_t + a_{it})} \left( \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J e^{c_{jt}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \\ & \frac{\tilde{W} L_i}{J} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} e^{\tilde{w}_{jt} + \hat{l}_{ijt}} + e^{\tilde{w}_{Jt}} \left( J - \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} e^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\hat{l}_{ijt}} \right)^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (41)$$

After a second-order Taylor approximation to the real profit function  $f$  at the non-stochastic steady state, we obtain the following result.

**Proposition 1** (*Expected discounted sum of profits*) *Let  $f$  denote the real profit function defined by equation (41). Let  $\tilde{f}$  denote the second-order Taylor approximation to  $f$  at the non-stochastic steady state. Let  $x_t$ ,  $z_t$  and  $v_t$  denote the following vectors*

$$x'_t = \begin{pmatrix} \hat{p}_{it} & \hat{l}_{i1t} & \cdots & \hat{l}_{i(J-1)t} \end{pmatrix}, \quad (42)$$

$$z'_t = \begin{pmatrix} a_t & a_{it} & c_{1t} & \cdots & c_{Jt} & \tilde{w}_{1t} & \cdots & \tilde{w}_{Jt} \end{pmatrix}, \quad (43)$$

$$v'_t = \begin{pmatrix} x'_t & z'_t & 1 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (44)$$

Let  $v_{m,t}$  denote the  $m$ th element of  $v_t$ . Finally, let  $E_{i,-1}$  denote the expectation operator conditioned on the information of the decision-maker of firm  $i$  in period  $-1$ . Suppose that there exist two constants  $\delta < (1/\beta)$  and  $A \in \mathbb{R}_+$  such that, for each period  $t \geq 0$  and for all  $m$  and  $n$ ,

$$E_{i,-1} |v_{m,t} v_{n,t}| < \delta^t A. \quad (45)$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned}
& E_{i,-1} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \tilde{f}(x_t, z_t) \right] - E_{i,-1} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \tilde{f}(x_t^*, z_t) \right] \\
&= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{i,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} (x_t - x_t^*)' H (x_t - x_t^*) \right], \tag{46}
\end{aligned}$$

where the matrix  $H$  is given by

$$H = -C_j^{-\gamma} \tilde{W} L_i \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\vartheta}{\alpha} \left(1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \vartheta\right) & 0 & \cdots & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{2}{\eta J} & \frac{1}{\eta J} & \cdots & \frac{1}{\eta J} \\ \vdots & \frac{1}{\eta J} & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \frac{1}{\eta J} \\ 0 & \frac{1}{\eta J} & \cdots & \frac{1}{\eta J} & \frac{2}{\eta J} \end{bmatrix}, \tag{47}$$

and the vector  $x_t^*$  is given by:

$$\hat{p}_{it}^* = \frac{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}}{1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \vartheta} \left( \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J c_{jt} \right) + \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \vartheta} \left( \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J \tilde{w}_{jt} \right) - \frac{\frac{1}{\alpha}}{1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \vartheta} (a_t + a_{it}), \tag{48}$$

and

$$\hat{l}_{ijt}^* = -\eta \left( \tilde{w}_{jt} - \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J \tilde{w}_{jt} \right). \tag{49}$$

**Proof.** See Appendix A. ■

After the log-quadratic approximation to the real profit function, the profit-maximizing price in period  $t$  is given by equation (48) and the profit-maximizing factor mix in period  $t$  is given by equation (49). In addition, after the log-quadratic approximation to the real profit function, the loss in profits in period  $t$  in the case of a deviation from the profit-maximizing decisions (i.e.  $x_t \neq x_t^*$ ) is given by the quadratic form in expression (46). The upper-left element of the matrix  $H$  determines the profit loss in the case of a sub-optimal price setting decision. The loss is increasing in the price elasticity of demand,  $\vartheta$ , and increasing in the degree of decreasing returns-to-scale,  $(1/\alpha)$ . The lower-right block of the matrix  $H$  determines the profit loss in the case of a sub-optimal factor mix decision. The loss is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between types of labor,  $\eta$ , and depends on the number of types of labor,  $J$ . Note that the diagonal elements of  $H$  determine the loss in

profits in the case of a deviation in a single variable, while the off-diagonal elements of  $H$  determine how a deviation in one variable affects the loss in profits due to a deviation in another variable. Finally, condition (45) ensures that, in the expression for the expected discounted sum of profits, after the log-quadratic approximation to the real profit function, one can change the order of integration and summation and the infinite sum converges.

## 5 Derivation of the households' objective

In this section, we derive a log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of period utility. We will use this expression below when we assume that households choose the allocation of attention so as to maximize expected lifetime utility. To derive the log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of period utility, we proceed in three steps. First, we make a guess concerning the labor demand function that a household faces. Second, we substitute the flow budget constraint, the consumption aggregator and the labor demand function into the period utility function to derive an expression for period utility that incorporates those constraints. Third, we compute a log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of period utility around the non-stochastic steady state.

First, we guess that the demand function for labor supplied by household  $j$  has the form

$$L_{jt} = \xi \left( \frac{W_{jt}}{W_t} \right)^{-\zeta} L_t, \quad (50)$$

where  $\xi > 0$  and  $\zeta > 1$  are undetermined coefficients satisfying

$$\xi \hat{W}_j^{-\zeta} = \hat{W}_j^{-\eta}, \quad (51)$$

$L_t$  is aggregate composite labor input, and  $W_t$  is a wage index satisfying the following equation for some twice continuously differentiable function  $h$

$$1 = \sum_{j=1}^J h \left( \frac{W_{jt}}{W_t} \right). \quad (52)$$

When we solve the model for alternative assumptions about the information structure below, we always verify that the guess (50)-(52) concerning the labor demand function is correct.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>To give the simplest example, when firms have perfect information,  $\xi = 1$ ,  $\zeta = \eta$  and  $W_t$  is given by equation (20). In this case,  $h(x) = x^{1-\eta}$ .

Second, we substitute the consumption aggregator (2), the flow budget constraint (3) and the labor demand function (50) into the period utility function (1) to derive an expression for period utility that incorporates those constraints. We start by rewriting the flow budget constraint (3) as

$$C_{jt} \left( \sum_{i=1}^I P_{it} \hat{C}_{ijt} \right) + B_{jt} = R_{t-1} B_{jt-1} + (1 + \tau_w) W_{jt} L_{jt} + \frac{D_t}{J} - \frac{T_t}{J},$$

where  $\hat{C}_{ijt} = (C_{ijt}/C_{jt})$  is relative consumption of good  $i$  by household  $j$ . The term in brackets on the left-hand side is consumption expenditure per unit of composite consumption. Rearranging yields

$$C_{jt} = \frac{R_{t-1} B_{jt-1} - B_{jt} + (1 + \tau_w) W_{jt} L_{jt} + \frac{D_t}{J} - \frac{T_t}{J}}{\sum_{i=1}^I P_{it} \hat{C}_{ijt}}.$$

Dividing the numerator and the denominator on the right-hand side by  $P_t$ , where  $P_t$  is some price index, yields

$$C_{jt} = \frac{\frac{R_{t-1}}{\Pi_t} \tilde{B}_{jt-1} - \tilde{B}_{jt} + (1 + \tau_w) \tilde{W}_{jt} L_{jt} + \frac{\tilde{D}_t}{J} - \frac{\tilde{T}_t}{J}}{\sum_{i=1}^I \hat{P}_{it} \hat{C}_{ijt}}. \quad (53)$$

Here  $\tilde{B}_{jt} = (B_{jt}/P_t)$  are real bond holdings by the household,  $\tilde{D}_t = (D_t/P_t)$  are real aggregate profits,  $\tilde{T}_t = (T_t/P_t)$  are real lump-sum taxes, and  $\Pi_t = (P_t/P_{t-1})$  is inflation. Afterwards, we rewrite the equation for composite consumption (2) as

$$1 = \sum_{i=1}^I \hat{C}_{ijt}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}. \quad (54)$$

Substituting the flow budget constraint (53), the equation for composite consumption (54) and the labor demand function (50) into the period utility function (1) yields the following expression for period utility that incorporates those constraints:

$$\frac{1}{1-\gamma} \left( \frac{\frac{R_{t-1}}{\Pi_t} \tilde{B}_{jt-1} - \tilde{B}_{jt} + (1 + \tau_w) \tilde{W}_{jt} \xi \left( \frac{\tilde{W}_{jt}}{\tilde{W}_t} \right)^{-\zeta} L_t + \frac{\tilde{D}_t}{J} - \frac{\tilde{T}_t}{J}}{\sum_{i=1}^{I-1} \hat{P}_{it} \hat{C}_{ijt} + \hat{P}_{It} \left( 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{I-1} \hat{C}_{ijt}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}} \right)^{1-\gamma} - \frac{1}{1-\gamma} - \varphi \frac{1}{1+\psi} \left[ \xi \left( \frac{\tilde{W}_{jt}}{\tilde{W}_t} \right)^{-\zeta} L_t \right]^{1+\psi}. \quad (55)$$

Expressing the period utility function (55) in terms of log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state and using equations (11), (21), (22), (23), (28) and (51) yields our final expression for period utility:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{C_j^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \left( \frac{\frac{\omega_B}{\beta} e^{r_{t-1}-\pi_t+\tilde{b}_{jt-1}} - \omega_B e^{\tilde{b}_{jt}} + \frac{\zeta}{\zeta-1} \omega_W e^{(1-\zeta)\tilde{w}_{jt}+\zeta\tilde{w}_t+l_{it}} + \omega_D e^{\tilde{d}_t} - \omega_T e^{\tilde{t}_t}}{\frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I-1} e^{\hat{p}_{it}+\hat{c}_{ijt}} + \frac{1}{I} e^{\hat{p}_{It}} \left( I - \sum_{i=1}^{I-1} e^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \hat{c}_{ijt}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}} } \right)^{1-\gamma} \\ & - \frac{1}{1-\gamma} - \frac{C_j^{1-\gamma}}{1+\psi} \omega_W e^{-\zeta(1+\psi)(\tilde{w}_{jt}-\tilde{w}_t)+(1+\psi)l_{it}}, \end{aligned} \quad (56)$$

where  $\omega_B$ ,  $\omega_W$ ,  $\omega_D$  and  $\omega_T$  denote the following steady-state ratios:

$$\left( \omega_B \quad \omega_W \quad \omega_D \quad \omega_T \right) = \left( \frac{\tilde{B}_j}{\tilde{C}_j} \quad \frac{\tilde{W}_j L_j}{\tilde{C}_j} \quad \frac{\tilde{D}_j}{\tilde{C}_j} \quad \frac{\tilde{T}_j}{\tilde{C}_j} \right). \quad (57)$$

Third, we compute a log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of period utility around the non-stochastic steady state.

**Proposition 2** (*Expected discounted sum of period utility*) *Let  $g$  denote the functional that is obtained by multiplying the period utility function (56) by  $\beta^t$  and summing over all  $t$  from zero to infinity. Let  $\tilde{g}$  denote the second-order Taylor approximation to  $g$  at the non-stochastic steady state. Let  $x_t$ ,  $z_t$  and  $v_t$  denote the following vectors*

$$x'_t = \left( \tilde{b}_{jt} \quad \tilde{w}_{jt} \quad \hat{c}_{1jt} \quad \cdots \quad \hat{c}_{I-1jt} \right), \quad (58)$$

$$z'_t = \left( r_{t-1} \quad \pi_t \quad \tilde{w}_t \quad l_t \quad \tilde{d}_t \quad \tilde{t}_t \quad \hat{p}_{1t} \quad \cdots \quad \hat{p}_{It} \right), \quad (59)$$

$$v'_t = \left( x'_t \quad z'_t \quad 1 \right). \quad (60)$$

Let  $v_{m,t}$  denote the  $m$ th element of  $v_t$ . Finally, let  $E_{j,-1}$  denote the expectation operator conditioned on information of household  $j$  in period  $-1$ . Suppose that

$$E_{j,-1} \left[ \tilde{b}_{j,-1}^2 \right] < \infty, \quad (61)$$

and, for all  $m$ ,

$$E_{j,-1} \left| \tilde{b}_{j,-1} v_{m,0} \right| < \infty. \quad (62)$$

Furthermore, suppose that there exist two constants  $\delta < (1/\beta)$  and  $A \in \mathbb{R}_+$  such that, for each period  $t \geq 0$ , for  $\tau = 0, 1$  and for all  $m$  and  $n$ ,

$$E_{j,-1} |v_{m,t} v_{n,t+\tau}| < \delta^t A. \quad (63)$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{j,-1} \left[ \tilde{g} \left( \tilde{b}_{j,-1}, x_0, z_0, x_1, z_1, \dots \right) \right] - E_{j,-1} \left[ \tilde{g} \left( \tilde{b}_{j,-1}, x_0^*, z_0, x_1^*, z_1, \dots \right) \right] \\ &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} (x_t - x_t^*)' H_0 (x_t - x_t^*) + (x_t - x_t^*)' H_1 (x_{t+1} - x_{t+1}^*) \right], \end{aligned} \quad (64)$$

where the matrix  $H_0$  is given by

$$H_0 = -C_j^{1-\gamma} \begin{bmatrix} \gamma \omega_B^2 \left(1 + \frac{1}{\beta}\right) & \gamma \omega_B \zeta \omega_W & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \gamma \omega_B \zeta \omega_W & \zeta \omega_W (\gamma \zeta \omega_W + 1 + \zeta \psi) & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \frac{2}{\theta I} & \dots & \frac{1}{\theta I} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \frac{1}{\theta I} & \dots & \frac{2}{\theta I} \end{bmatrix}, \quad (65)$$

the matrix  $H_1$  is given by

$$H_1 = C_j^{1-\gamma} \begin{bmatrix} \gamma \omega_B^2 & \gamma \omega_B \zeta \omega_W & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (66)$$

and the process  $\{x_t^*\}$  is defined by the following two requirements: (i) the vector  $v_t$  with  $x_t = x_t^*$  satisfies conditions (61)-(63), and (ii) in each period  $t \geq 0$ ,

$$c_{jt}^* = E_t \left[ -\frac{1}{\gamma} \left( r_t - \pi_{t+1} - \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I (\hat{p}_{it+1} - \hat{p}_{it}) \right) + c_{jt+1}^* \right], \quad (67)$$

$$\tilde{w}_{jt}^* = \frac{\gamma}{1 + \zeta \psi} c_{jt}^* + \frac{\psi}{1 + \zeta \psi} (\zeta \tilde{w}_t + l_t) + \frac{1}{1 + \zeta \psi} \left( \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I \hat{p}_{it} \right), \quad (68)$$

$$\tilde{c}_{ijt}^* = -\theta \left( \hat{p}_{it} - \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I \hat{p}_{it} \right), \quad (69)$$

where the variable  $c_{jt}^*$  is defined by

$$\begin{aligned}
c_{jt}^* &= \frac{\omega_B}{\beta} \left( r_{t-1} - \pi_t + \tilde{b}_{jt-1}^* \right) - \omega_B \tilde{b}_{jt}^* + \frac{\zeta}{\zeta - 1} \omega_W \left[ (1 - \zeta) \tilde{w}_{jt}^* + \zeta \tilde{w}_t + l_t \right] \\
&\quad + \omega_D \tilde{d}_t - \omega_T \tilde{t}_t - \left( \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I \hat{p}_{it} \right), \tag{70}
\end{aligned}$$

and  $E_t$  denotes the expectation operator conditioned on the entire history of the economy up to and including period  $t$ .

**Proof.** See Appendix B. ■

After the log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of period utility, alternative sequences for bond holdings, the wage and the consumption mix that satisfy conditions (61)-(63) can be ranked using equation (64). Equations (67)-(70) characterize the optimal behavior under perfect information (i.e. the decisions the household would take if in each period  $t$  the household knew the entire history of the economy up to and including period  $t$ ), while equation (64) gives the loss in expected lifetime utility in the case of deviations from the optimal behavior under perfect information. The upper-left blocks of the matrices  $H_0$  and  $H_1$  determine the loss in expected lifetime utility in the case of sub-optimal bond holdings and sub-optimal wage setting. A percentage deviation in bond holdings from optimal bond holdings causes a larger utility loss the larger  $\omega_B$ ,  $\gamma$  and  $(R/\Pi) = (1/\beta)$ . A percentage deviation in wage setting from optimal wage setting causes a larger utility loss the larger  $\omega_W$ ,  $\gamma$ ,  $\psi$  and  $\zeta$ . Furthermore, the off-diagonal elements of  $H_0$  show that a bond deviation in period  $t$  affects the utility cost of a wage deviation in period  $t$ . In addition, the first row of  $H_1$  shows that a bond deviation in period  $t$  affects the utility cost of a bond deviation in period  $t + 1$  and the utility cost of a wage deviation in period  $t + 1$ . The lower-right block of the matrix  $H_0$  determines the utility loss in the case of a sub-optimal consumption mix. The loss is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods,  $\theta$ , and depends on the number of consumption goods,  $I$ . Finally, conditions (61)-(63) ensure that, in the expression for the expected discounted sum of period utility, after the log-quadratic approximation to expected lifetime utility, one can change the order of integration and summation and the infinite sum converges.

## 6 Aggregation

In this section, we describe issues related to aggregation.

In the following, we will work with log-linearized equations for all aggregate variables. Log-linearizing the equations for aggregate output (8), for aggregate composite consumption (13) and for aggregate composite labor input (14) yields

$$y_t = \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I y_{it}, \quad (71)$$

$$c_t = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J c_{jt}, \quad (72)$$

and

$$l_t = \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I l_{it}. \quad (73)$$

Log-linearizing the equations for the price index (31) and for the wage index (52) yields

$$0 = \sum_{i=1}^I \hat{p}_{it},$$

and

$$0 = \sum_{j=1}^J \hat{w}_{jt}.$$

The last two equations can also be stated as

$$p_t = \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I p_{it}, \quad (74)$$

and

$$\tilde{w}_t = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J \tilde{w}_{jt}. \quad (75)$$

Furthermore, we will work with log-linearized equations when we aggregate the demands for a particular good or for a particular type of labor. Formally,

$$c_{it} = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J c_{ijt}, \quad (76)$$

and

$$l_{jt} = \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I l_{ijt}. \quad (77)$$

Finally, note that the production function (4) and the monetary policy rule (7) are already log-linear:

$$y_{it} = a_t + a_{it} + \alpha l_{it}, \quad (78)$$

and

$$r_t = \rho_R r_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_R) (\phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y y_t) + \varepsilon_t^R. \quad (79)$$

## 7 Case 1: Perfect information

In this section, we study the solution of the model under perfect information. This solution will serve as a benchmark. We define a solution under perfect information as follows: In each period  $t$ , all agents know the entire history of the economy up to and including period  $t$ ; households choose the utility-maximizing consumption vector and nominal wage rate; firms choose the profit-maximizing price and factor mix; the government sets the nominal interest rate according to the monetary policy rule, pays subsidies so as to correct the distortions due to market power and chooses a fiscal policy that satisfies the government budget constraint; aggregate variables are given by their respective equations; and households have rational expectations.

The following proposition characterizes the solution under perfect information after the log-quadratic approximation to the real profit function (see Section 4), the log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of period utility (see Section 5) and the log-linearization of the equations for the aggregate variables (see Section 6).

**Proposition 3** (*Solution under perfect information*) *A solution to the system of equations (48)-(49), (67)-(70), (71)-(76), (4), (12),  $y_{it} = c_{it}$  and  $\hat{c}_{ijt} = c_{ijt} - c_{jt}$  with the same initial bond holdings for each household and a non-explosive bond sequence for each household (i.e.*

$\lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} E_t \left[ \beta^{s+1} \left( \tilde{b}_{j,t+s+1} - \tilde{b}_{j,t+s} \right) \right] = 0$  satisfies:

$$y_t = c_t = \frac{1 + \psi}{1 - \alpha + \alpha\gamma + \psi} a_t, \quad (80)$$

$$l_t = \frac{1 - \gamma}{1 - \alpha + \alpha\gamma + \psi} a_t, \quad (81)$$

$$\tilde{w}_t = \frac{\gamma + \psi}{1 - \alpha + \alpha\gamma + \psi} a_t, \quad (82)$$

$$r_t - E_t [\pi_{t+1}] = \gamma \frac{1 + \psi}{1 - \alpha + \alpha\gamma + \psi} E_t [a_{t+1} - a_t], \quad (83)$$

and

$$\hat{c}_{ijt} = -\theta \hat{p}_{it}, \quad (84)$$

$$\hat{p}_{it} = -\frac{\frac{1}{\alpha}}{1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\theta} a_{it}, \quad (85)$$

$$\hat{l}_{ijt} = -\eta (\tilde{w}_{jt} - \tilde{w}_t), \quad (86)$$

$$(\tilde{w}_{jt} - \tilde{w}_t) = 0. \quad (87)$$

**Proof.** See Appendix C. ■

Under perfect information, aggregate output, aggregate consumption, aggregate labor input, the real wage index, and the real interest rate depend only on aggregate technology. Furthermore, relative consumption of good  $i$  by household  $j$  and the relative price of good  $i$  depend only on firm-specific productivity of firm  $i$ . In addition, firm  $i$ 's relative input of type  $j$  labor and the relative wage rate for type  $j$  labor are constant.

Note that, in this model, monetary policy has no real effects under perfect information. Monetary policy does affect nominal variables. The nominal interest rate and inflation follow from the monetary policy rule (79) and the real interest rate (83). Since  $(1 - \rho_R) \phi_\pi > 0$  and  $(1 - \rho_R) \phi_\pi + \rho_R > 1$ , the equilibrium paths of the nominal interest rate and inflation are locally determinate.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>See Woodford (2003), Chapter 2, Proposition 2.8.

## 8 Case 2: Firms have limited attention and households have perfect information

In this section, we solve the model under rational inattention on the side of decision-makers in firms. We assume that decision-makers in firms have limited attention and that they decide how to allocate their attention. For the moment, we continue to assume that households have perfect information to isolate the implications of rational inattention on the side of decision-makers in firms.

### 8.1 Firms' attention problem

Following Sims (2003), we model attention as a flow of information and we model limited attention as a constraint on the flow of information. We let agents choose the overall information flow subject to a constant marginal cost of information flow. Furthermore, we let agents choose the allocation of information flow. In particular, agents decide how much information flow they allocate to their different decision problems; and for each decision problem, agents decide how much information flow they allocate to the different factors that determine the optimal decision. We will refer to the level and the allocation of information flow as the allocation of attention.

We assume that decision-makers in firms choose the allocation of attention in period  $-1$  so as to maximize the expected discounted sum of profits. Formally, the attention problem of the decision-maker in firm  $i$  reads:

$$\max_{B(L), C(L), \zeta, \phi, \kappa} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{i,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} (x_t - x_t^*)' H (x_t - x_t^*) \right] - \frac{\lambda}{1 - \beta} \kappa, \quad (88)$$

where

$$x_t - x_t^* = \begin{pmatrix} p_{it} \\ \hat{l}_{i1t} \\ \vdots \\ \hat{l}_{i(J-1)t} \end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix} p_{it}^* \\ \hat{l}_{i1t}^* \\ \vdots \\ \hat{l}_{i(J-1)t}^* \end{pmatrix}, \quad (89)$$

subject to the equations characterizing the profit-maximizing decisions

$$p_{it}^* = \underbrace{A_1(L)\varepsilon_t^A}_{p_{it}^{A*}} + \underbrace{A_2(L)\varepsilon_t^R}_{p_{it}^{R*}} + \underbrace{A_3(L)\varepsilon_{it}^I}_{p_{it}^{I*}} \quad (90)$$

$$\hat{l}_{ijt}^* = -\eta\hat{w}_{jt}, \quad (91)$$

the equations characterizing the actual decisions

$$p_{it} = \underbrace{B_1(L)\varepsilon_t^A + C_1(L)\nu_{it}^A}_{p_{it}^A} + \underbrace{B_2(L)\varepsilon_t^R + C_2(L)\nu_{it}^R}_{p_{it}^R} + \underbrace{B_3(L)\varepsilon_{it}^I + C_3(L)\nu_{it}^I}_{p_{it}^I} \quad (92)$$

$$\hat{l}_{ijt} = -\zeta \left( \hat{w}_{jt} + \frac{\text{Var}(\hat{w}_{jt})}{\phi} \nu_{ijt}^L \right), \quad (93)$$

and the information flow constraint

$$\mathcal{I} \left( \left\{ p_{it}^{A*}, p_{it}^{R*}, p_{it}^{I*}, \hat{l}_{i1t}^*, \dots, \hat{l}_{i(J-1)t}^* \right\}; \left\{ p_{it}^A, p_{it}^R, p_{it}^I, \hat{l}_{i1t}, \dots, \hat{l}_{i(J-1)t} \right\} \right) \leq \kappa. \quad (94)$$

Here  $A_1(L)$  to  $A_3(L)$ ,  $B_1(L)$  to  $B_3(L)$ , and  $C_1(L)$  to  $C_3(L)$  are infinite-order lag polynomials. The noise terms  $\nu_{it}^A$ ,  $\nu_{it}^R$ ,  $\nu_{it}^I$  and  $\nu_{ijt}^L$  in the actual decisions are assumed to follow unit-variance Gaussian white noise processes that are: (i) firm-specific, (ii) independent of all other processes in the economy, and (iii) independent of each other. The operator  $\mathcal{I}$  (defined below) measures the information flow between the profit-maximizing behavior and the actual behavior. In the following paragraphs, we explain this decision problem in detail.

Recall that, after the log-quadratic approximation to the real profit function, the profit-maximizing decisions are given by equations (48)-(49) and the profit loss in the case of a deviation from the profit-maximizing decisions (i.e.  $x_t \neq x_t^*$ ) is given by equation (46). Hence, objective (88) means that the decision-maker in firm  $i$  maximizes the expected discounted sum of profits net of the cost of information flow. Here  $\lambda \geq 0$  is the constant (per-period) marginal cost of information flow, and  $\kappa \geq 0$  is the information flow devoted to the price setting and factor mix decisions. The marginal cost  $\lambda$  can be interpreted as an opportunity cost (i.e. the opportunity cost of devoting less attention to some other activity) or a monetary cost (e.g. a wage payment). In equation (89), we use the fact that  $(\hat{p}_{it} - \hat{p}_{it}^*) = (p_{it} - p_{it}^*)$ .

Equation (90) characterizes the profit-maximizing pricing behavior. Here we guess that the profit-maximizing price (48) has the representation (90) after substituting in  $\hat{p}_{it} = p_{it} - p_t$

and the equilibrium processes for  $p_t$ ,  $c_t$ ,  $\tilde{w}_t$ ,  $a_t$  and  $a_{it}$ . We will verify this guess. Equation (92) characterizes the actual pricing behavior. By choosing the lag polynomials  $B_1(L)$  to  $B_3(L)$  and  $C_1(L)$  to  $C_3(L)$ , the decision-maker chooses the joint distribution of the profit-maximizing price and the actual price. For example, if  $B_1(L) = A_1(L)$  and  $C_1(L) = 0$ , the price set by the decision-maker responds perfectly to aggregate technology shocks. Similarly, if  $B_2(L) = A_2(L)$  and  $C_2(L) = 0$ , the price set by the decision-maker responds perfectly to monetary policy shocks.

Equation (91) characterizes the profit-maximizing factor mix. Here we have simply rewritten the profit-maximizing factor mix (49) using  $\hat{w}_{jt} = (\tilde{w}_{jt} - \tilde{w}_t)$ . Equation (93) characterizes the actual factor mix. By choosing the coefficient  $\zeta$  and the signal-to-noise ratio  $\phi$ , the decision-maker chooses the joint distribution of the profit-maximizing factor mix and the actual factor mix. The fact that the decision-maker can only choose two coefficients in equation (93) may seem restrictive compared to equation (92), but we will show below that the firm cannot do better with a less restrictive choice in equation (93).

The operator  $\mathcal{I}$  measures the information flow between stochastic processes and is defined as

$$\mathcal{I}(\{X_t\}; \{Y_t\}) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} [H(X_1, \dots, X_T) - H(X_1, \dots, X_T | Y_1, \dots, Y_T)], \quad (95)$$

where  $H(X_1, \dots, X_T)$  denotes the entropy of the sequence of random variables  $X_1, \dots, X_T$  and  $H(X_1, \dots, X_T | Y_1, \dots, Y_T)$  denotes the conditional entropy of the sequence of random variables  $X_1, \dots, X_T$  given  $Y_1, \dots, Y_T$ . Entropy is a measure of uncertainty. The difference  $H(X_1, \dots, X_T) - H(X_1, \dots, X_T | Y_1, \dots, Y_T)$  measures the reduction in uncertainty about  $(X_1, \dots, X_T)$  due to knowledge of  $(Y_1, \dots, Y_T)$ . Thus, the right-hand side of (95) is a measure of the average per-period amount of information that the process  $\{Y_t\}$  contains about the process  $\{X_t\}$ . Hence, the information flow constraint (94) states that the average per-period amount of information that the actual decisions contain about the profit-maximizing decisions cannot exceed the value  $\kappa$ .

Note that we have assumed that the actual decisions follow a Gaussian process. One can show that a Gaussian process for the actual decisions is optimal because the objective (88) is quadratic and the profit-maximizing decisions (90)-(91) follow a Gaussian process.<sup>7</sup> We have

---

<sup>7</sup>See Sims (2006) or Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2008).

also assumed that the noise in the actual decisions is firm-specific. This assumption accords well with the idea that the friction is the limited attention of an individual decision-maker rather than the limited availability of information. Finally, we have assumed that the noise terms  $\nu_{it}^A$ ,  $\nu_{it}^R$ ,  $\nu_{it}^I$  and  $\nu_{ijt}^L$  are independent of each other. This assumption captures the idea that paying attention to the state of aggregate technology, to monetary policy disturbances, to firm-specific productivity and to relative wage rates are independent activities. In the future, we also plan to study the case where the noise terms can be correlated.

Two remarks on solving the problem (88)-(94) are in place. When we solve the problem (88)-(94) numerically, we turn this infinite-dimensional problem into a finite-dimensional problem by parameterizing each infinite-order lag polynomial  $B_1(L)$  to  $B_3(L)$  and  $C_1(L)$  to  $C_2(L)$  as a lag-polynomial of an ARMA(p,q) process where p and q are finite. Furthermore, when any of the variables appearing in the information flow constraint (94) is non-stationary, we replace the original variable by its first difference in the information flow constraint to ensure that entropy is well defined.

## 8.2 Computing the equilibrium

We use an iterative procedure to solve for the equilibrium of the model. First, we make a guess concerning the process for the profit-maximizing price (90) and a guess concerning the process for the relative wage rate in equation (91). Second, we solve the firms' attention problem (88)-(94). Third, we aggregate the individual prices to obtain the aggregate price level:

$$p_t = \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I p_{it}. \quad (96)$$

Fourth, we compute the aggregate dynamics implied by those price level dynamics. The following equations have to be satisfied in equilibrium:

$$r_t = \rho_R r_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_R) [\phi_\pi (p_t - p_{t-1}) + \phi_y y_t] + \varepsilon_t^R, \quad (97)$$

$$c_t = E_t \left[ -\frac{1}{\gamma} (r_t - p_{t+1} + p_t) + c_{t+1} \right], \quad (98)$$

$$\tilde{w}_t = \gamma c_t + \psi l_t, \quad (99)$$

$$y_t = c_t, \quad (100)$$

$$y_t = a_t + \alpha l_t, \quad (101)$$

$$a_t = \rho_A a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^A. \quad (102)$$

The first equation is the monetary policy rule. The second and third equation follow from the assumption that households have perfect information and the optimality conditions (67) and (68) in combination with equations (72), (74) and (75). The fourth equation follows from the requirement that output has to equal demand. The fifth equation follows from the production function (78) in combination with equations (71), (73) and (12). The last equation is the process for aggregate technology. We employ a standard solution method for linear rational expectations models to solve the system of equations containing the price level dynamics and those six equations. We obtain the law of motion for  $(r_t, c_t, \tilde{w}_t, y_t, l_t, a_t)$  implied by the price level dynamics. Fifth, we compute the law of motion for the profit-maximizing price from equations (48), (72) and (75):

$$p_{it}^* = p_t + \frac{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}}{1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\vartheta} c_t + \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\vartheta} \tilde{w}_t - \frac{\frac{1}{\alpha}}{1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\vartheta} (a_t + a_{it}). \quad (103)$$

In the last equation, we set  $\vartheta = \theta$  because the assumption that households have perfect information and the optimality condition (69) in combination with equation (74) imply that the price elasticity of demand equals  $\theta$ . If the process for the profit-maximizing price differs from our guess, we update our guess until we reach a fixed point.

Finally, we compute the equilibrium relative wage rates and factor mix. Suppose that the firm chooses some values  $\zeta > 1$  and  $\phi > 0$ . Equations (93), (73), (77) and  $\hat{l}_{ijt} = l_{ijt} - l_{it}$  then imply that the labor demand function has the form (50)-(51). Furthermore, the assumption that households have perfect information and the optimality conditions (67)-(70) imply that all households choose the same consumption and set the same wage rates. Thus  $\hat{w}_{jt} = 0$ , implying that  $\hat{l}_{ijt}^* = \hat{l}_{ijt} = 0$ . Since the profit-maximizing factor mix is constant, the firm can attain the profit-maximizing factor mix without any information flow.

### 8.3 Benchmark parameter values and solution

In this section, we report the numerical solution of the model for the following parameter values. We set  $\beta = 0.99$ ,  $\gamma = 1$ ,  $\psi = 0$ ,  $\theta = 4$ ,  $\alpha = 2/3$  and  $\eta = 4$ .

To set the parameters governing the process for aggregate technology, equation (102), we consider quarterly U.S. data from 1960 Q1 to 2006 Q4. We first compute a time series for aggregate technology,  $a_t$ , using equation (101) and measures of  $y_t$  and  $l_t$ . We use the log of real output per person, detrended with a linear trend, as a measure of  $y_t$ . We use the log of hours worked per person, demeaned, as a measure of  $l_t$ .<sup>8</sup> We then fit equation (102) to the time series for  $a_t$  obtaining  $\rho_A = 0.96$  and a standard deviation of the innovation equal to 0.0085. In the benchmark economy, we set  $\rho_A = 0.95$  and we set the standard deviation of  $\varepsilon_t^A$  equal to 0.0085.

To set the parameters of the Taylor rule, we consider quarterly U.S. data on the Federal Funds rate, inflation and real GDP from 1960 Q1 to 2006 Q4.<sup>9</sup> We fit the Taylor rule (97) to the data obtaining  $\rho_R = 0.89$ ,  $\phi_\pi = 1.53$ ,  $\phi_y = 0.33$ , and a standard deviation of the innovation equal to 0.0021. In the benchmark economy, we set  $\rho_R = 0.9$ ,  $\phi_\pi = 1.5$ ,  $\phi_y = 0.33$ , and the standard deviation of  $\varepsilon_t^R$  equal to 0.0021.

We assume that firm-specific productivity follows a first-order autoregressive process. Recent papers calibrate the autocorrelation of firm-specific productivity to be about two-thirds in monthly data, e.g. Klenow and Willis (2007) use 0.68, Midrigan (2006) uses 0.5, and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) use 0.66. Since  $(2/3)^3$  equals about 0.3, we set the autocorrelation of firm-specific productivity in our quarterly model equal to 0.3. We then choose the standard deviation of the innovation to firm-specific productivity such that the average absolute size of price changes in our model equals 9.7 percent under perfect information. The value 9.7 percent is the average absolute size of price changes excluding sales reported in Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). This yields a standard deviation of the innovation to firm-specific productivity equal to 0.22.

We compute the solution of the model by fixing the marginal value of information flow instead of  $\kappa$ . The overall information flow,  $\kappa$ , is then determined within the model. The

---

<sup>8</sup>We use data for the non-farm business sector. The source of the data is the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis.

<sup>9</sup>We compute a time series for four-quarter inflation rate from the price index for personal consumption expenditures excluding food and energy. We compute a time series for percentage deviations of real GDP from potential real GDP. The sources of the data are the websites of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis and the Congressional Budget Office.

idea is the following. When the marginal value of information flow is high, decision-makers in firms have a high incentive to increase information flow in order to take better decisions. In contrast, when the marginal value of information flow is low, decision-makers in firms have little incentive to increase information flow. We set the marginal value of information flow equal to 0.1 percent of a firm’s steady state output. We obtain this marginal value of information flow in equilibrium by setting the marginal cost of information flow in objective (88) to  $\lambda = (0.001) Y_i$ .

We first report the optimal allocation of attention at the rational inattention fixed point. The decision-maker in a firm allocates 3.1 bits of information flow to tracking firm-specific productivity, 1 bit of information flow to tracking aggregate technology, and 0.35 bits of information flow to tracking monetary policy. The expected per-period loss in profits due to imperfect tracking of firm-specific productivity equals 0.07 percent of the firm’s steady state output; the expected per-period loss in profits due to imperfect tracking of aggregate technology equals 0.05 percent of the firm’s steady state output; and the expected per-period loss in profits due to imperfect tracking of monetary policy equals 0.03 percent of the firm’s steady state output. Together these numbers imply that the expected per-period loss in profits due to deviations of the actual price from the profit-maximizing price equals 0.15 percent of the firm’s steady state output. We think this is a reasonable number.

Figures 1 and 2 show impulse responses of the price level, inflation, output, and the nominal interest rate at the rational inattention fixed point (green lines with circles). For comparison, the figures also include impulse responses of the same variables at the equilibrium under perfect information derived in Section 7 (blue lines with points). All impulse responses are to shocks of one standard deviation. All impulse responses are drawn such that an impulse response equal to one means “a one percent deviation from the non-stochastic steady state”. Time is measured in quarters along horizontal axes.

Consider Figure 1. The price level shows a dampened and delayed response to a monetary policy shock compared with the case of perfect information. The response of inflation to a monetary policy shock is persistent. Output falls after a positive innovation in the Taylor rule and the decline in output is persistent. The nominal interest rate increases on impact and then converges slowly to zero. The impulse responses to a monetary policy shock

under rational inattention differ markedly from the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock under perfect information. Under perfect information, the price level adjusts fully on impact to a monetary policy shock, there are no real effects, and the nominal interest rate fails to change.

Consider Figure 2. The price level and inflation show a dampened response to an aggregate technology shock compared with the case of perfect information. The output gap is negative for a few quarters after the shock. Output and the nominal interest rate show hump-shaped impulse responses to an aggregate technology shock. Note that under rational inattention the response of the price level to an aggregate technology shock is less dampened and less delayed than the response of the price level to a monetary policy shock. The reason is the optimal allocation of attention. Decision-makers in firms decide to allocate about three times as much attention to aggregate technology than to monetary policy. Therefore, prices respond faster to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. As a result, the output gap is negative for only 5 quarters after an aggregate technology shock, while the output gap is negative for 10 quarters after a monetary policy shock.<sup>10</sup>

Figure 3 shows the impulse response of an individual price to a firm-specific productivity shock. Prices respond almost perfectly to firm-specific productivity shocks. The reason is the optimal allocation of attention. Decision-makers in firms decide to pay close attention to firm-specific productivity.

## 8.4 Comparison to the Calvo model

For comparison, we solved the Calvo model for the same parameter values and assuming that prices change every 2.5 quarters on average. Figures 4 and 5 show the impulse responses in the benchmark economy with rational inattention (green lines with circles) and the impulse responses in the Calvo model with perfect information (red lines with crosses). The impulse

---

<sup>10</sup>See also Paciello (2008). Paciello solves the white noise case of a similar model analytically, where white noise case means that: (i) all exogenous processes are white noise processes, (ii) there is no lagged interest rate in the Taylor rule, and (iii) the price level instead of inflation appears in the Taylor rule. The analytical solution in the white noise case helps to understand in more detail the differential response of prices to aggregate technology shocks and to monetary policy shocks.

responses to a monetary policy shock are essentially identical in the two models, while the impulse responses to an aggregate technology shock are quite different in the two models. In particular, inflation responds to a monetary policy shock by the same amount on impact in the benchmark economy and in the Calvo model, while inflation responds to an aggregate technology shock twice more strongly on impact in the benchmark economy than in the Calvo model. This is because decision-makers in firms in the benchmark economy decide to allocate about three times as much attention to aggregate technology than to monetary policy.

In the benchmark economy and in the Calvo model, firms experience profit losses due to deviations of the actual price from the profit-maximizing price. In the benchmark economy, profit losses due to deviations of the actual price from the profit-maximizing price are an order of magnitude smaller than in the Calvo model that generates the same real effects. Specifically, the expected loss in profits due to sub-optimal price responses to aggregate conditions is 23 times smaller than in the Calvo model. In addition, the expected loss in profits due to sub-optimal price responses to firm-specific conditions is 57 times smaller than in the Calvo model. The main reason for this result is the optimal allocation of attention. In the benchmark economy, prices respond slowly to monetary policy shocks, but fairly quickly to aggregate technology shocks, and very quickly to micro-level shocks. In contrast, in the Calvo model, prices respond slowly to all those shocks. Another reason for this result is that under rational inattention deviations of the actual price from the profit-maximizing price are less likely to be extreme than in the Calvo model.

## 9 Case 3: Firms and households have limited attention

We now study the implications of adding rational inattention on the side of households. We first make two simplifying assumptions to focus on the implications of rational inattention on the side of households for consumption behavior. In particular, we assume that households set real wage rates (instead of nominal wage rates) and  $\psi = 0$ . One can show analytically that these two assumptions imply that the optimal wage setting behavior under both perfect

information and limited attention satisfies

$$\tilde{w}_{jt} = \gamma c_{jt}. \quad (104)$$

The reason is as follows. When households set real wage rates and  $\psi = 0$ , each household only needs to know his/her own consumption to be on the labor supply curve. Knowing own consumption does not require any information flow. Hence, the assumptions that households set real wage rates (instead of nominal wage rates) and  $\psi = 0$  allow us to study in isolation the implications of rational inattention by households for consumption behavior.

### 9.1 Households' attention problem

The attention problem of household  $j$  reads:

$$\max_{B(L), C(L), \vartheta, \phi, \kappa} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} (x_t - x_t^*)' H_0 (x_t - x_t^*) + (x_t - x_t^*)' H_1 (x_{t+1} - x_{t+1}^*) \right] - \frac{\lambda}{1 - \beta} \kappa, \quad (105)$$

where

$$x_t - x_t^* = \begin{pmatrix} \tilde{b}_{jt} \\ \tilde{w}_{jt} \\ \hat{c}_{1jt} \\ \vdots \\ \hat{c}_{I-1jt} \end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix} \tilde{b}_{jt}^* \\ \tilde{w}_{jt}^* \\ \hat{c}_{1jt}^* \\ \vdots \\ \hat{c}_{I-1jt}^* \end{pmatrix}, \quad (106)$$

subject to an equation linking an argument of the objective and two decision variables

$$\tilde{b}_{jt} - \tilde{b}_{jt}^* = -\frac{1}{\omega_B} \sum_{s=0}^t \left( \frac{1}{\beta} \right)^{t-s} [(c_{js} - c_{js}^*) + \zeta \omega_W (\tilde{w}_{js} - \tilde{w}_{js}^*)], \quad (107)$$

the equations characterizing the household's optimal behavior under perfect information

$$c_{jt}^* = \underbrace{A_1(L) \varepsilon_t^A}_{c_{jt}^{A*}} + \underbrace{A_2(L) \varepsilon_t^R}_{c_{jt}^{R*}} \quad (108)$$

$$\tilde{w}_{jt}^* = \gamma c_{jt}^* \quad (109)$$

$$\hat{c}_{ijt}^* = -\theta \hat{p}_{it}, \quad (110)$$

the equations characterizing the household's actual behavior

$$c_{jt} = \underbrace{B_1(L)\varepsilon_t^A + C_1(L)\nu_{jt}^A}_{c_{jt}^A} + \underbrace{B_2(L)\varepsilon_t^R + C_2(L)\nu_{jt}^R}_{c_{jt}^R} \quad (111)$$

$$\tilde{w}_{jt} = \gamma c_{jt} \quad (112)$$

$$\hat{c}_{ijt} = -\vartheta \left( \hat{p}_{it} + \frac{\text{Var}(\hat{p}_{it})}{\phi} \nu_{ijt}^I \right), \quad (113)$$

and the information flow constraint

$$\mathcal{I}(\{c_{jt}^{A*}, c_{jt}^{R*}, \hat{c}_{1jt}^*, \dots, \hat{c}_{I-1jt}^*\}; \{c_{jt}^A, c_{jt}^R, \hat{c}_{1jt}, \dots, \hat{c}_{I-1jt}\}) \leq \kappa. \quad (114)$$

Here  $A_1(L)$ ,  $A_2(L)$ ,  $B_1(L)$ ,  $B_2(L)$ ,  $C_1(L)$  and  $C_2(L)$  are infinite-order lag polynomials. The noise terms  $\nu_{jt}^A$ ,  $\nu_{jt}^R$  and  $\nu_{ijt}^I$  in the actual decisions are assumed to follow unit-variance Gaussian white noise processes that are: (i) household-specific, (ii) independent of all other processes in the economy, and (iii) independent of each other. The operator  $\mathcal{I}$  measures the information flow between the household's optimal behavior under perfect information and the household's actual behavior.

In equations (111)-(113), we assume that the household chooses a consumption vector and a real wage rate. The household's bond holdings then follow from equation (107), which follows from the flow budget constraint (70).

Finally, we assume that, in period  $-1$ , the economy is in the non-stochastic steady state and all households know that the economy is in the non-stochastic steady state.

When we solve the problem (105)-(114) numerically, we turn this infinite-dimensional problem into a finite-dimensional problem by parameterizing each infinite-order lag polynomial  $B_1(L)$ ,  $B_2(L)$ ,  $C_1(L)$  and  $C_2(L)$  as a lag-polynomial of an ARMA(p,q) process where p and q are finite.

## 9.2 Benchmark parameter values and solution

We assume the same parameter values as in the benchmark economy in Section 8.3. We have to choose values for three additional parameters:  $\omega_B$ ,  $\omega_W$  and the household's marginal value of information flow. We set  $\omega_B = 4$  and  $\omega_W = 0.95$ . We set the household's marginal value of information flow equal to 0.1 percent of the household's steady state composite

consumption. We obtain this marginal value of information flow in equilibrium by setting the marginal cost of information flow in objective (105) to  $\lambda = (0.001) C_j$ .

We begin with the following experiment in order to get a first idea of how rational inattention by households affects consumption behavior. We study the optimal allocation of attention by an individual household assuming that decision-makers in firms have limited attention and all other households have perfect information, i.e. we study the optimal allocation of attention by an individual household at the fixed point derived in Section 8. The optimal allocation of attention by the household has the following features. The household allocates 0.31 bits of information flow to tracking aggregate technology and 0.12 bits of information flow to tracking monetary policy. The expected per-period loss in utility due to imperfect tracking of aggregate technology equals 0.02 percent of the household's steady state composite consumption, and the expected per-period loss in utility due to imperfect tracking of monetary policy also equals 0.02 percent of the household's steady state composite consumption. Figure 6 shows the impulse response of composite consumption by the individual household to a monetary policy shock (upper panel) and to an aggregate technology shock (lower panel). In each panel, the green line with circles is the impulse response under perfect information, while the black line with diamonds is the impulse response under limited attention. We would like to point out four results. First, there are sizeable differences between the impulse responses of consumption under perfect information and the impulse responses of consumption under rational inattention, despite the fact that the utility loss from deviations from the perfect information behavior is very small and the marginal value of information flow is very low. Second, the impulse response of consumption to a monetary policy shock under rational inattention is hump-shaped, while the impulse response under perfect information is monotonic. Third, consumption under rational inattention differs from consumption under perfect information, but in the long run the difference between consumption under rational inattention and consumption under perfect information goes to zero. Similarly, we find that bond holdings under rational inattention differ from bond holdings under perfect information, but in the long run the difference between bond holdings under rational inattention and bond holdings under perfect information goes to zero. Fourth, the impulse responses of consumption under rational

inattention look similar to the impulse responses of consumption in a model with habit formation.

Next, we solve for the fixed point when decision-makers in firms and all households have limited attention. When we add rational inattention by households, the decision-maker in a firm allocates 1 bit of information flow to tracking aggregate technology and 0.3 bits of information flow to tracking monetary policy. Less attention gets allocated to tracking monetary policy compared with the case when households had perfect information. The expected per-period loss in profits due to imperfect tracking of aggregate technology is approximately unaffected. The expected per-period loss in profits due to imperfect tracking of monetary policy falls to 0.02 percent of the firm's steady state output. Each household allocates 0.34 bits of information flow to tracking aggregate technology and 0.18 bits of information flow to tracking monetary policy. The expected per-period loss in utility due to imperfect tracking of aggregate technology equals 0.03 percent of the household's steady state composite consumption. The expected per-period loss in utility due to imperfect tracking of monetary policy also equals 0.03 percent of the household's steady state composite consumption.

Figures 7 and 8 show equilibrium impulse responses of the price level, inflation, consumption, and the nominal interest rate (black lines with asterisks). For comparison, the figures also include impulse responses of the same variables at the fixed point when decision-makers in firms have limited attention and households have perfect information (green lines with circles). When we add rational inattention by households, the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock change considerably, despite the fact that the utility loss from sub-optimal behavior is very small and the marginal value of information flow is very low. The response of the price level to a monetary policy shock becomes more dampened. The response of inflation to a monetary policy shock becomes more persistent. The response of consumption to a monetary policy shock becomes hump-shaped. See Figure 7. Adding rational inattention by households has only a small effect on the impulse responses to an aggregate technology shock. See Figure 8. One reason is that households allocate twice more attention to tracking aggregate technology than to tracking monetary policy.

## 10 Conclusion

We have solved a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which decision-makers in firms and households have limited attention and decide how to allocate their attention. In contrast to the existing literature on rational inattention, we solve a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. In contrast to the existing literature on business cycle models with imperfect information, the information structure is the outcome of an optimization problem.

The impulse responses of prices under rational inattention on the side of decision-makers in firms have several properties of empirical impulse responses: (i) the price level responds slowly to monetary policy shocks, (ii) the price level responds faster to aggregate technology shocks, and (iii) prices respond very fast to disaggregate shocks.<sup>11</sup> These impulse responses imply that profit losses due to deviations of the actual price from the profit-maximizing price are an order of magnitude smaller than in the Calvo model that generates the same real effects.

The impulse response of consumption to a monetary policy shock under rational inattention on the side of households looks similar to the impulse response of consumption to a monetary policy disturbance in a model with habit formation.

These results suggest that the slow responses of prices and consumption to monetary policy shocks that are usually modeled with a Calvo price-setting friction and habit formation may have a different origin.

---

<sup>11</sup>For empirical evidence on the response of the price level to aggregate technology shocks, see Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004). For empirical evidence on the response of prices to disaggregate shocks, see Boivin, Giannoni, and Mihov (2007) and Maćkowiak, Moench, and Wiederholt (2009).

## A Proof of Proposition 1

First, we introduce notation. Let  $x_t$  denote the vector of variables appearing in the real profit function  $f$  that the firm can affect

$$x'_t = \left( \hat{p}_{it} \quad \hat{l}_{i1t} \quad \cdots \quad \hat{l}_{i(J-1)t} \right). \quad (115)$$

Let  $z_t$  denote the vector of variables appearing in the real profit function  $f$  that the firm takes as given

$$z'_t = \left( a_t \quad a_{it} \quad c_{1t} \quad \cdots \quad c_{Jt} \quad \tilde{w}_{1t} \quad \cdots \quad \tilde{w}_{Jt} \right). \quad (116)$$

Second, we compute a quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of profits (40) at the non-stochastic steady state. Let  $\tilde{f}$  denote the second-order Taylor approximation to  $f$  at the non-stochastic steady state. We have

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{i,-1} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \tilde{f}(x_t, z_t) \right] \\ &= E_{i,-1} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( f(0,0) + h'_x x_t + h'_z z_t + \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_x x_t + x'_t H_{xz} z_t + \frac{1}{2} z'_t H_z z_t \right) \right], \end{aligned} \quad (117)$$

where  $h_x$  is the vector of first derivatives of  $f$  with respect to  $x_t$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state,  $h_z$  is the vector of first derivatives of  $f$  with respect to  $z_t$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state,  $H_x$  is the matrix of second derivatives of  $f$  with respect to  $x_t$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state,  $H_z$  is the matrix of second derivatives of  $f$  with respect to  $z_t$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state, and  $H_{xz}$  is the matrix of second derivatives of  $f$  with respect to  $x_t$  and  $z_t$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state. Third, we rewrite equation (117) using condition (45). Let  $v_t$  denote the following vector

$$v'_t = \left( x'_t \quad z'_t \quad 1 \right), \quad (118)$$

and let  $v_{m,t}$  denote the  $m$ th element of  $v_t$ . Condition (45) implies that

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{i,-1} \left| f(0,0) + h'_x x_t + h'_z z_t + \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_x x_t + x'_t H_{xz} z_t + \frac{1}{2} z'_t H_z z_t \right| < \infty. \quad (119)$$

It follows that one can rewrite equation (117) as

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{i,-1} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \tilde{f}(x_t, z_t) \right] \\ &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{i,-1} \left[ f(0, 0) + h'_x x_t + h'_z z_t + \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_x x_t + x'_t H_{xz} z_t + \frac{1}{2} z'_t H_z z_t \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (120)$$

See Rao (1973), p. 111. Condition (45) also implies that the infinite sum on the right-hand side of equation (120) converges to an element in  $\mathbb{R}$ . Fourth, we define the vector  $x_t^*$ . In each period  $t \geq 0$ , the vector  $x_t^*$  is defined by

$$h_x + H_x x_t^* + H_{xz} z_t = 0. \quad (121)$$

We will show below that  $H_x$  is an invertible matrix. Therefore, one can write the last equation as

$$x_t^* = -H_x^{-1} h_x - H_x^{-1} H_{xz} z_t. \quad (122)$$

Hence,  $x_t^*$  is uniquely determined and the vector  $v_t$  with  $x_t = x_t^*$  satisfies condition (45).

Fifth, equation (120) implies that

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{i,-1} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \tilde{f}(x_t, z_t) \right] - E_{i,-1} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \tilde{f}(x_t^*, z_t) \right] \\ &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{i,-1} \left[ h'_x (x_t - x_t^*) + \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_x x_t - \frac{1}{2} x_t^{*'} H_x x_t^* + (x_t - x_t^*)' H_{xz} z_t \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (123)$$

Using equation (121) to substitute for  $H_{xz} z_t$  in the last equation and rearranging yields

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{i,-1} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \tilde{f}(x_t, z_t) \right] - E_{i,-1} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \tilde{f}(x_t^*, z_t) \right] \\ &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{i,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} (x_t - x_t^*)' H_x (x_t - x_t^*) \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (124)$$

Sixth, we compute the vector of first derivatives and the matrices of second derivatives appearing in equations (122) and (124). Using equation (37) yields

$$h_x = 0, \quad (125)$$

$$H_x = -C_j^{-\gamma} \tilde{W} L_i \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\vartheta}{\alpha} \left(1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \vartheta\right) & 0 & \cdots & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{2}{\eta J} & \frac{1}{\eta J} & \cdots & \frac{1}{\eta J} \\ \vdots & \frac{1}{\eta J} & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \frac{1}{\eta J} \\ 0 & \frac{1}{\eta J} & \cdots & \frac{1}{\eta J} & \frac{2}{\eta J} \end{bmatrix}, \quad (126)$$

and

$$H_{xz} = C_j^{-\gamma} \tilde{W} L_i \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{\vartheta}{\alpha} \frac{1}{\alpha} & -\frac{\vartheta}{\alpha} \frac{1}{\alpha} & \frac{\vartheta}{\alpha} \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{1}{J} & \cdots & \frac{\vartheta}{\alpha} \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{1}{J} & \frac{\vartheta}{\alpha} \frac{1}{J} & \cdots & \cdots & \frac{\vartheta}{\alpha} \frac{1}{J} & \frac{\vartheta}{\alpha} \frac{1}{J} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & -\frac{1}{J} & 0 & \cdots & 0 & \frac{1}{J} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & 0 & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & 0 & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & -\frac{1}{J} & \frac{1}{J} \end{bmatrix}. \quad (127)$$

Seventh, substituting equations (125)-(127) into equation (121) yields the following system of  $J$  equations:

$$\hat{p}_{it}^* = \frac{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}}{1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \vartheta} \left( \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J c_{jt} \right) + \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \vartheta} \left( \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J \tilde{w}_{jt} \right) - \frac{\frac{1}{\alpha}}{1 + \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \vartheta} (a_t + a_{it}), \quad (128)$$

and

$$\forall j \neq J : \hat{l}_{ijt}^* + \sum_{k=1}^{J-1} \hat{l}_{ikt}^* = -\eta (\tilde{w}_{jt} - \tilde{w}_{Jt}). \quad (129)$$

Finally, we rewrite equation (129). Summing equation (129) over all  $j \neq J$  yields

$$\sum_{j=1}^{J-1} \hat{l}_{ijt}^* = -\eta \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J \tilde{w}_{jt} + \eta \tilde{w}_{Jt}. \quad (130)$$

Substituting the last equation back into equation (129) yields

$$\forall j \neq J : \hat{l}_{ijt}^* = -\eta \left( \tilde{w}_{jt} - \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^J \tilde{w}_{jt} \right). \quad (131)$$

## B Proof of Proposition 2

First, we introduce notation. In each period  $t \geq 0$ , let  $x_t$  denote the vector of variables that appear in the period utility function (56) and that the household can affect in period  $t$

$$x_t' = \left( \tilde{b}_{jt} \quad \tilde{w}_{jt} \quad \hat{c}_{1jt} \quad \cdots \quad \hat{c}_{I-1jt} \right). \quad (132)$$

Furthermore, in each period  $t \geq 0$ , let  $z_t$  denote the vector of variables that appear in the period utility function (56) and that the household takes as given

$$z'_t = \begin{pmatrix} r_{t-1} & \pi_t & \tilde{w}_t & l_t & \tilde{d}_t & \tilde{t}_t & \hat{p}_{1t} & \cdots & \hat{p}_{It} \end{pmatrix}. \quad (133)$$

The one variable appearing in the period utility function (56) that is neither an element of  $x_t$  nor an element of  $z_t$  is the predetermined variable  $\tilde{b}_{jt-1}$ . For ease of exposition, we define the  $(1 + I)$ -dimensional column vector  $x_{-1}$  by

$$x'_{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} \tilde{b}_{j,-1} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (134)$$

Then, in each period  $t \geq 0$ , the predetermined variable  $\tilde{b}_{jt-1}$  is an element of  $x_{t-1}$ . Furthermore, let  $g$  denote the functional that is obtained by multiplying the period utility function (56) by  $\beta^t$  and summing over all  $t$  from zero to infinity, and let  $\tilde{g}$  denote the second-order Taylor approximation to  $g$  at the non-stochastic steady state. Finally, let  $E_{j,-1}$  denote the expectation operator conditioned on information of household  $j$  in period  $-1$ . Second, we compute a log-quadratic approximation to the expected discounted sum of period utility around the non-stochastic steady state. This yields

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{j,-1} [\tilde{g}(x_{-1}, x_0, z_0, x_1, z_1, x_2, z_2, \dots)] \\ = & E_{j,-1} \left[ \begin{array}{c} g(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, \dots) \\ + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \begin{pmatrix} h'_x x_t + h'_z z_t \\ + \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{x,-1} x_{t-1} + \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{x,0} x_t + \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{x,1} x_{t+1} \\ + \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{xz,0} z_t + \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{xz,1} z_{t+1} \\ + \frac{1}{2} z'_t H_{z,0} z_t + \frac{1}{2} z'_t H_{zx,-1} x_{t-1} + \frac{1}{2} z'_t H_{zx,0} x_t \end{pmatrix} \\ + \beta^{-1} (h'_{-1} x_{-1} + \frac{1}{2} x'_{-1} H_{-1} x_{-1} + \frac{1}{2} x'_{-1} H_{x,1} x_0 + \frac{1}{2} x'_{-1} H_{xz,1} z_0) \end{array} \right], \quad (135) \end{aligned}$$

where  $(\beta^t h_x)$  is the vector of first derivatives of  $g$  with respect to  $x_t$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state and  $(\beta^t h_z)$  is the vector of first derivatives of  $g$  with respect to  $z_t$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state. Furthermore,  $(\beta^t H_{x,\tau})$  is the matrix of second derivatives of  $g$  with respect to  $x_t$  and  $x_{t+\tau}$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state,  $(\beta^t H_{xz,\tau})$  is the matrix of second derivatives of  $g$  with respect to  $x_t$  and  $z_{t+\tau}$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state,  $(\beta^t H_{z,0})$  is the matrix of second derivatives of  $g$  with respect to  $z_t$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state, and  $(\beta^t H_{zx,\tau})$  is the matrix of

second derivatives of  $g$  with respect to  $z_t$  and  $x_{t+\tau}$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state. Finally,  $(\beta^{-1}h_{-1})$  is a  $(1+I)$ -dimensional column vector whose first element equals the first derivative of  $g$  with respect to  $\tilde{b}_{j,-1}$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state and  $(\beta^{-1}H_{-1})$  is a  $(1+I) \times (1+I)$  matrix whose upper left element equals the second derivative of  $g$  with respect to  $\tilde{b}_{j,-1}$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state. For the following three reasons, only certain quadratic terms appear on the right-hand side of equation (135): (i) for all  $t \geq 0$ , the vector of first derivatives of  $g$  with respect to  $x_t$  depends only on elements of  $x_{t-1}$ ,  $x_t$ ,  $x_{t+1}$ ,  $z_t$  and  $z_{t+1}$ , (ii) for all  $t \geq 0$ , the vector of first derivatives of  $g$  with respect to  $z_t$  depends only on elements of  $z_t$ ,  $x_{t-1}$  and  $x_t$ , and (iii) the first derivative of  $g$  with respect to  $\tilde{b}_{j,-1}$  depends only on elements of  $x_{-1}$ ,  $x_0$  and  $z_0$ . Furthermore, note that, when we write the vector of first derivatives of  $g$  with respect to  $x_t$  evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state as  $(\beta^t h_x)$ , we exploit the fact that this vector of first derivatives depends on  $t$  only through the multiplicative term  $\beta^t$ . Third, we rewrite equation (135) using conditions (61)-(63). For all  $t \geq 0$ , let  $v_t$  denote the following vector

$$v'_t = \begin{pmatrix} x'_t & z'_t & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad (136)$$

and for  $t = -1$ , let  $v_t$  denote a  $(8+2I)$ -dimensional column vector whose first element equals  $\tilde{b}_{j,-1}$  and all other elements equal zero. Let  $v_{m,t}$  denote the  $m$ th element of  $v_t$ . Condition (63) implies that, for all  $m$  and  $n$  and for  $\tau = 0, 1$ ,

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} |v_{m,t} v_{n,t+\tau}| < \infty. \quad (137)$$

Furthermore, condition (62) implies that condition (137) also holds for  $\tau = -1$ . It follows that, for all  $m$  and  $n$  and for  $\tau = 0, 1, -1$ ,

$$E_{j,-1} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t v_{m,t} v_{n,t+\tau} \right] = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [v_{m,t} v_{n,t+\tau}]. \quad (138)$$

See Rao (1973), p. 111. Conditions (62)-(63) also imply that the infinite sum on the right-hand side of equation (138) converges to an element in  $\mathbb{R}$ . Hence, conditions (62)-(63) imply

that one can rewrite equation (135) as

$$\begin{aligned}
& E_{j,-1} [\tilde{g}(x_{-1}, x_0, z_0, x_1, z_1, x_2, z_2, \dots)] \\
= & g(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, \dots) + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [h'_x x_t] + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [h'_z z_t] \\
& + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{x,-1} x_{t-1} \right] + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{x,0} x_t \right] \\
& + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{x,1} x_{t+1} \right] + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{xz,0} z_t \right] + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{xz,1} z_{t+1} \right] \\
& + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} z'_t H_{z,0} z_t \right] + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} z'_t H_{zx,-1} x_{t-1} \right] + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} z'_t H_{zx,0} x_t \right] \\
& + \beta^{-1} E_{j,-1} \left[ h'_{-1} x_{-1} + \frac{1}{2} x'_{-1} H_{-1} x_{-1} + \frac{1}{2} x'_{-1} H_{x,1} x_0 + \frac{1}{2} x'_{-1} H_{xz,1} z_0 \right], \tag{139}
\end{aligned}$$

and that each infinite sum on the right-hand side of equation (139) converges to an element in  $\mathbb{R}$ . Finally, conditions (61)-(62) ensure that also the term in the last line on the right-hand side of equation (139) is finite. Using  $H_{xz,0} = H'_{zx,0}$ ,  $H_{xz,1} = \beta H'_{zx,-1}$  and  $H_{x,1} = \beta H'_{x,-1}$  one can rewrite equation (139) as

$$\begin{aligned}
& E_{j,-1} [\tilde{g}(x_{-1}, x_0, z_0, x_1, z_1, x_2, z_2, \dots)] \\
= & g(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, \dots) + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [h'_x x_t] + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [h'_z z_t] \\
& + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} x'_t H_{x,0} x_t \right] + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [x'_t H_{x,1} x_{t+1}] + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [x'_t H_{xz,0} z_t] \\
& + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [x'_t H_{xz,1} z_{t+1}] + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} z'_t H_{z,0} z_t \right] \\
& + \beta^{-1} E_{j,-1} \left[ h'_{-1} x_{-1} + \frac{1}{2} x'_{-1} H_{-1} x_{-1} + x'_{-1} H_{x,1} x_0 + x'_{-1} H_{xz,1} z_0 \right]. \tag{140}
\end{aligned}$$

Fourth, we define the process  $\{x_t^*\}$ . Let  $E_t$  denote the expectation operator conditioned on the entire history of the economy up to and including period  $t$ . The process  $\{x_t^*\}$  is defined by the following three requirements: (i)  $x_{-1}^*$  is given by equation (134), (ii) in each period  $t \geq 0$ ,  $x_t^*$  satisfies

$$E_t [h_x + H_{x,-1} x_{t-1}^* + H_{x,0} x_t^* + H_{x,1} x_{t+1}^* + H_{xz,0} z_t + H_{xz,1} z_{t+1}] = 0, \tag{141}$$

and (iii) the vector  $v_t$  with  $x_t = x_t^*$  satisfies conditions (61)-(63). Fifth, we derive a result that we will use below. Multiplying equation (141) by  $(x_t - x_t^*)'$  and using the fact that

$E_t$  is the expectation operator conditioned on the entire history of the economy up to and including period  $t$  yields

$$E_t [(x_t - x_t^*)' (h_x + H_{x,-1}x_{t-1}^* + H_{x,0}x_t^* + H_{x,1}x_{t+1}^* + H_{xz,0}z_t + H_{xz,1}z_{t+1})] = 0. \quad (142)$$

Taking the expectation conditioned on information of household  $j$  in period  $t = -1$  and using the law of iterated expectations yields

$$E_{j,-1} [(x_t - x_t^*)' (h_x + H_{x,-1}x_{t-1}^* + H_{x,0}x_t^* + H_{x,1}x_{t+1}^* + H_{xz,0}z_t + H_{xz,1}z_{t+1})] = 0. \quad (143)$$

Rearranging the last equation yields

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{j,-1} [(x_t - x_t^*)' (h_x + H_{xz,0}z_t + H_{xz,1}z_{t+1})] \\ &= -E_{j,-1} [(x_t - x_t^*)' (H_{x,-1}x_{t-1}^* + H_{x,0}x_t^* + H_{x,1}x_{t+1}^*)]. \end{aligned} \quad (144)$$

Sixth, it follows from equation (140) that

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{j,-1} [\tilde{g}(x_{-1}, x_0, z_0, x_1, z_1, x_2, z_2, \dots)] - E_{j,-1} [\tilde{g}(x_{-1}^*, x_0^*, z_0, x_1^*, z_1, x_2^*, z_2, \dots)] \\ &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} x_t' H_{x,0} x_t + x_t' H_{x,1} x_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2} x_t^{*'} H_{x,0} x_t^* - x_t^{*'} H_{x,1} x_{t+1}^* \right] \\ &+ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [(x_t - x_t^*)' (h_x + H_{xz,0}z_t + H_{xz,1}z_{t+1})] \\ &+ \beta^{-1} E_{j,-1} \left[ h_{-1}' x_{-1} + \frac{1}{2} x_{-1}' H_{-1} x_{-1} + x_{-1}' H_{x,1} x_0 + x_{-1}' H_{xz,1} z_0 \right] \\ &- \beta^{-1} E_{j,-1} \left[ h_{-1}' x_{-1}^* + \frac{1}{2} x_{-1}^{*'} H_{-1} x_{-1}^* + x_{-1}^{*'} H_{x,1} x_0^* + x_{-1}^{*'} H_{xz,1} z_0 \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (145)$$

Substituting  $x_{-1}^* = x_{-1}$  and equation (144) into equation (145) yields

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{j,-1} [\tilde{g}(x_{-1}, x_0, z_0, x_1, z_1, x_2, z_2, \dots)] - E_{j,-1} [\tilde{g}(x_{-1}^*, x_0^*, z_0, x_1^*, z_1, x_2^*, z_2, \dots)] \\ &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} x_t' H_{x,0} x_t + x_t' H_{x,1} x_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2} x_t^{*'} H_{x,0} x_t^* - x_t^{*'} H_{x,1} x_{t+1}^* \right] \\ &- \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [(x_t - x_t^*)' (H_{x,-1}x_{t-1}^* + H_{x,0}x_t^* + H_{x,1}x_{t+1}^*)] \\ &+ \beta^{-1} E_{j,-1} [x_{-1}' H_{x,1} (x_0 - x_0^*)]. \end{aligned}$$

Rearranging the right-hand side of the last equation using (i)  $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} [x_t' H_{x,\tau} x_{t+\tau}^*]$  converges to an element in  $\mathbb{R}$  for  $\tau = 0, 1, -1$ , (ii)  $H_{x,1} = \beta H'_{x,-1}$ , and (iii)  $x_{-1}^* = x_{-1}$  yields

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{j,-1} [\tilde{g}(x_{-1}, x_0, z_0, x_1, z_1, x_2, z_2, \dots)] - E_{j,-1} [\tilde{g}(x_{-1}^*, x_0^*, z_0, x_1^*, z_1, x_2^*, z_2, \dots)] \\ &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t E_{j,-1} \left[ \frac{1}{2} (x_t - x_t^*)' H_{x,0} (x_t - x_t^*) + (x_t - x_t^*)' H_{x,1} (x_{t+1} - x_{t+1}^*) \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (146)$$

Seventh, we compute the vector of first derivatives and the matrices of second derivatives appearing in equations (141) and (146). This yields

$$h'_x = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad (147)$$

$$H_{x,0} = -C_j^{1-\gamma} \begin{bmatrix} \gamma\omega_B^2 \left(1 + \frac{1}{\beta}\right) & \gamma\omega_B\zeta\omega_W & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \gamma\omega_B\zeta\omega_W & \zeta\omega_W (\gamma\zeta\omega_W + 1 + \zeta\psi) & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \frac{2}{\theta I} & \dots & \frac{1}{\theta I} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \frac{1}{\theta I} & \dots & \frac{2}{\theta I} \end{bmatrix}, \quad (148)$$

$$H_{x,1} = C_j^{1-\gamma} \begin{bmatrix} \gamma\omega_B^2 & \gamma\omega_B\zeta\omega_W & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (149)$$

$$H_{x,-1} = \frac{1}{\beta} H'_{x,1}, \quad (150)$$

$$H_{xz,0} = C_j^{1-\gamma} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\gamma\omega_B^2}{\beta} & -\frac{\gamma\omega_B^2}{\beta} & \frac{\gamma\omega_B\zeta^2\omega_W}{\zeta-1} & & \frac{\gamma\omega_B\zeta\omega_W}{(\zeta-1)} \\ \frac{\gamma\omega_B\zeta\omega_W}{\beta} & -\frac{\gamma\omega_B\zeta\omega_W}{\beta} & \zeta^2\omega_W \left( \frac{\gamma\zeta\omega_W}{\zeta-1} + \psi \right) & & \zeta\omega_W \left( \frac{\gamma\zeta\omega_W}{\zeta-1} + \psi \right) \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & & 0 \\ \gamma\omega_B\omega_D & -\gamma\omega_B\omega_T & \frac{\omega_B(1-\gamma)}{I} & \dots & \frac{\omega_B(1-\gamma)}{I} & \frac{\omega_B(1-\gamma)}{I} \\ \gamma\zeta\omega_W\omega_D & -\gamma\zeta\omega_W\omega_T & \frac{\zeta\omega_W(1-\gamma)}{I} & \dots & \frac{\zeta\omega_W(1-\gamma)}{I} & \frac{\zeta\omega_W(1-\gamma)}{I} \\ 0 & 0 & -\frac{1}{I} & \dots & 0 & \frac{1}{I} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & -\frac{1}{I} & \frac{1}{I} \end{bmatrix}, \quad (151)$$

$$H_{xz,1} = C_j^{1-\gamma} \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{\gamma\omega_B^2}{\beta} + \omega_B & \frac{\gamma\omega_B^2}{\beta} - \omega_B & -\frac{\gamma\omega_B\zeta^2\omega_W}{\zeta-1} & & -\frac{\gamma\omega_B\zeta\omega_W}{(\zeta-1)} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & & 0 \\ -\gamma\omega_B\omega_D & \gamma\omega_B\omega_T & -\frac{\omega_B(1-\gamma)}{I} & \dots & -\frac{\omega_B(1-\gamma)}{I} & -\frac{\omega_B(1-\gamma)}{I} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (152)$$

Eighth, substituting equations (147)-(152) into equation (141) yields the following system of  $1 + I$  equations:

$$c_{jt}^* = E_t \left[ -\frac{1}{\gamma} \left( r_t - \pi_{t+1} - \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I (\hat{p}_{it+1} - \hat{p}_{it}) \right) + c_{jt+1}^* \right], \quad (153)$$

$$\tilde{w}_{jt}^* = \frac{\gamma}{1 + \zeta\psi} c_{jt}^* + \frac{\psi}{1 + \zeta\psi} (\zeta\tilde{w}_t + l_t) + \frac{1}{1 + \zeta\psi} \left( \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I \hat{p}_{it} \right), \quad (154)$$

and

$$\forall i \neq I : \hat{c}_{ijt}^* + \sum_{k=1}^{I-1} \hat{c}_{kjt}^* = -\theta (\hat{p}_{it} - \hat{p}_{It}). \quad (155)$$

Here the variable  $c_{jt}^*$  is defined by

$$\begin{aligned} c_{jt}^* &= \frac{\omega_B}{\beta} \left( r_{t-1} - \pi_t + \tilde{b}_{jt-1}^* \right) - \omega_B \tilde{b}_{jt}^* + \frac{\zeta}{\zeta - 1} \omega_W \left[ (1 - \zeta) \tilde{w}_{jt}^* + \zeta \tilde{w}_t + l_t \right] \\ &\quad + \omega_D \tilde{d}_t - \omega_T \tilde{t}_t - \left( \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I \hat{p}_{it} \right). \end{aligned} \quad (156)$$

Finally, we rewrite equation (155). Summing equation (155) over all  $i \neq I$  yields

$$\sum_{i=1}^{I-1} \hat{c}_{ijt}^* = -\theta \left( \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I \hat{p}_{it} - \hat{p}_{It} \right).$$

Substituting the last equation back into equation (155) yields

$$\forall i \neq I : \hat{c}_{ijt}^* = -\theta \left( \hat{p}_{it} - \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I \hat{p}_{it} \right). \quad (157)$$

## C Solution under perfect information

First, the price setting equation (48) and equations (72), (74), (75) and (12) imply that

$$0 = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} c_t + \tilde{w}_t - \frac{1}{\alpha} a_t.$$

Second, the wage setting equation (68) and equations (72), (74) and (75) imply that

$$\tilde{w}_t = \gamma c_t + \psi l_t.$$

Third, the production function (78) and equations (71), (73) and (12) imply that

$$y_t = a_t + \alpha l_t.$$

Fourth, equation (71) and equations  $y_{it} = c_{it}$ , (76),  $c_{ijt} = \hat{c}_{ijt} + c_{jt}$ , (69), (72) and (74) imply that

$$y_t = c_t.$$

Solving the last four equations for the endogenous variables  $y_t$ ,  $c_t$ ,  $l_t$  and  $\tilde{w}_t$  yields equations (80)-(82). Fifth, the consumption Euler equation (67) and equations (72) and (74) imply that

$$c_t = E_t \left[ -\frac{1}{\gamma} (r_t - \pi_{t+1}) + c_{t+1} \right].$$





Substituting the solution for  $c_t$  into the last equation yields equation (83). Sixth, the optimality condition (69) and equation (74) imply equation (84). Note that the price elasticity of demand satisfies  $\vartheta = \theta$ . Seventh, the price setting equation (48) and equations (72), (75), (80), (82) and  $\vartheta = \theta$  imply equation (85). Eighth, the optimality condition (49) and equation (75) imply equation (86). Ninth, when all households have the same initial bond holdings and the bond sequence for each household is non-explosive (i.e.  $\lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} E_t \left[ \beta^{s+1} \left( \tilde{b}_{j,t+s+1} - \tilde{b}_{j,t+s} \right) \right] = 0$ ), equations (67)-(70) have a unique solution for consumption that is identical for all households. The wage setting equation (68) then implies that all households set the same wage. It follows from equation (75) that  $(\tilde{w}_{jt} - \tilde{w}_t) = 0$ .

## References

- [1] Altig, David, Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum and Jesper Linde (2004): “Firm-Specific Capital, Nominal Rigidities and the Business Cycle.” NBER Working Paper 11034.
- [2] Boivin, Jean, Marc Giannoni and Ilian Mihov (2007): “Sticky Prices and Monetary Policy: Evidence from Disaggregated U.S. Data.” *American Economic Review*, forthcoming.
- [3] Klenow, Peter J. and Oleksiy Kryvtsov (2008): “State-Dependent or Time-Dependent Pricing: Does It Matter for Recent U.S. Inflation?” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3), 863-904.
- [4] Klenow, Peter J. and Jonathan L. Willis (2007): “Sticky Information and Sticky Prices.” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 54 (sup. 1), 79-99 .
- [5] Lucas, Robert E. Jr. (1972): “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money.” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 4(2): 103-124.
- [6] Luo, Yulei (2008): “Consumption Dynamics under Information Processing Constraints.” *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 11: 366-385.
- [7] Lorenzoni, Guido (2008): “A Theory of Demand Shocks.” *American Economic Review*, forthcoming.
- [8] Maćkowiak, Bartosz, Emanuel Moench and Mirko Wiederholt (2009): “Sectoral Price Data and Models of Price Setting.” Discussion paper, European Central Bank, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Northwestern University.
- [9] Maćkowiak, Bartosz and Mirko Wiederholt (2008): “Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention.” *American Economic Review*, forthcoming.
- [10] Mankiw, N. Gregory and Ricardo Reis (2002): “Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4): 1295-1328.

- [11] Midrigan, Virgiliu (2006): “Menu Costs, Multi-Product Firms and Aggregate Fluctuations.” Discussion paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- [12] Nakamura, Emi and Jón Steinsson (2008): “Five Facts About Prices: A Reevaluation of Menu Cost Models.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(4), 1415-1464.
- [13] Paciello, Luigi (2008): “The Response of Prices to Technology and Monetary Policy Shocks under Rational Inattention.” Discussion paper, Northwestern University.
- [14] Sims, Christopher A. (2003): “Implications of Rational Inattention.” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 50(3), 665-690.
- [15] Sims, Christopher A. (2006): “Rational Inattention: Beyond the Linear-Quadratic Case.” *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, 96(2): 158-163.
- [16] Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn and Laura Veldkamp (2008): “Information Acquisition and Under-Diversification.” Discussion paper, New York University.
- [17] Woodford, Michael (2002): “Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy.” In *Knowledge, Information, and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps*, ed. Philippe Aghion et al. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- [18] Woodford, Michael (2003): *Interest and Prices. Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- [19] Woodford, Michael (2008): “Information-Constrained State-Dependent Pricing.” Discussion paper, Columbia University.

**Figure 1: Impulse responses, benchmark economy**



**Figure 2: Impulse responses, benchmark economy**
















Figure 3: Impulse response of an individual price to a firm-specific productivity shock





**Figure 4: Impulse responses, benchmark economy and the Calvo model**







**Figure 5: Impulse responses, benchmark economy and the Calvo model**



**Figure 6: Impulse responses, household problem**



**Figure 7: Impulse responses, benchmark economy**



**Figure 8: Impulse responses, benchmark economy**

