Department of Economics

4-101 Hanson Hall

1925 Fourth Street South

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455

U.S.A

(612) 625-6353

(612) 624-0209 FAX

Placement Director

 Fabrizio Perri

 (612) 625-7504   or

 (612) 204-5526

 fperri@umn.edu

Placement Coordinator

 Catherine Bach

 (612) 625-6859

 c-bach@umn.edu

Curriculum Vitae

Fall 2011

MARYAM SAEEDI

Personal Data

Address

4-101 Hanson Hall

1925 Fourth Street South

Minneapolis, MN 55455

Telephone Numbers:

Citizenship: Iran, Canadian Permanent Resident

Major Fields of Concentration

Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics, Game Theory

Education

Degree

Field

Institution

Year

Ph.D.

Economics

University of Minnesota (expected)

2012

M.A.

Economics

University of British Columbia

2005

B.S.

Mechanical Engineering

Sharif University of Technology

2004

Dissertation

Title: “Essays on Reputation”

Dissertation Advisor: Professor Patrick Bajari

Expected Completion: Summer 2012

References

Professor Patrick Bajari

(612)625-8369

bajari@umn.edu

Department of Economics University of Minnesota

4-101 Hanson Hall

1925 Fourth Street South

Minneapolis, MN 55455

Professor Thomas Holmes

(612) 625-4512

holmes@umn.edu

Professor Amil Petrin

(612) 625-0145

petrin@umn.edu

Dr. Neel Sundaresan

(408) 239-3165

nsundaresan@ebay.com

eBay Research Labs

2065 Hamilton Avenue

San Jose, CA   95125

Honors and Awards

2010

Gross Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

2010

Graduate Research Partnership Program Fellowship, Graduate School, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

2009

Third Place, Hardy Third Year Paper Competition, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

2005

A.D. Scott Fellowship in Economics, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia.

2004

University Graduate Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia.

2001

Second Prize, International Mathematical Competition, Czech Republic.

2000

Gold Medal, National Mathematical Olympiad.

Teaching Experience

Summer 2009

Instructor, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Instructor for the Graduate Numerical Methods Course.

2006 - 2007

Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Led recitation sections for Principles of Microeconomics

2004 - 2005

Teaching Assistant,  Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia. Teaching Assistant for Applied Economics, Honors International Microeconomics and Empirical Problems in Economics.

Research Experience

2011 - Present

Research Intern, eBay Research Lab, eBay Inc.

2008 - 2010

Research Analyst, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

2007 - 2008

Research Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.  Research assistant to Patrick Bajari.

2005

Research Assistant, Department of Economics,  University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia.

Work in Progress

 “Reputation and Adverse Selection: Theory and Evidence from eBay”

“Estimating Repeated Games,” with Ali Shourideh

“To Be Top Rated or Not: An Analysis of eBay’s Reputation System,” with Zeqian Shen and Neel Sundaresan

Computer Skills

C, C++, Fortran, Python, Perl, Bash Scripting, MATLAB, STATA, SAS

Languages

English (fluent), Farsi (native), French (basic), Arabic (basic)

Abstracts

“Reputation and Adverse Selection: Theory and Evidence from eBay,” job market paper

As shown by many authors, adverse selection among sellers on eBay is very common, and ever since Ackerlof (1970), it is known that adverse selection can hinder trade. In this paper, I study how actors in a marketplace can introduce mechanisms to overcome adverse selection, and I focus on one mechanism employed by eBay: seller’s reputation. Using a unique data set that follows sellers on eBay over time, I show that reputation, according to various measures, is a major determinant of variations in prices of homogeneous goods sold on eBay (iPods in particular.) Inspired by this observation, I develop a model of firm dynamics where firms have heterogeneous qualities that are unobservable by consumers. Reputation is used as a signal of private information to buyers in order to improve allocations. I structurally estimate this model to uncover deep parameters of buyers’ utility and sellers’ costs as well as their unobservable qualities. The estimated model suggests that reputation has a positive effect on the expected profits of high quality sellers as well as their survival probability. Various counterfactuals have been performed to establish the value of reputation. Removing reputation mechanisms put in place by eBay will increase the profits of low quality sellers and will decrease the profits of high quality sellers. Moreover, removing reputation mechanisms significantly increases entry by low quality sellers. Finally, consumer welfare is significantly improved as a result of the reputation mechanism.

“To Be Top Rated or Not: An Analysis of eBay’s Reputation System,” with Zeqian Shen and Neel Sundaresan

Existence of adverse selection in lemon markets can lead to potential breakdown of trading or high inefficiencies in a marketplace as noted by Akerlof [1970]. Reputation can be used as a possible mechanism in mitigating lemon problems, resolving the inefficiencies caused by asymmetric information and help the marketplace to thrive. eBay, as a lemon market, was propped by a transparent reputation mechanism. eBay has, over years, adopted policies that it believes will ensure the functionality of the market. The goal of this paper is to study the use of feedback as a reputation mechanism over the life of eBay and also understand the possible effects of the policy changes on participation and the participants.