Econ 8503 Graduate Labor Economics

Syllabus under preparation

Spring 2005
Department of Economics, University of Minnesota

Time:
Tu-Th 9:45-11:25
Location: ??
Instructor: Andrea Moro
Office: 947 Heller Hall
Phone: 625 8369
Hours: by appointment
E-mail: amoro@econ.umn.edu
Home: http://www.econ.umn.edu/~amoro/Teaching/gradlaborsyl.html

Overview

The goal of the course is to provide students with examples of frontier research in economics. Hopefully, this will allow students to (a) understand what economics as a social science intends to accomplish (b) distinguish between good and bad economics (c) find a dissertation idea. I will accomplish my objective by illustrating a few topics I am interested in. I will mainly cover the theory and estimation of human capital models. Theory and Empirical research will receive approximately the same class time, unless there is a strong preference for a different allocation among students.

I will focus on (1) different theories of labor market discrimination, based on taste, human capital, signaling and search frictions, and on (2) the empirical and theoretical debate regarding human capital vs signaling explanations for labor market differentials. This will give me a chance to focus on the rather esoteric yet fascinating topic of (3) estimating models with multiple equilibria. We will also cover (4) the effects of policies such as affirmative action and racial profiling.

Assignments and grading policies

Students will be required to complete a couple of problem sets, give an in-class presentation and of a paper from a list that I will provide and write referee reports on the papers presented in class.

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Outline

  1. Theories of Discrimination
    1. Taste discrimination:
      • Becker, G. The Economics of Discrimination, 1957
    2. Statistical theories based on informational imperfection: Phelps, Aigner and Cain:
    3. Educational Signaling:
    4. Statistical theories based on human capital:
    5. Statistical theories based on search frictions:
    6. Policy: Affirmative action and Racial Profiling
    7. Dynamic Models:
  2. The empirical evidence of discrimination
  3. The estimation of models with multiple equilibria
    • Bisin, Moro and Topa: "The empirical implications of models with multiple equilibria"
    • Aguirregabiria, Victor and Pedro Mira: "Sequential Simulated-Based Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games", mimeo, July 2002
    • Additional readings:
      • Tamer, Elie "Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria" Review of Economic Studies, 2002.
      • Bresnahan T. and Reiss P. "Empirical Models of Discrete Games" Journal of Econometrics1991, 57-81
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Student presentations

Each student should pick a paper from this list and prepare transparencies for an in-class presentation. All students must write referee reports on all papers presented.

Other readings

Related books::

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