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Curriculum Vitae Fall 2009

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Major Fields of Concentration

Economic Theory, Game Theory

Education

<i>Degree</i>	<i>Field</i>	<i>Institution</i>	<i>Year</i>
Ph.D.	Economics	University of Minnesota (expected)	2010
M.A.	Economics	University of Minnesota	2009
Diplom	Economics	University of Mannheim	2004
Vordiplom	Economics	University of Passau	2001

Dissertation

Title: "Robust Implementation in Dynamic Mechanisms"

Dissertation Advisor: Professor Kim-Sau Chung

Expected Completion: May 2010

References

Professor Kim-Sau Chung	(612) 624-4060 sau@umn.edu	Department of Economics University of Minnesota 4-101 Hanson Hall 1925 Fourth Street South Minneapolis, MN 55455
Professor David Rahman	(612) 625-3525 dmr@umn.edu	
Professor Itai Sher	(612) 626-9675 isher@umn.edu	
Professor Jan Werner	(612) 625-0708 jwerner@econ.umn.edu	

Honors and Awards

- 2009 - 2010 Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, Graduate School, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
2005 Summer Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Teaching Experience

- Spring 2006, *Teaching Assistant*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
2004 - 2005 Led recitation sections for graduate level sequence in *Microeconomic Analysis*, and for undergraduate *Principles of Microeconomics* and *Principles of Macroeconomics*.
Fall 2005 *Instructor*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Taught *Intermediate Microeconomics*.

Research Experience

- 2009 - 2010 *Visiting Scholar*, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
2006 - 2009 *Research Analyst*, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Papers

“Robust Virtual Implementation under Common Strong Belief in Rationality”

Work in Progress

“Belief Revision Independent Robust Implementation”

Presentations

“Robust Virtual Implementation in Extensive Form Mechanisms,” presented at Workshop: Information and Dynamic Mechanism Design, Hausdorff Research Institute for Mathematics, Bonn (June 2009); SED Annual Meeting, Istanbul (July 2009); Econometric Society European Meeting, Barcelona (August 2009).

Professional Activities

Referee for *Games and Economic Behavior*

Computer Skills

Maple, Matlab, Pascal, WinRATS

Languages

German (native), English (fluent), Spanish (beginner)

Dissertation Abstract

“Robust Virtual Implementation under Common Strong Belief in Rationality”

Robust virtual implementation asks if a social goal can be approximately achieved if merely the agents' rationality is common knowledge. Bergemann and Morris (2009) show that static mechanisms can robustly virtually implement essentially no social goal if preferences are sufficiently interdependent. Without any knowledge of how agents revise their beliefs this impossibility result extends to dynamic mechanisms, and focusing on static mechanisms is without loss of generality. In contrast, this paper shows that excluding dynamic mechanisms entails considerable loss of generality if agents commonly believe in rationality "as long as possible". We illustrate this in private consumption environments with discrete payoff types and generic valuation functions. In such environments, dynamic mechanisms can robustly virtually implement all ex-post incentive compatible social goals regardless of the level of preference interdependence. This result derives from the key insight that under common strong belief in rationality (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002), dynamic mechanisms can almost always distinguish all payoff type profiles by their strategic choices. Notably, dynamic mechanisms can robustly virtually implement the efficient allocation of an object even if static mechanisms cannot.