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Curriculum Vitae Fall 2008

EVSEN TURKAY

Personal Data

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Major Fields of Concentration

Game Theory, Information Economics, Law and Economics, Microeconomic Theory, Financial Economics

Education

<i>Degree</i>	<i>Field</i>	<i>Institution</i>	<i>Year</i>
Ph.D.	Economics	University of Minnesota (expected)	2009
M.A.	Economics	University of Minnesota	2008
B.A.	Economics (Honors)	Bogazici University	2003

Dissertation

Title: "Two Sided Uncertainty in Persuasion Games"

Dissertation Advisor: Professor Marcel K. Richter and Professor Jan Werner

Expected Completion: Summer 2009

References

Professor Jan Werner	(612) 625-0708 jwerner@econ.umn.edu	Department of Economics University of Minnesota 4-101 Hanson Hall 1925 Fourth Street South
Professor Marcel K. Richter	(612) 625-7832 richter@econ.umn.edu	
Professor Itai Sher	(612) 626-9675 isher@umn.edu	
Dr. Simran Sahi	(612) 625-6353 ssahi@econ.umn.edu	

Honors and Awards

- 2008 Travel Grant, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Summer 2007 Seminar Grant, 18th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory
Summer 2007 Travel Grant, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Summer 2006 Seminar Grant, 17th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory
2003 Graduated with Honors, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey.

Teaching Experience

- 2004 - Present *Instructor*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Taught *Industrial Organization and Antitrust Policy*, *Intermediate Microeconomics*, *Principles of Macroeconomics*, and *Principles of Microeconomics*. Prepared lectures, homework assignments, and answer keys.
- Fall 2005 *Teaching Associate*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Led recitations for graduate-level *Microeconomic Analysis*.
- 2003 - 2004 *Teaching Assistant*, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Led recitations for *Principles of Microeconomics* and *Principles of Macroeconomics*.
- 2002 - 2003 *Undergraduate Teaching Assistant*, Department of Economics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey. Led recitation sections for *Public Economics*.

Papers

“Two Sided Uncertainty in Persuasion Games: Theory”

“Two Sided Uncertainty in Persuasion Games: Disclosure and Punishment”

Presentations

“Two Sided Uncertainty in Persuasion Games” presented at Midwest Theory and Trade Meetings Fall 2008, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, October 3-5, 2008; 18th Summer School in Economic Theory: Economic Aspects of Communication and Information, The Victor Rothschild Memorial Symposium, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, June 12-20, 2007 (poster presentation); 17th Summer School in Economic Theory: Law and Economics, The Victor Rothschild Memorial Symposium, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, June 18-27, 2006 (poster presentation).

Computer Skills

Mathematica, LaTeX, HTML

Languages

Turkish (native), English (fluent)

Dissertation Abstract

"Two Sided Uncertainty in Persuasion Games"

I study a communication game where a speaker sends costless but verifiable messages in order to persuade a listener to take an action that is favorable for the speaker. The speaker is uncertain about the preferences of the listener. This paper explores two possible tools that can be used for information extraction in such a game. The first tool is the uncertainty about the listener's preferences (type) that may be maintained or removed. Another tool is to change the scale of actions, for example increasing or decreasing legal punishment. First, in a persuasion game in which the listener has two possible types and two actions to choose from, I show that when one of the listener's types is more likely, the equilibrium speaker strategies are a subset of those that arise when the speaker knows the listener's type. Further, I show that among the equilibria that deliver the highest expected utility to the more likely type when there is certainty, there is always one that remains in the set of equilibria under uncertainty. These results imply that maintaining uncertainty can be a useful tool only for the less likely type. To analyze the effect of the second tool, I study a legal application of persuasion games with two sided uncertainty. A defendant (speaker) is trying to persuade a judge by presenting evidence to take a favorable legal action rather than less favorable ones on his case. I show that the equilibrium disclosure of the defendant is not affected by a change in the scale of legal actions when there is no uncertainty on how the judge evaluates evidence. With uncertainty, however, the defendant can be induced to disclose more information by decreasing the severity of the most unfavorable legal action relative to the favorable one.