Research

 Labor market and Schooling Choice: Italy vs US (JOB MARKET PAPER)

The aim of this paper is to study the effect of labor market institutions on schooling choice. I develop a search model where workers' heterogeneous abilities and labor market structure endogenously determine college wage premium and college decisions. Higher labor mobility and higher wage dispersion increase worker's probability to reach the right tail of the wage distribution. This increases agents' incentive to shift the wage distribution to the right, and they can do that by attending college.The model fits US and Italian data, two countries that present wide differences in educational achievements. Specifically, the US presents a larger college premium, higher enrollment and graduation rates in college. I find that the labor markets in US and Italy differ significantly in two dimensions. The US is characterized by higher job mobility and higher return of innate ability. The former accounts for around 30% of the different enrollment and graduation rates. The latter rises the observed college premium in US above Italy, despite the effect of schooling on wage being higher in Italy, and can account for almost 50% of differences in educational  attainment.

 European Union Membership, labor disputes and employment protection (coming soon)

 This paper develops a model of voluntary union membership, where unions provide excludable employment protection to members, by supporting them in case of dismissal conflicts and enforcing higher firing costs. In Europe, where closed shops are exceptional and often unconstitutional, membership rates significantly vary across countries. When calibrated to match the features of labor markets in different European countries, the model is able to account for both heterogeneity of membership rates across Europe and the pattern of (de)unionization observed in the 90s. Specifically I find that membership rates i) are low in countries where public employment protection is stronger, and/or available to a wider fraction of workers; ii) decrease when low unemployment duration reduces the welfare loss of a dismissal.

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