

Border Lecture

Anderson and van Wincoop: Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle

- Start with McCallum (1995). Shipment data from Canadian provinces to other provinces and to U.S. states

$$\ln x_{ij} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 \ln h_i + \alpha_3 \ln y_j + \alpha_4 \ln d_{ij} + \alpha_5 \delta_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where

- x_{ij} : exports from region i to j
- y_i and y_j : gross domestic production at i and j
- d_{ij} : distance i to j
- δ_{ij} : dummy=1, province/province, =0, state/province

- McCallum adds atheoretic “remoteness” variable (that will try to capture ideas in this paper)

$$REM_i = \sum_{m \neq j} \frac{d_{im}}{y_m}$$

- Results

- Notice large border coefficient for Canada. 16.4! (similar to McCallum of 22)
- Notice that get something very different when do same exercise with US orginations
- Notice the slick why the paper is transitioned into unitary income elasticity.
- Notice adding REM doesn't change anything.

TABLE 1—McCALLUM REGRESSIONS

Data	McCallum regressions			Unitary income elasticities		
	(i) CA-CA CA-US	(ii) US-US CA-US	(iii) US-US CA-CA CA-US	(iv) CA-CA CA-US	(v) US-US CA-US	(vi) US-US CA-CA CA-US
Independent variable						
$\ln y_i$	1.22 (0.04)	1.13 (0.03)	1.13 (0.03)	1	1	1
$\ln y_j$	0.98 (0.03)	0.98 (0.02)	0.97 (0.02)	1	1	1
$\ln d_{ij}$	-1.35 (0.07)	-1.08 (0.04)	-1.11 (0.04)	-1.35 (0.07)	-1.09 (0.04)	-1.12 (0.03)
<i>Dummy-Canada</i>	2.80 (0.12)		2.75 (0.12)	2.63 (0.11)		2.66 (0.12)
<i>Dummy-U.S.</i>		0.41 (0.05)	0.40 (0.05)		0.49 (0.06)	0.48 (0.06)
<i>Border-Canada</i>	16.4 (2.0)		15.7 (1.9)	13.8 (1.6)		14.2 (1.6)
<i>Border-U.S.</i>		1.50 (0.08)	1.49 (0.08)		1.63 (0.09)	1.62 (0.09)
\bar{R}^2	0.76	0.85	0.85	0.53	0.47	0.55
Remoteness variables added						
<i>Border-Canada</i>	16.3 (2.0)		15.6 (1.9)	14.7 (1.7)		15.0 (1.8)
<i>Border-U.S.</i>		1.38 (0.07)	1.38 (0.07)		1.42 (0.08)	1.42 (0.08)
\bar{R}^2	0.77	0.86	0.86	0.55	0.50	0.57

Figure 1:

Model (Armington Model from Last Class)

- Utility of j is CES over location i goods,

$$U_j = \left(\sum_i \beta_i^{(1-\sigma)/\sigma} c_{ij}^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma} \right)^{\sigma/(\sigma-1)}$$

maximize subject to

$$\sum_i p_{ij} c_{ij} = y_j$$

- Endowment of good i at location i Trade costs $p_{ij} = p_i t_{ij}$.
Total income

$$y_i = \sum_j x_{ij}.$$

- To get total revenues from sales from location i to j , of course

$$Q_j = \frac{y_j}{P_j}$$

and demand per unit from i at j is $\beta_{ij} (\beta_{ij} p_{ij})^{-\sigma} P_j^\sigma$, so spending by j at i is

$$\begin{aligned} x_{ij} &= p_{ij} \beta_{ij} (\beta_{ij} p_{ij})^{-\sigma} P_j^\sigma \frac{y_j}{P_j} \\ &= \left(\frac{\beta_i p_i t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} y_j \end{aligned}$$

where we use $p_{ij} = p_i t_{ij}$. And as usual,

$$P_j = \left[\sum_i (\beta_i p_i t_{ij})^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

- General equilibrium

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_i &= \sum_j x_{ij} \\
 &= \sum_j \left(\frac{\beta_i p_i t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} y_j \\
 &= (\beta_i p_i)^{1-\sigma} \sum_j \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} y_j
 \end{aligned}$$

So solve out for $\beta_i p_i$

$$\left(\frac{y_i}{\sum_j \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} y_j} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} = \beta_i p_i$$

Then get the **gravity equation**

$$\begin{aligned}
 x_{ij} &= \left(\frac{\beta_i p_i t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} y_j = (\beta_i p_i)^{1-\sigma} \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} y_j \\
 &= \frac{y_i}{\sum_j \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} y_j} \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} y_j \\
 &= \frac{y_i y_j}{y^W} \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{\left[\sum_j \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} \frac{y_j}{y^W} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} \\
 &= \frac{y_i y_j}{y^W} \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{\prod_i P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)}
 \end{aligned}$$

for

$$\Pi_i \equiv \left(\sum_j \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{1-\sigma} \theta_j \right)^{1/(1-\sigma)}$$

We can substitute into the equilibrium scaled prices to get

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_j &= \left[\sum_i (\beta_i p_i t_{ij})^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
 &= \left[\sum_i (\beta_i p_i)^{1-\sigma} (t_{ij})^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
 &= \left[\sum_i \frac{y_i}{\sum_j \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} y_j} (t_{ij})^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
 &= \left[\sum_i \frac{\theta_i}{\sum_j \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} \theta_j} (t_{ij})^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\
 &= \left[\sum_i \theta_i \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{\Pi_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}
 \end{aligned}$$

So now have:

$$\Pi_i \equiv \left(\sum_j \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_j} \right)^{1-\sigma} \theta_j \right)^{1/(1-\sigma)}$$
$$P_j = \left[\sum_i \theta_i \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{\Pi_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

- Can solve for Π_i and P_i in terms of income shares θ_i and $\{t_{ij}\}$ and σ .
- Suppose symmetry: $t_{ij} = t_{ji}$. Then get a solution where

$$P_j = \prod_i,$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_j^{1-\sigma} &= \sum_i \theta_i \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} \\ &= \sum_i P_i^{\sigma-1} \theta_i t_{ij}^{1-\sigma} \end{aligned}$$

Now the gravity equation can be written

$$\begin{aligned} x_{ij} &= \frac{y_i y_j}{y^W} \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{\prod_i P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} \\ &= \frac{y_i y_j}{y^W} \left(\frac{t_{ij}}{P_i P_j} \right)^{(1-\sigma)} \end{aligned}$$

- Call $\{P_i\}$ multilateral resistance, as they depend upon bilateral resistance t_{ij} .

- A rise in trade barriers with all trading partners will raise the index.
- If $t_{ij} = 1$, then $P_i = 1$
- Intuition for why trade depends on multilateral resistance of both the importer j and the exporter i .
- What happens then t_{ij} all increase proportionately (including t_{ii}). Homeogeneous of degree zero, while P_i are homogeneous of degree $1/2$.

Implications

- Implication 1: Trade Barriers reduce size adjusted trade between the large countries more than between small countries

On one basis can such a claim be made? Paper considers the following. Start at $t_{ij} = 1$. Then set $dt_{ij} = dt$, $i \neq j$, and $dt_{ii} = 0$. Start with

$$P_j^{1-\sigma} = \sum_i P_i^{\sigma-1} \theta_i t_{ij}^{1-\sigma}$$

Totally differentiate

$$\begin{aligned}(1 - \sigma) P_j^{-\sigma} dP_j &= \sum_i (\sigma - 1) P_i^\sigma dP_i \theta_i t_{ij}^{1-\sigma} \\ &+ \sum_i P_i^{\sigma-1} d\theta_i t_{ij}^{1-\sigma} \\ &+ (1 - \sigma) \sum_i P_i^{\sigma-1} \theta_i t_{ij}^{-\sigma} dt_{ij}\end{aligned}$$

set $P_j = 1 = t_{ij}$,

$$(1 - \sigma) dP_j = \sum_i (\sigma - 1) dP_i \theta_i + \sum_i d\theta_i + (1 - \sigma) \sum_i \theta_i dt_{ij}$$

or

$$dP_j = - \sum_i dP_i \theta_i + \sum_i \theta_i dt_{ij}$$

Multiply by θ_j gives

$$\theta_j dP_j = -\theta_j \sum_i dP_i \theta_i + \sum_i \theta_j \theta_i dt_{ij}$$

Sum over j ?

$$\sum_j \theta_j dP_j = - \sum_j \theta_j \sum_i dP_i \theta_i + \sum_j \sum_i \theta_j \theta_i dt_{ij}$$

using $dt_{ij} = 1$, for $i \neq j$ and $dt_{ii} = 0$, somehow gets to

$$dP_i = \left(\frac{1}{2} - \theta_i + \frac{1}{2} \sum_k \theta_k^2 \right) dt$$

Form this conclude that a uniform increase in trade barriers raises multilateral resistance more for a small country than a large country.

Next

$$d \left(x_{ij} \frac{y^W}{y_i y_j} \right) = - (\sigma - 1) \left[\theta_i + \theta_j - \sum_k \theta_k^2 \right] dt$$

and this gets us implication 1.

- skip some other stuff
- get to a comparison of theoretical gravity equation and McCallum
- Assume this specification:

$$t_{ij} = b_{ij}d_{ij}^{\rho}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\ln x_{ij} &= k + \ln y_i + \ln y_j + (1 - \sigma) \rho \ln d_{ij} \\ &\quad + (1 - \sigma) \ln b_{ij} - (1 - \sigma) \ln P_i \\ &\quad - (1 - \sigma) \ln P_j\end{aligned}$$

- Now how estimate? Given model parameters $t_{ij} = b_{ij}d_{ij}^{\rho}$ and

data θ_i

$$\begin{aligned} P_j^{1-\sigma} &= \sum_i P_i^{\sigma-1} \theta_i t_{ij}^{1-\sigma} \\ &= \sum_i P_i^{\sigma-1} \theta_i b_{ij}^{(1-\sigma)} d_{ij}^{\rho(1-\sigma)} \\ &= \sum_i P_i^{\sigma-1} \theta_i e^{a_1 \ln d_{ij} + a_2(1-\delta_{ij})} \end{aligned}$$

for

$$b_{ij} = b^{1-\delta_{ij}}$$

where $\delta_{ij} = 1$ if in same country

$$a_1 = (1 - \sigma) \rho$$

$$a_2 = (1 - \sigma) \ln b$$

So have nonlinear equations to be solved in $P_i^{\sigma-1}$. So solve equation for this (note

- Note allow locations to have own internal distance $d_{ii} > 1$.
- Get it down to

$$\ln z_{ij} = \ln \left(\frac{x_{ij}}{y_i y_j} \right) = k + a_1 \ln d_{ij} + a_2 (1 - \delta_{ij}) - \ln P_i^{1-\sigma} - \ln P_j^{1-\sigma} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

take ε_{ij} to be measurement error. Take as given $\sigma = 5$, then given k, a_1, a_2 , have nonlinear least squares

$$\ln z = h(d, \delta, \theta; k, a_1, a_2) + \varepsilon$$

- Estimates

TABLE 2—ESTIMATION RESULTS

		Two-country model	Multicountry model
Parameters	$(1 - \sigma)\rho$	-0.79 (0.03)	-0.82 (0.03)
	$(1 - \sigma)\ln b_{US,CA}$	-1.65 (0.08)	-1.59 (0.08)
	$(1 - \sigma)\ln b_{US,ROW}$		-1.68 (0.07)
	$(1 - \sigma)\ln b_{CA,ROW}$		-2.31 (0.08)
	$(1 - \sigma)\ln b_{ROW,ROW}$		-1.66 (0.06)
Average error terms:	US-US	0.06	0.06
	CA-CA	-0.17	-0.02
	US-CA	-0.05	-0.04

Figure 2:

TABLE 3—AVERAGE OF $P^{1-\sigma}$		
	US	Canada
Two-country model		
With border barrier (BB)	0.77 (0.03)	2.45 (0.12)
Borderless trade (NB)	0.75 (0.03)	1.18 (0.01)
Ratio (BB/NB)	1.02 (0.00)	2.08 (0.08)

Figure 3:

- Estimates: Resulting average of $P^{1-\sigma}$