My
CV in HTML and CV in PDF
AUCTION THEORY
I
will be presenting my job market paper at
GAMES
2008, The Third World Congress of The Game Theory
Society,
SED
2008, 5th Conference on Economic
Design,
NEW VERSION Essay 1: An Extension of Ausubel's Auction for
Heterogeneous Discrete Goods [JOB
MARKET PAPER]
It is well-known that when multiple goods are to be auctioned, standard auction mechanisms are generally inefficient. Ausubel’s dynamic auction for heterogeneous goods (AER 2006) is among the few exceptions. It yields an efficient equilibrium outcome when bidders have private values, i.e., values that are not interdependent. However, Ausubel’s mechanism works in a limited environment when goods are discrete. If bidders’ values for goods are not integers, then the auction mechanism may not yield an efficient allocation without any information on bidders’ values. In this paper, I extend Ausubel's auction for heterogeneous discrete goods to real-valued quasilinear utility functions. The mechanism I propose reaches a Walrasian equilibrium price vector in finite “steps” without any additional information on bidders’ values. I also show that truthful bidding constitutes an efficient equilibrium. [DOWNLOAD]
Essay
2: An Efficient Auction for
Heterogeneous Discrete Goods
Designing a dynamic efficient auction mechanism for multiple objects when bidders’ values are interdependent is one of the challenging questions of the auction theory. Perry and Reny (REStud 2005) proposed an ascending multi-unit discrete goods auction mechanism that has an efficient equilibrium outcome when bidders’ values are interdependent and goods are homogeneous. They show that Ausubel’s ascending auction for homogeneous goods (AER 2004) has an efficient equilibrium outcome when there are two bidders whose values are interdependent. In this paper, I extend Perry and Reny auction mechanism to heterogeneous goods and show that Ausubel’s auction for heterogeneous discrete goods (AER 2006) has an efficient equilibrium when there are two bidders whose values are interdependent. (Work In Progress).
Essay
3: An Efficient Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods When
Preferences are Separable
An important question in auction theory is designing a dynamic efficient auction mechanism for multiple objects when bidders’ values are interdependent. Perry and Reny (REStud 2005) introduced an efficient auction for discrete homogeneous goods when bidders’ values are interdependent. In this paper, I propose an ascending auction mechanism for heterogeneous goods when bidders’ values are interdependent. I construct the auction mechanism by using a Perry and Reny auction mechanism for each type of good. I show that if agents' utility functions are additively separable in goods, quasilinear in money and agents’ budget constraints are not binding, then this auction mechanism has an efficient equilibrium outcome. [DOWNLOAD]
LAW AND
ECONOMICS
Essay
1: Choice of Enforcement (Work In Progress) [Coming Soon!]
Essay
2: Private vs. Public Externalities and Enforcement (Work In Progress)