

◦ Homotheticity and Utility representation

◦ \succeq is homothetic if

$$\forall x, x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^L \quad \forall \lambda > 0, \quad \text{if } x \sim x', \text{ then } \lambda x \sim \lambda x'.$$

Claim Let consumption set $X = \mathbb{R}_+^L$.

Let \succeq be reflexive, transitive, complete, continuous and strictly increasing (i.e. strongly monotonic).

Then, \succeq is homothetic iff \exists utility representation u s.t. u is HPI.

pf

$$(\Leftarrow) \quad \forall x, x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^L, \quad \forall \lambda > 0,$$

$$x \sim x' \iff u(x) = u(x')$$

$$\iff \lambda u(x) = \lambda u(x')$$

$$\implies u(\lambda x) = u(\lambda x') \quad (\because \text{HPI})$$

$$\iff \lambda x \sim \lambda x' \quad \square$$

(\Rightarrow)

Thm If \succeq on $X = \mathbb{R}_+^L$ is reflexive, transitive, complete, continuous and strictly increasing, then \succeq has a utility representation.

pf Below. \square

Suppose \succeq is homothetic.

In the proof of the thm, we have

$$\forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L, \quad \exists! \alpha_x \geq 0 \quad \text{s.t.} \quad x \sim \alpha_x e.$$

By the homotheticity, $\forall \lambda > 0,$

$$\lambda x \sim \lambda \alpha_x e.$$

Thus, by def. of $u,$

$$u(\lambda x) = \lambda \alpha_x$$

$$= \lambda u(x).$$

Therefore, u is HPI. \square

pf of thm

Let $e = \{1, 1, \dots, 1\} \in \mathbb{R}_+^L$.

Then define $A^+ = \{\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid \alpha e \succeq x\}$,
 $A^- = \{\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid x \succeq \alpha e\}$.

Prove that

- (i) $A^+ \neq \emptyset, A^- \neq \emptyset$.
- (ii) A^+, A^- closed
- (iii) $A^+ \cup A^- = \mathbb{R}_+$

(i) Consider $\bar{\alpha} = \max_{1 \leq k \leq L} x_k$. Then $\bar{\alpha} e \succeq x$ by strict increasingness.

Thus $\bar{\alpha} \in A^+$.

Also $0 \in A^-$ since $x \succeq 0$ by strict increasingness.

(ii) Let $L = \{\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid \alpha \geq 0\}$. L is a closed set in \mathbb{R}_+^L .

Since $P(x) \equiv \{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^L \mid y \succeq x\}$ is closed by the continuity

Thus $P(x) \cap L$ is closed, hence A^+ is also closed.

Same for A^- .

(iii) Obvious.

Then, since \mathbb{R}_+^L is connected, $A^+ \cap A^- \neq \emptyset$.

Take $\alpha_x \in A^+ \cap A^-$.

Prove that α_x is unique. Sp. $\exists \bar{\alpha}_x \in A^+ \cap A^-$ and $\bar{\alpha}_x \neq \alpha_x$.

Then, $\alpha_x e \sim x$ and $\bar{\alpha}_x e \sim x$. Thus $\alpha_x e \sim \bar{\alpha}_x e$.

Hence $\alpha_x = \bar{\alpha}_x$ by def of e . Contradiction.

Define $u(x)$ by $u(x) = \alpha_x$.

Prove that u is indeed a utility representation of \succeq .

If $x \succeq x'$, then $\alpha_x e \succeq \alpha_{x'} e$.

If $\alpha_x < \alpha_{x'}$, then $\alpha_{x'} e > \alpha_x e$ by the str. increasingness.

Thus $\alpha_x \geq \alpha_{x'}$ and hence $u(x) \geq u(x')$.

If $u(x) \geq u(x')$, then $\alpha_x \geq \alpha_{x'}$.

By the strictly increasingness, $\alpha_x e \succeq \alpha_{x'} e$ and hence $x \succeq x'$.

Therefore u is a utility representation of \succeq .

Q.E.D.

- Second-order stochastic dominance
- $Y + Z$ is more risky than Y . ($E[Z | Y > y] = 0$)
- $Y + 2Z \rightsquigarrow Y + Z$.

(a) $Y + Z$ is more risky than Y .

Def.
 Y is more risky than Z
 when Z SOSD Y
 and $E(Y) = E(Z)$

$$E(x) = E[E(x|y)]$$

Ⓟ Since

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y+Z) &= E[E(Y+Z|Y)] \\ &= E[Y + E(Z|Y)] \\ &= E(Y), \end{aligned}$$

* →

it suffices to show that for any nondecreasing concave continuous v ,
 $E[v(Y+Z)] \leq E[v(Y)]$.

$$\begin{aligned} E[v(Y+Z)] &= E\{E[v(Y+Z)|Y]\} \\ &= \pi_1 E[v(Y+Z)|Y=y_1] + \pi_2 E[v(Y+Z)|Y=y_2] \\ &\leq \pi_1 v[E(Y+Z|Y=y_1)] + \pi_2 v[E(Y+Z|Y=y_2)] \quad (\text{°° } v \text{ is concave, + } \textcircled{+}) \\ &= \pi_1 v(y_1 + E(Z|Y=y_1)) + \pi_2 v(y_2 + E(Z|Y=y_2)) \\ &= \pi_1 v(y_1) + \pi_2 v(y_2) \\ &= E[v(Y)]. \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \textcircled{+} E[v(Y+Z)|Y] &= \int v(Y+z) f(z|Y) dz \\ &\leq v\left[\int (Y+z) f(z|Y) dz\right] \quad (\text{by concavity}) \\ &= v[E(Y+Z|Y)] \end{aligned}$$

(b) $Y + 2Z$ is more risky than $Y + Z$.

Ⓟ Since

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y+2Z) &= E[E(Y+2Z|Y)] \\ &= E[Y + E(2Z|Y)] \\ &= E(Y), \end{aligned}$$

it suffices to show that for any nondecreasing concave continuous v
 $E[v(Y+2Z)] \leq E[v(Y+Z)]$.

Since we have

$$E[Y+Z] = \pi_1 E[v(Y_1+Z)] + \pi_2 E[v(Y_2+Z)],$$

it suffices to show that

$$\forall i=1,2, \quad E[v(Y_i+Z)] \leq E[v(Y_i+Z)].$$

Observe that

* →

$$Y_i + Z = \frac{1}{2}(Y_i + Z) + \frac{1}{2}(Y_i + 0)$$

$$\Rightarrow v(Y_i + Z) \geq \frac{1}{2}v(Y_i + Z) + \frac{1}{2}v(Y_i) \quad (\because v \text{ is concave})$$

$$\Rightarrow E v(Y_i + Z) \geq E \left[\frac{1}{2}v(Y_i + Z) + \frac{1}{2}v(Y_i) \right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} E v(Y_i + Z) + \frac{1}{2} E v(Y_i) \quad \dots (*)$$

Since

$$E v(Y_i + Z) \leq v[E(Y_i + Z)]$$

($\because v$ is concave)

$$= v(Y_i),$$

(by the argument:)

$$\text{LHS of } (*) \geq \frac{1}{2} E v(Y_i + Z) + \frac{1}{2} E v(Y_i)$$

$$E(Y+Z) = E(Y)$$

$$\therefore E v(Y_i + Z) \geq E v(Y_i + Z).$$

Q.E.D.

- o Weakly dominance
- o Finiteness

(a) **Claim** \forall finite game G , $\exists s^* \in NE(G)$ s.t. $\exists i$ s.t. $s_i^*(a) > 0$ and a is WD.

(pf)

(Sketch)

Step 1: $PE(G)$ exists

Step 2: $PE(G) \subseteq NE(G)$

Step 3: If $s^* \in PE(G)$, $\forall i, a \in A^i$ s.t. a is WD, $s_i^*(a) = 0$. \square

(b) **Claim** \forall finite game G , $\exists s^* \in NE(G)$ s.t. $\exists i$ s.t. s_i^* is WD.

(pf)

Step 3': If $s^* \in PE(G)$, $\forall i, s_i^*$ is not WD. \square

(2008 Mid)

(c)

1 \ 2	1	2	3
1	1.1	0.0	0.0
2	1.1	1.1	0.0
3	1.1	1.1	1.1

For player 2, the only str. which is not WD is 1.

Given this, $\forall n$, $s = (n, 1)$ is a NE.

But $\forall n$, n is WD by $n+1$.

Thus, $\forall s \in NE(G)$, player 1 chooses WD str.

• Equivalence b/w 2 def. of continuity of \preceq .

(2007, PS 3 Q2.)

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\preceq : transitive $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall x, y, z \in X$, if $x \preceq y \wedge y \preceq z$, then $x \preceq z$.

complete $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall x, y \in X$, $x \preceq y$ or $y \preceq x$ holds.

$$X = \mathbb{R}_+^1$$

C1 : $\forall \{x^n\}, \{y^n\} \subset X$ s.t. $x^n \rightarrow x$, $y^n \rightarrow y$ and $x^n \preceq y^n, \forall n$, then $x \preceq y$.

C2 : $\forall x \in X$, $U(x) \equiv \{y \in X \mid y \preceq x\}$ and $L(x) \equiv \{y \in X \mid x \preceq y\}$ are closed.

(pf) C1 \Rightarrow C2

Fix $x \in X$. Take an arbitrary convergent sequence in $L(x)$, i.e., $\{y_n\}$ and $y_n \rightarrow y$.

Let $\{x_n\}$ be $x_n = x, \forall n$. Since $\forall n, y_n \in L(x)$,

$$x_n \preceq y_n \quad \forall n.$$

Thus, $x \preceq y$. Therefore, $y \in L(x)$ and hence $L(x)$ is closed.

$U(x)$ is closed by the same argument.

Q.E.D.

(pf) C2 \Rightarrow C1

Sp. not. Then $x^n \rightarrow x$, $y^n \rightarrow y$, $x^n \preceq y^n, \forall n$ but $y \succ x$.

Prove that $\exists z \in X$ s.t. $y \succ z \succ x$. Sp. not.

Then $U(y) \cup L(x) = X$. Also since $y \in U(y)$ and $x \in L(x)$, $U(y) \cap L(x) \neq \emptyset$.

By C2, $U(y)$ and $L(x)$ are closed and $U(y) \cap L(x) = \emptyset$ since $y \succ x$.

This contradicts that $X = \mathbb{R}_+^1$ is connected. Thus $\exists z \in X$ s.t. $y \succ z \succ x$.

By C2, $U^c(z)$ and $L^c(z)$ are open and $y \in L^c(z)$ and $x \in U^c(z)$.

Since $U^c(z)$ is open, x is an interior point and hence $\exists \epsilon_x > 0$ s.t. $B_{\epsilon_x}(x) \subset U^c(z)$.

Since $x^n \rightarrow x$, $\exists n_x \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $\forall n > n_x$, $x_n \in B_{\epsilon_x}(x)$. $\therefore z \succ x_n \quad \forall n > n_x$.

Likewise, $\exists \epsilon_y > 0$ s.t. $B_{\epsilon_y}(y) \subset L^c(z)$ and $\exists n_y \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $\forall n > n_y$, $y_n \in B_{\epsilon_y}(y)$.

Thus $y_n \succ z$, $\forall n > n_y$. Let $\bar{n} = \max\{n_x, n_y\}$.

Then $\forall n > \bar{n}$, we have $z \succ x_n$ and $y_n \succ z$. By the transitivity, $y_n \succ x_n$.

This is a contradiction. Thus $x \preceq y$.

Q.E.D.

- Risk compensation and Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion
- Application of the Pratt Thm. (Corollary 16.3)

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Def Risk compensation for risky claim $z \in \mathbb{R}^S$ w/ $E(z) = 0$ at risk-free initial wealth w is $p(w, z)$ s.t.

$$E v(w+z) = v(w - p(w, z))$$

Def Arrow Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion at w is

$$A(w) = - \frac{v''(w)}{v'(w)}$$

(i) Claim A is weakly decreasing in w iff so is $p \forall z$ w/ $E(z) = 0$.

pf Fix $\epsilon > 0$.

Prove that for $\hat{v}(w) \equiv v(w+\epsilon)$, we get

$$\hat{p}(w, z) = p(w+\epsilon, z) \quad \forall z \text{ w/ } E(z) = 0,$$

$$\hat{A}(w) = A(w+\epsilon).$$

* \rightarrow

By def, $E \hat{v}(w+z) = \hat{v}(w - \hat{p}(w, z))$

$$\text{LHS} = E v(w+\epsilon+z)$$

$$= v(w+\epsilon - p(w+\epsilon, z))$$

$$\text{RHS} = v(w+\epsilon - \hat{p}(w, z))$$

$$\therefore \hat{p}(w, z) = p(w+\epsilon, z)$$

By def, $\hat{A}(w) = - \frac{\hat{v}''(w)}{\hat{v}'(w)}$

$$= - \frac{v''(w+\epsilon)}{v'(w+\epsilon)}$$

$$= A(w+\epsilon).$$

Then

$$A(w+\epsilon) \leq A(w)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \hat{A}(w) \leq A(w)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \hat{p}(w, z) \leq p(w, z) \quad \forall z \text{ w/ } E(z) = 0$$

by Pratt Thm

$$\Leftrightarrow p(w+\epsilon, z) \leq p(w, z) \quad \forall z \text{ w/ } E(z) = 0$$

Q.E.D.

(ii) **Claim** If $p(w, z)$ is independent of $w \forall z$ w/ $E(z) > 0$, then v is an affine transformation of $\bar{v}(x) = -e^{-\alpha x}$ for $\alpha > 0$.

pf As in (i), we have

f is independent of $w \iff$ so is A .

Thus, let $A(w) = \alpha \forall w$.

Note that $A\bar{v}(w) = \frac{-(-\alpha^2 e^{-\alpha x})}{\alpha e^{-\alpha x}} = \alpha$.

Let v be an arbitrary fcn s.t. $A v(w) = \alpha \forall w$.

Since $A\bar{v}(w) = A v(w) \forall w$, by Pratt Thm,

\exists increasing, concave fcn $f \neq g$ s.t.

$$v(w) = f(\bar{v}(w)) \quad \forall w.$$

$$\bar{v}(w) = g(v(w))$$

Note that $\bar{v}(w) = (g \circ f)(\bar{v}(w)) \forall w$.

It suffices to show that f is linear.

Sp. not. Then $\exists w_1, w_2$ s.t. $x_1 = \bar{v}(w_1), x_2 = \bar{v}(w_2)$ and for some $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, $f(\lambda x_1 + (1-\lambda)x_2) > \lambda f(x_1) + (1-\lambda)f(x_2)$.

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda x_1 + (1-\lambda)x_2 &= (g \circ f)[\lambda x_1 + (1-\lambda)x_2] \\ &> g[\lambda f(x_1) + (1-\lambda)f(x_2)] \quad (\because g \text{ is increasing}) \\ &\geq \lambda (g \circ f)(x_1) + (1-\lambda)(g \circ f)(x_2) \quad (\because g \text{ is concave}) \\ &= \lambda x_1 + (1-\lambda)x_2 \end{aligned}$$

This is a contradiction.

Thus f is linear and hence v is an affine transformation of \bar{v} .

Q.E.D.

- Linear game.
- Isbell / Kuhn Thm

(a) An EFG is linear if $\forall z \in Z$, $\forall i$, $\forall u^i \in U^i$, $\text{path}(z) \cap u^i$ has at most one element, where $\text{path}(z) = \{x \in K \mid z \succeq x \succeq 0\}$.

(b) **Claim** ^{pure} Given $s^i \in \Sigma^i$, $\forall b^i \in B^i \exists \sigma^i \in \Delta(A^i)$ s.t.
If G is linear, $P_{(b^i, s^i)}(z) = P_{(\sigma^i, s^i)}(z)$, $\forall z \in Z$

pf Fix s^i , b^i .

Prove that a mixed str.

$$\sigma^i(s^i) = \prod_{u^i \in U^i} \pi_i b^i(u^i, s^i(u^i))$$

gives the same prob. dist. on Z .

$\forall z \in Z$, $\text{path}(z)$ is unique by def. of tree,
and $\forall x \in \text{path}(z)$, x is in a different info. set since the game is linear.

$$\bar{Z} = \{z \in Z \mid \exists s^i \in \Sigma^i \text{ s.t. } P_{(s^i, s^i)}(z) \neq 0\}$$

$$\bar{U}^i = \{u^i \in U^i \mid u^i \cap \text{path}(z) \neq \emptyset\}$$

E^i : set of actions of i that take $x \in \text{path}(z)$ to $y \in S(x) \cap \text{path}(z)$

$$\bar{\Sigma}^i = \{s^i \in \Sigma^i \mid P_{(s^i, s^i)}(z) \neq 0\}$$

Then, $\forall z \in Z \setminus \bar{Z}$,

$$P_{(\sigma^i, s^i)}(z) = 0 = P_{(b^i, s^i)}(z)$$

and $\forall z \in \bar{Z}$,

$$\begin{aligned} P_{(\sigma^i, s^i)}(z) &= \sum_{s^i \in \Sigma^i} \sigma^i(s^i) P_{(s^i, s^i)}(z) \\ &= \sum_{s^i \in \bar{\Sigma}^i} \prod_{u^i \in U^i} b^i(u^i, s^i(u^i)) \end{aligned}$$

$$= \sum_{s^i \in \bar{\Sigma}^i} \prod_{u^i \in \bar{U}^i} b^i(u^i, s^i(u^i)) \prod_{u^i \in U^i \setminus \bar{U}^i} b^i(u^i, s^i(u^i))$$


$$= \prod_{a \in E^i} b^i(a) \sum_{s^i \in \bar{\Sigma}^i} \prod_{u^i \in U^i \setminus \bar{U}^i} b^i(u^i, s^i(u^i))$$

$$= \prod_{a \in E^i} b^i(a)$$

$$= P_{(b^i, s^i)}(z)$$

Q.E.D.

(c)



Note that this game is linear (but not perfect recall).

$$\begin{cases} \sigma(L_1, L_2) = \frac{1}{2} \\ \sigma(L_1, R_2) = 0 \\ \sigma(R_1, L_2) = 0 \\ \sigma(R_1, R_2) = \frac{1}{2} \end{cases}$$

Let

$$\begin{aligned} b(u_1, L_1) &= q_1 \\ b(u_1, R_1) &= 1 - q_1 \\ b(u_2, L_2) &= q_2 \\ b(u_2, R_2) &= 1 - q_2 \end{aligned}$$

Then

$$\begin{cases} P(z_1) = q_1 q_2 \\ P(z_2) = q_1 (1 - q_2) \\ P(z_3) = (1 - q_1) q_2 \\ P(z_4) = (1 - q_1) (1 - q_2) \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow \quad q_1 q_2 &= \frac{1}{2} \\ q_1 (1 - q_2) &= 0 \\ (1 - q_1) q_2 &= 0 \\ (1 - q_1) (1 - q_2) &= \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

no $q_1, q_2 \in [0, 1]$
satisfy these 4 eqn.

- profit fcn / supply correspondence
- Thm 4.1 - 4.3

Def Profit fcn π^* is a fcn of price vector p s.t. $\pi^*(p) = \max_{y \in Y} p \cdot y$.

Def Supply correspondence s^* is a correspondence of p s.t. $s^*(p) = \text{argmax}_{y \in Y} p \cdot y$.

(a) Claim π^* is (i) continuous, and (ii) convex.

(pf) (i) Since $Y \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ and Y is closed and bounded, Y is compact. The objective fcn is continuous on $\mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^n$. Thus π^* is continuous by the Thm of Maximum

(ii) For $p_1, p_2 \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, let $y^* \in s^*(\lambda p_1 + (1-\lambda)p_2)$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} \pi^*(\lambda p_1 + (1-\lambda)p_2) &= [\lambda p_1 + (1-\lambda)p_2] \cdot y^* \\ &= \lambda p_1 \cdot y^* + (1-\lambda)p_2 \cdot y^* \\ &\leq \lambda \pi^*(p_1) + (1-\lambda)\pi^*(p_2) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{by def. of } \pi^*)$$

Thus, π^* is convex.

Q.E.D.

(b) Claim s^* has closed graph

(pf) As in (a) (i), we can apply the Thm of Maximum and hence s^* is u.h.c.

Prove that u.h.c. \rightarrow closed graph

For any convergent seq. $(p_n, s_n) \in \{(p, s) \in \mathbb{R}^L \times \mathbb{R}^L \mid s \in s^*(p)\} \equiv A(s^*)$ the limit pt $(p, s) \in A(s^*)$. Thus graph is closed. (u.h.c.)

(c) **Claim** π^* : diff $\Rightarrow D\pi^*(p) = s^*(p)$.

(pf) π^* : diff $\Leftrightarrow s^*$ is single-valued at p .

Then we define

$$F(p) \equiv p s^*(p) - p s^*(\bar{p})$$

with some fixed \bar{p} .

By def. of s^* , $F(p) \geq 0, \forall p$.

Also we have $F(\bar{p}) = 0$.

Thus, FOC wrt p : $D F(p) = D\pi^*(p) - s^*(\bar{p})$.

Since \bar{p} is the solution,

$$0 = D F(\bar{p}) = D\pi^*(\bar{p}) - s^*(\bar{p})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow D\pi^*(\bar{p}) = s^*(\bar{p}) \quad \text{Q.E.D.}$$

(d) **Claim** π^*, s^* : diff at $p \Rightarrow \frac{\partial s_i^*}{\partial p_i}(p) \geq 0, \forall i = 1, \dots, n$

(pf) Since π^* diff, (c) holds.

Also since s^* diff, π^* is twice-differentiable and we have

$$D^2 \pi^*(p) = D s^*(p). \quad (*)$$

Since π^* is convex as proved in (a), the LHS of (*)

is positive semi-definite and symmetric and hence

so is the RHS of (*).

That is, \forall vector $h \in \mathbb{R}^n$,

$$h^T D s^*(p) h \geq 0$$

Thus for any $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, taking $h_i = (0, \dots, 1, 0, \dots, 0)^T$

gives

$$h_i^T D s^*(p) h_i \geq 0$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\partial s_i^*}{\partial p_i}(p) \geq 0$$

Q.E.D.

- Conditions for state-separable representation.
- Concave expected utility representation and risk averse.

Def U has a state-separable representation if there exist fcn's $v_s: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
 s.t. $U(c_1, \dots, c_s) \geq U(c'_1, \dots, c'_s)$ iff $\sum_{s=1}^{\beta} v_s(c_s) \geq \sum_{s=1}^{\beta} v_s(c'_s)$
 for all $c, c' \in \mathbb{R}^{\beta}$.

Def U has a concave expected utility representation if \exists concave fcn $v: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
 s.t. $U(c_1, \dots, c_s) \geq U(c'_1, \dots, c'_s)$ iff $\sum_{s=1}^{\beta} \pi_s v(c_s) \geq \sum_{s=1}^{\beta} \pi_s v(c'_s)$
 for all $c, c' \in \mathbb{R}^{\beta}$.

(a) U has a state-separable representation iff \Leftrightarrow

Let $c-s y$ be a consumption plan s.t.

$$c-s y = (c_1, \dots, c_{s-1}, y, c_{s+1}, \dots, c_{\beta})$$

where $y \in \mathbb{R}$.

Then we say that U satisfies the sure thing principle if
 $U(c-s y) \geq U(c'-s y)$ iff $U(c-s z) \geq U(c'-s z)$
 for all $c, c' \in \mathbb{R}^{\beta}$, $y, z \in \mathbb{R}$ and $s \in \{1, \dots, \beta\}$.

Then, U has a state-separable representation iff U satisfies the sure thing principle.

(b) Claim U has a concave utility representation w/ π_s iff U has a state-separable representation and is risk averse w.r.t. π .

Ⓟ

(⇒) Let u be a concave fcn s.t.

$$U(c) \geq U(c') \iff \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s v(c_s) \geq \sum_{s=1}^S \pi_s v(c'_s) \quad \forall c, c'$$

Define $v_s : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ as

$$v_s(x) = \pi_s v(x) \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}.$$

Then

$$U(c) \geq U(c') \iff \sum_{s=1}^S v_s(c_s) \geq \sum_{s=1}^S v_s(c'_s). \quad \forall c, c'$$

Thus U has a state-contingent representation.

Also, since v is concave

$$\begin{aligned} E(v(c)) &\leq v(E(c)) && \forall c \in \mathbb{R}^S \\ \iff U(c) &\leq U(E(c)) && \forall c \in \mathbb{R}^S \end{aligned}$$

by def of v . Thus U is risk averse. \square

(⇐) Let $v_s : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be s.t.

$$U(c) \geq U(c') \iff \sum_{s=1}^S v_s(c_s) \geq \sum_{s=1}^S v_s(c'_s), \quad \forall c, c'$$

Assume v_s 's are differentiable.

For each $x \in \mathbb{R}$, consider a problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c \in \mathbb{R}^S} & \sum_{s=1}^S v_s(c_s) \\ \text{s.t.} & E(c) = x. \end{aligned}$$

Since U is risk averse, $c = (x, \dots, x)$ solves this problem.

Thus, FOC: $v'_s(x) = \lambda \pi_s \quad \forall s = 1, \dots, S.$

$$\therefore v'_s(x) = \frac{\pi_s}{\pi_1} v'_1(x)$$

$$\therefore v_s(x) = \frac{\pi_s}{\pi_1} v_1(x) + \Delta_s$$

for some Δ_s . Let $v \equiv v_1$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \pi_s v_s(c_s) \geq \sum \pi_s v_s(c'_s) &\iff \sum \pi_s \left(\frac{1}{\pi_1} v(c_s) + \frac{\Delta_s}{\pi_s} \right) \geq \sum \pi_s \left(\frac{1}{\pi_1} v(c'_s) + \frac{\Delta_s}{\pi_s} \right) \\ &\iff \sum \pi_s v(c_s) \geq \sum \pi_s v(c'_s). \end{aligned}$$

(∵ v is an affine transformation of $(*)$)

Thus U has an expected utility representation.

Since U is risk averse,

$$\begin{aligned} U(c) \leq U(E(c)) &\iff \sum \pi_s v(c) \leq \sum \pi_s v(E(c)) \\ &\iff E(v(c)) \leq v(E(c)) \quad \forall c \in \mathbb{R}^S. \end{aligned}$$

Thus v is concave. \square

- Perfect eqm
- closedness of PE

(a) Claim $PE(G) \subseteq NE(G)$.

pf $s^* \in PE(G)$.

$\exists \epsilon_n \rightarrow 0$ and $s_n \in NE(G_{\epsilon_n}), \forall n$, s.t. $s^* \rightarrow s^*$

$\forall n, s_n \in NE(G_{\epsilon_n})$

$\Leftrightarrow \forall n, \forall i, s_n^i \in BR_{G_{\epsilon_n}}^i(s_n)$

$\Leftrightarrow \forall n, \forall i, \forall t_i \in \beta_{\epsilon_n}^i, U_i(s_n^i, s_n^i) \geq U_i(t_i, s_n^i)$

Since β^i is compact and $\epsilon_n \rightarrow 0$, $\forall t_i \in \beta^i \exists$ convergent seq t_n^i
s.t. $t_n^i \rightarrow t^i$ and $t_n^i \in \beta_{\epsilon_n}^i$.

Then

(*) $\Leftrightarrow \forall i, \forall n, \forall t_n^i \in \beta_{\epsilon_n}^i, U_i(s_n^i, s_n^i) \geq U_i(t_n^i, s_n^i)$.

Continuity of U_i implies

$\forall i, \forall t_i \in \beta^i, U_i(s^i, s^i) \geq U_i(t_i, s^i)$

Thus, $s^* \in BR(s^*)$ i.e., $s^* \in NE(G)$.

O.E.D.

(b) Claim $PE(G)$ is closed

pf Let $s_n \in PE(G), \forall n$ and $s_n \rightarrow s$.

WTS: $s \in PE(G)$.

Since $\forall n, s_n \in PE(G), \exists \epsilon_m^n \rightarrow 0$ as $m \rightarrow \infty$ and $s_m^n \in NE(G_{\epsilon_m^n})$
s.t. $s_m^n \rightarrow s_n$ as $m \rightarrow \infty$.

Since $\epsilon_m^n \rightarrow 0$ as $m \rightarrow \infty$, $\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \epsilon_m^n = 0$.

Since $\epsilon_m^n \in [0, 1]^{\#A_1 \times \dots \times \#A_N}$ and $[0, 1]^{\#A_1 \times \dots \times \#A_N}$ is compact,

\exists convergent subseq $\epsilon_{n_k}^{n_k}$ s.t. $\epsilon_{n_k}^{n_k} \rightarrow 0$.

Let $\epsilon_k = \epsilon_{n_k}^{n_k}$. Then $\epsilon_k \rightarrow 0$.

Since $\forall n, s_n^i \in NE(G_{\epsilon_n^i})$, if we take $s_k = s_{n_k}^{n_k}$,

we have $s_k \in NE(G_{\epsilon_k})$ by construction.

Since $s_n \rightarrow s$, we have $s_k \rightarrow s$. Thus $s \in PE(G)$ and $PE(G)$ is closed.

1 \ 2	1	2	3	...	M
1	(-1, 1)	(1, -1)	(1, -1)	...	(1, -1)
2	(1, -1)	(-1, 1)			
3	(1, -1)				
...					
M	(1, -1)				(-1, 1)

Given $s^2 \in \mathcal{F}^2$,

$$\begin{aligned} BR^1(s^2) &= \operatorname{argmax}_{s^1 \in \mathcal{F}^1} \sum_{i=1}^M s^1(i) [-s^2(i) + (1 - s^2(i))] \\ &= \operatorname{argmin}_{s^1 \in \mathcal{F}^1} \sum_{i=1}^M s^1(i) s^2(i) \end{aligned}$$

Given $s^1 \in \mathcal{F}^1$,

$$\begin{aligned} BR^2(s^1) &= \operatorname{argmax}_{s^2 \in \mathcal{F}^2} \sum_{i=1}^M s^1(i) [s^1(i) - (1 - s^1(i))] \\ &= \operatorname{argmax}_{s^2 \in \mathcal{F}^2} 2 \sum_{i=1}^M s^1(i) s^2(i) - 1 \\ &= \operatorname{argmax}_{s^2 \in \mathcal{F}^2} \sum_{i=1}^M s^1(i) s^2(i) \end{aligned}$$

Then, since $s^1 \in \mathcal{F}^1$, $s^2 \in \mathcal{F}^2$, we have

(*) $\forall s^1 \in BR^1(s^2)$, if $i \in \operatorname{argmax}_i s^2(i) \equiv M_1 \wedge M_1 \not\subseteq \{1, \dots, M\}$,
then $s^1(i) = 0$.

(**) $\forall s^2 \in BR^2(s^1)$, if $i \in \operatorname{argmin}_i s^1(i) \equiv M_2 \wedge M_2 \not\subseteq \{1, \dots, M\}$,
then $s^2(i) = 0$.

WTS $M_1^c = \emptyset$ or $M_2^c = \emptyset$.

Sp. not. Then $M_1^c \neq \emptyset \wedge M_2^c \neq \emptyset$.

Then $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, M\}$, if $i \in M_1$, then $s^1(i) = 0$. (by $M_1^c \neq \emptyset \notin (*)$)
 $\Rightarrow i \in M_2$
 $\Rightarrow M_1 \subseteq M_2$... (##)

$\forall i \in \{1, \dots, M\}$, if $i \in M_2$, then $s^2(i) = 0$ (by $M_2^c \neq \emptyset \notin (**)$)
 $\Rightarrow i \notin M_1$ (since $\exists_{j \neq i}, s^1(j) > 0$)
 $\Rightarrow M_2 \subseteq M_1^c$... (###)

Thus $M_1 \subseteq M_1^c$, which is a contradiction.

Thus $M_1^c = \emptyset$ or $M_2^c = \emptyset$.

Therefore, $\forall \hat{s} \in \text{NE}(G)$,

$$\hat{s}^1(i) = \frac{1}{M} \quad \forall i \quad \text{or} \quad \hat{s}^2(i) = \frac{1}{M} \quad \forall i.$$

Sp. $\hat{s}^1(i) = \frac{1}{M}, \forall i$.

$$\text{Then } BR^2(\hat{s}^1) = \underset{s^2}{\operatorname{argmax}} \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^M s^2(i) \\ = s^2$$

By def of NE, $\hat{s}^1 \in BR^1(\hat{s}^2)$.

Sp. $\exists i, j$ s.t. $\hat{s}^2(i) \neq \hat{s}^2(j)$, wlog $\hat{s}^2(i) < \hat{s}^2(j)$.

$$\text{Then } \bar{s}^1(k) = \begin{cases} \frac{2}{M} & k = i \\ 0 & k = j \\ \frac{1}{M} & k \neq i, j \end{cases}$$

attains

$$\sum_k \bar{s}^1(k) \hat{s}^2(k) < \sum_k \hat{s}^1(k) \hat{s}^2(k).$$

This contradicts that $\hat{s}^1 \in BR^1(\hat{s}^2)$.

Thus $\forall i, j, \hat{s}^2(i) = \hat{s}^2(j)$.

Sp. $\hat{s}^2(i) = \frac{1}{M}, \forall i$.

$$\text{Then } BR^1(\hat{s}^2) = \underset{s^1}{\operatorname{argmin}} \frac{1}{M} \sum s^1(i) \\ = s^1$$

By def of NE, $\hat{s}^2 \in BR^2(\hat{s}^1)$.

Sp. $\exists i, j$ s.t. $\hat{s}^1(i) \neq \hat{s}^1(j)$ wlog $\hat{s}^1(i) < \hat{s}^1(j)$.

$$\text{Then } \bar{s}^2(k) = \begin{cases} \frac{2}{M} & k = i \\ 0 & k = j \\ \frac{1}{M} & k \neq i, j \end{cases}$$

attains

$$\sum_k \bar{s}^2(k) \hat{s}^1(k) > \sum_k \hat{s}^2(k) \hat{s}^1(k)$$

This contradicts that $\hat{s}^2 \in BR^2(\hat{s}^1)$.

Thus, $\forall i, j, \hat{s}^1(i) = \hat{s}^1(j)$.

Therefore, the unique NE is

$$\hat{s} = \left(\left(\frac{1}{M}, \dots, \frac{1}{M} \right), \left(\frac{1}{M}, \dots, \frac{1}{M} \right) \right).$$

Q.E.D.

• Equivalence of the games.

(pf)

$$\forall \hat{s}^{-k} \in \mathcal{S}^{-k}$$

$$\hat{s}^k \in BR^k(\hat{s}^{-k}) \mid G^{new}$$

$$= \operatorname{argmax}_{s^k \in \mathcal{S}^k} \sum_{a^{-k} \in \mathcal{A}^{-k}} \hat{s}^{-k}(a^{-k}) \sum_{a^k \in \mathcal{A}^k} s^k(a^k) v(a^k, a^{-k})$$

$$= \operatorname{argmax}_{s^k \in \mathcal{S}^k} b U^k(s^k, \hat{s}^{-k}) + \sum_{a^{-k} \in \mathcal{A}^{-k}} \hat{s}^{-k}(a^{-k}) \sum_{a^k \in \mathcal{A}^k} s^k(a^k) (c(a^k) + b U^k(a^k, a^{-k}))$$

$$= \operatorname{argmax}_{s^k \in \mathcal{S}^k} b U^k(s^k, \hat{s}^{-k}) + \sum_{a^{-k} \in \mathcal{A}^{-k}} \hat{s}^{-k}(a^{-k}) \sum_{a^k \in \mathcal{A}^k} s^k(a^k) c(a^k)$$

$$= \operatorname{argmax}_{s^k \in \mathcal{S}^k} b U^k(s^k, \hat{s}^{-k}) + \sum_{a^{-k} \in \mathcal{A}^{-k}} \hat{s}^{-k}(a^{-k}) c(a^k) \sum_{a^k \in \mathcal{A}^k} s^k(a^k)$$

$$= \operatorname{argmax}_{s^k \in \mathcal{S}^k} b U^k(s^k, \hat{s}^{-k}) + 1$$

$$= \operatorname{argmax}_{s^k \in \mathcal{S}^k} U^k(s^k, \hat{s}^{-k}) \quad (\text{since } b > 0)$$

$$= BR^k(\hat{s}^{-k}) \mid G.$$

Q.E.D.

- Special preference : $x \succeq x'$ iff $x_1 \geq x'_1 \wedge \sum x_i \geq \sum x'_i$ [7, 8]
- properties of \succeq / utility representation
- Demand Correspondence

Def \succeq is continuous if the sets $U(x) \equiv \{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid y \succeq x\}$ and $L(x) \equiv \{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid x \succeq y\}$ are closed for all $x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$.

Def \succeq is convex if $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, the set $\{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid y \succeq x\}$ is convex.

Def $u: \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a utility representation of \succeq if $\forall x, x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$,
 $u(x) \geq u(x')$ iff $x \succeq x'$.

(a) Claim \succeq is (i) continuous and (ii) convex.

pf (i) Sps not. Then $\exists x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ s.t. $U(x)$ or $L(x)$ is not closed.

WLOG, say $U(x)$ is not closed. Then \exists a seq. $\{y^m\}$ s.t.

$y^m \in U(x)$, $\forall m \in \mathbb{N}$ and $y^m \rightarrow y \notin U(x)$.

Since $y^m \in U(x)$, $\forall m$, $y_1^m \geq x_1 \wedge \sum_{i=1}^n y_i^m \geq \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$.

Since $y \notin U(x)$, $x_1 > y_1 \vee \sum_{i=1}^n x_i > \sum_{i=1}^n y_i$.

Sps $x_1 > y_1$. Let $\epsilon = x_1 - y_1$.

Since $y^m \rightarrow y$, $\exists \bar{m} \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $\forall m > \bar{m}$, $y_1^m \in B_{\epsilon/2}(y_1)$.

Thus $x_1 > y_1^m$. Hence $y^m \notin U(x)$. This is a contradiction.

Sps $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i > \sum_{i=1}^n y_i$. Since $x, y \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, $\exists i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ s.t.

$x_i > y_i$. This is a contradiction by the same argument as $i=1$ case.

Therefore, $y \in U(x)$ and hence $U(x)$ is closed.

Similarly, $L(x)$ is also closed. Since x is arbitrary, \succeq is continuous.

(ii) Let $y, z \in U(x)$.

Then $y_1 \geq x_1 \wedge \sum y_i \geq \sum x_i \wedge z_1 \geq x_1 \wedge \sum z_i \geq \sum x_i$.

For any $\lambda \in (0, 1)$,

$$\lambda y_1 + (1-\lambda)z_1 \geq \lambda x_1 + (1-\lambda)x_1$$

$$= x_1$$

$$\sum \lambda y_i + \sum (1-\lambda)z_i = \lambda \sum y_i + (1-\lambda) \sum z_i$$

$$\geq \sum x_i$$

Thus, $\lambda y + (1-\lambda)z \in U(x)$ and hence \succeq is convex.

(b) **Claim** \succeq does not have a util. rep.

* If \succeq has u,
then \succeq is
complete & transitive.

pf Sps \succeq has a utility rep. $u: \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that is,
 $x \succeq x'$ iff $u(x) \geq u(x')$.

Let $x, x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ be s.t.

$$x_1 > x'_1 \text{ and } \sum_{k=1}^n x_k < \sum_{k=1}^n x'_k$$

Then we have neither $x \succeq x'$ nor $x' \succeq x$.

But, since \mathbb{R} is complete, we have to have
either $u(x) \geq u(x')$ or $u(x) \leq u(x')$.

This is a contradiction. Thus \succeq has no util. rep. Q.E.D.

(c) Derive the demand.

Case 1: $p_1 > p_2$.

Claim $x \in d(p, w)$ iff $p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 = w$

pf (\Rightarrow) Sps $p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 < w$. Then $(x_1 + \epsilon, x_2) \succ (x_1, x_2) \wedge p_1(x_1 + \epsilon) + p_2 x_2 < w$.

with $\epsilon > 0$ small enough. $\Rightarrow x \notin d(p, w)$.

(\Leftarrow) Sps $\exists x' \in B(p, w)$ s.t. $x' \succ x$.

Since $x' \in B(p, w)$, $p_1 x'_1 + p_2 x'_2 = w$.

Thus $p_1(x'_1 - x_1) = p_2(x_2 - x'_2) \Rightarrow x'_1 - x_1 < x_2 - x'_2 \because p_1 > p_2$

Thus $x'_1 + x'_2 < x_1 + x_2 \Rightarrow x' \succ x$. □



Case 2: $p_1 \leq p_2$

Claim $x \in d(p, w)$ iff $p_1 x_1 = w$


pf (\Rightarrow) the same as case 1 (sps not, then take ϵ).

(\Leftarrow) Sps $\exists x' \in B(p, w)$ s.t. $x' \succ x$.

If $x'_1 > x_1$, $p_1 x'_1 > p_1 x_1 = w \Rightarrow x' \notin B(p, w)$

Then $x'_1 = x_1$. Since $x' \succ x$, $x'_2 > x_2 = 0$

Then $p_1 x'_1 + p_2 x'_2 > p_1 x_1 = p_1 x_1 = w \Rightarrow x' \notin B(p, w)$. □



The demand above is not u.h.c. and hence not continuous.

pf Let $p^n = (p_1^n, p_2^n)$, $n=1, \dots$, $p_1^n = 1/n$, $p_2^n = 1 - 1/n$. Then $p^n \rightarrow p = (1, 1)$.

Let $x^n = (x_1^n, x_2^n)$, $n=1, \dots$, $x_1^n = 0$, $x_2^n = \frac{w}{p_2^n}$. Then $x^n \in d(p^n, w)$

and $x^n \rightarrow x = (0, w)$. But $x \notin d(p, w) = \{x^*\}$, $x^* = (w, 0)$.

Thus d is not u.h.c. □

- State-separable utility representation
- Why is " $\beta \geq 3$ " needed?

(a) U has a state-separable utility representation iff $\sim ?$

Let $c-sy$ be a consumption plan s.t.

$$c-sy = (c_1, \dots, c_{s-1}, y, c_{s+1}, \dots, c_\beta)$$

for $y \in \mathbb{R}_+$.

U has a state-separable utility representation iff

U satisfies the sure thing principle, i.e.,

$$U(c-sy) \geq U(c'-sy) \text{ iff } U(c-sz) \geq U(c'-sz)$$

for all $c, c' \in \mathbb{R}_+^\beta$, $y, z \in \mathbb{R}_+$ and $s \in \{1, \dots, \beta\}$.

(b) **Claim** If U has a state-separable utility representation, then U satisfies the sure thing principle.

pf Let $v_s : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, $s = 1, \dots, \beta$ be

$$U(c) \geq U(c') \text{ iff } \sum_s v_s(c_s) \geq \sum_s v_s(c'_s).$$

Then for any $c, c' \in \mathbb{R}_+^\beta$, $y, z \in \mathbb{R}_+$ and $\bar{s} \in \{1, \dots, \beta\}$

$$U(c-\bar{s}y) \geq U(c'-\bar{s}y) \iff \sum_{s \neq \bar{s}} v_s(c_s) + v_{\bar{s}}(y) \geq \sum_{s \neq \bar{s}} v_s(c'_s) + v_{\bar{s}}(y)$$

$$\iff \sum_{s \neq \bar{s}} v_s(c_s) \geq \sum_{s \neq \bar{s}} v_s(c'_s)$$

$$\iff \sum_{s \neq \bar{s}} v_s(c_s) + v_{\bar{s}}(z) \geq \sum_{s \neq \bar{s}} v_s(c'_s) + v_{\bar{s}}(z)$$

$$\iff U(c-\bar{s}z) \geq U(c'-\bar{s}z).$$

Thus, U satisfies the sure thing principle. \square

(c) **Claim** When $S=2$, the sure thing principle is necessary but not sufficient for U to have a state-separable representation.

pf Necessity: Obvious by (b).

Not Sufficient:

Let $U(c) = c_1 c_2$.

Prove that U satisfies the sure thing principle
but does not have a state-separable representation.

Note that U is obviously strictly increasing and continuous.

$\forall c, c' \in \mathbb{R}_+^2, y, z \in \mathbb{R}_+$,

$$\begin{aligned} U((c_i, y)) \geq U((c'_i, y)) &\Leftrightarrow y c_i \geq y c'_i \\ &\Leftrightarrow U((c_i, z)) \geq U((c'_i, z)) \end{aligned}$$

for $i=1, 2$

Thus, U satisfies the sure thing principle.

Sps U has a state-separable representation: $\exists v_1, v_2$ s.t.

$$U(c) \geq U(c') \Leftrightarrow v_1(c_1) + v_2(c_2) \geq v_1(c'_1) + v_2(c'_2)$$

Let $c = (1, 0), c' = (2, 0)$

$\bar{c} = (1, 1), \bar{c}' = (2, 1)$

We have

$$U(c) = 0 = U(c')$$

$$U(\bar{c}) = 1 < 2 = U(\bar{c}')$$

But,

$$U(c) = U(c') \Leftrightarrow v_1(1) + v_2(0) = v_1(2) + v_2(0)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow v_1(1) = v_1(2)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow v_1(1) + v_2(1) = v_1(2) + v_2(1)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow U(\bar{c}) = U(\bar{c}')$$

This is a contradiction.

Thus U has no state-separable representation and hence the sure thing principle is not sufficient.

Q.E.D.

NE & PE.

(a) ex of a game w/ NE that is not PE.

	L	R
U	1,1	0,0
R	0,0	0,0

(b) (i) $(a_{11} > a_{21} \wedge a_{12} > a_{22} \wedge b_{11} > b_{12} \wedge b_{21} > b_{22})$

$\vee (> > < <)$

$\vee (< < > >)$

$\vee (< < < <)$

(ii) $(> < < >)$

$\vee (< > > <)$

(iii) $\neg (1) \wedge \neg (2)$

(c) Fact: PE exists.

Fact: If NE is fully mixed, that is PE.

\Rightarrow It suffices to prove that non-fully-mixed NE in (iii) are PE.

Claim \neq eqm that one plays pure and the other plays mixed.

(pf) Obvious. \square

- Expectation / Conditional Expectation
- More risky

Def X is more risky than Y if $E(X) = E(Y)$ and Y SOSD X .

(a) Claim " $\forall X, Z$ w/ $E(Z) = 0$, $X+Z$ is more risky than X " is false.

⊕ Sps the statement is true.

Then X SOSD $X+Z$.

$\Leftrightarrow \forall v$: nondecreasing, continuous, concave $E v(X+Z) \leq E v(X)$.

Let $v(\cdot) = \log(\cdot)$: nondec, cont, concave.

$$\text{Let } Z = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{state 1} \\ -1 & \text{state 2} \end{cases}$$

$$X = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{state 1} \\ 3 & \text{state 2} \end{cases}$$

Also $\text{Prob}(\text{state 1}) = \text{Prob}(\text{state 2}) = \frac{1}{2}$

Then $E(Z) = 0$

Note that $E(Z | X=1) = 1 \cdot \frac{1}{\frac{1}{2}} + (-1) \cdot \frac{0}{\frac{1}{2}} = 1 \neq 0$ ✓ $\frac{\text{Prob}(Z=-1 \wedge X=1)}{\text{Prob}(X=1)}$

But we have

$$E v(X+Z) = \frac{1}{2} v(2) + \frac{1}{2} v(2)$$

$$= v(2)$$

$$= \log 2,$$

$$E v(X) = \frac{1}{2} v(1) + \frac{1}{2} v(3)$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \log 3$$

$$< \log 2,$$

This contradicts that $E v(X+Z) \leq E v(X)$.

Q.E.D.

(b) Condition: $E(z|X) = 0$.

example of X, z :

	$z = -1$	$z = 1$	Prob(X)
$X = 1$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
$X = 2$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Prob(z)	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Then } E(z|X) &= (-1) \text{Prob}(z = -1|X) + 1 \cdot \text{Prob}(z = 1|X) \\ &= (-1) \cdot \frac{\frac{1}{4}}{\frac{1}{3}} + 1 \cdot \frac{\frac{1}{2}}{\frac{1}{2}} \\ &= 0\end{aligned}$$

(c)

$$\begin{aligned}E(X+z) &= E[E(X+z|X)] \\ &= E[X + E(z|X)] \\ &= E(X) \quad (\because E(z|X) = 0.)\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}E v(X+z) &= E[E[v(X+z)|X]] \\ &\leq E[v[E(X+z|X)]] \quad (\because v \text{ concave.}) \\ &= E[v(X + E(z|X))] \\ &= E v(X) \quad (\because E(z|X) = 0)\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $\forall X, z$ w/ $E(z|X) = 0$, $X+z$ is more risky than X .

- Utility representation : $U(x) : u(x)e \sim x$.
- Necessity of Continuity & Strict increasingness.

Def \succeq is continuous if $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, $U(x) \equiv \{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid y \succeq x\}$
and $L(x) \equiv \{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid x \succeq y\}$ are closed.

Def \succeq is strictly increasing if $\forall x, y \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, $x \succeq y \wedge x \neq y$ gives $x \succ y$.

Def U is a utility representation of \succeq if $\forall x, x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$
 $U(x) \geq U(x')$ iff $x \succ x'$

(a) Claim If \succeq is cont. & str. inc, then U is well-defined & represents \succeq .
(SI)

(pf) Existence

Define $A^+(x) \equiv \{\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid \alpha e \succeq x\}$,

$A^-(x) \equiv \{\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid x \succeq \alpha e\}$.

Then (i) $A^+(x), A^-(x) \neq \emptyset$:

Let $\bar{\alpha} = \max x_i + 1$. Then $\bar{\alpha}e \succeq x \wedge \bar{\alpha}e + x \Rightarrow \bar{\alpha}e \succ x$
by (SI). Thus $\bar{\alpha} \in A^+(x)$. Also $0 \in A^-(x)$ since $x \succeq 0$.

(ii) $A^+(x), A^-(x)$ closed.

Define $A = \{\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid \alpha \geq 0\}$. Note that A is closed.

Thus $A^+(x)$ and $A^-(x)$ are closed.

since $U(x)$ and $L(x)$ are closed by the continuity.

(iii) $A^+(x) \cup A^-(x) = \mathbb{R}_+$.

Thus, since \mathbb{R}_+ is connected, $A^+(x) \cap A^-(x) \neq \emptyset$.

By def, $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \exists u(x)$ s.t. $u(x)e \in A^+(x) \cap A^-(x)$, i.e., $u(x)e \sim x$.

Thus, U is well-defined.

U represents \succeq .

$\forall x, u(x) = \alpha$ is unique. Sps $\exists \alpha' \in \mathbb{R}_+$ s.t. $\alpha'e \sim x \wedge \alpha' \neq \alpha$.

But since $\alpha e \sim x$, $\alpha e \sim \alpha'e$. Then $\alpha = \alpha'$. Contradiction.

Thus $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n, \exists!$ $u(x)$ s.t. $u(x)e \sim x$.

If $x \succeq x'$, then $u(x)e \succeq u(x')e$. If $u(x) < u(x')$, then

$u(x')e \succ u(x)e$ by (SI). Contradiction. Thus $u(x) \geq u(x')$.

If $u(x) \geq u(x')$, then $u(x)e \succeq u(x')e$. Thus $x \succeq x'$.

Q.E.D.

(b) Ex of \succeq not (SI) and u does not represent \succeq .

Consider \succeq s.t. $\forall x, x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^h$

$$x \succeq x' \quad \text{iff} \quad \|x - e\| \leq \|x' - e\|,$$

where $\|\cdot\|$ is the Euclid norm.

• \succeq is continuous:

Fix x . Let $\varepsilon_x = \|x - e\|$. Then

$$U(x) = \{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^h \mid y \succeq x\} = \{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^h \mid \|y - e\| \leq \varepsilon_x\},$$

i.e., $U(x)$ is a closed ball of radius ε_x .

$$\text{Also } L(x) = \{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^h \mid x \succeq y\} = \{y \in \mathbb{R}_+^h \mid \|y - e\| \geq \varepsilon_x\}.$$

Thus, both $U(x)$ and $L(x)$ are closed. $\Rightarrow \succeq$ continuous.

• \succeq is not SI:

$$\exists e > 2e \quad \text{but} \quad 2e \succ 3e.$$

• u does not represent \succeq :

$$u(3) > u(2) \quad \text{but} \quad 2e \succ 3e.$$

(c) Ex of \succeq not continuous and u does not represent \succeq .

Consider \succeq s.t. $\forall x, x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^h$

$$x \succeq x' \quad \text{iff} \quad (x_1 > x'_1) \text{ or } (x_1 = x'_1 \wedge x_2 \geq x'_2)$$

• \succeq is not continuous:

Let $x \in \mathbb{R}_+^h$ s.t. $x_1 = 1 = x_2$. Define

$$\text{convergent seq } \{y^m\}_{m=1}^{\infty} \text{ s.t. } y_1^m = 1 - \frac{1}{m}, \quad y_2^m = 2.$$

Since for all $m \in \mathbb{N}$, $x_1 > y_1^m$, we have $y^m \in L(x)$.

Clearly $y^m \rightarrow y$ s.t. $y_1 = 1, y_2 = 2$. Thus $y \notin L(x)$.

Therefore, $L(x)$ is not closed and hence \succeq is not continuous.

• u does not represent \succeq :

Sp's not. Consider x s.t. $x_1 = 1, x_2 > 1$. Then

since $x \succ e$, $u(x) > 1$. Also, consider x' s.t.

$x'_1 = 1 + \varepsilon = x'_2$ for some $\varepsilon > 0$. Since $x' \succ x$, $u(x') > u(x)$.

Also $x' \sim (1 + \varepsilon)e$, $u(x') = 1 + \varepsilon$. Thus $1 < u(x) < 1 + \varepsilon$

But ε can be sufficiently small, this is a contradiction.

• Optimal insurance problem

Def A agent w/ expected utility fcn U is strictly risk averse if for any risky consumption plan x , $E[U(x)] < U[E(x)]$.

(i) Claim The opt. insurance $a^* < L$: full insurance.

PF If we have the corner sol'n, obviously $a^* = 0 < L$. Thus assume interior sol'n.

* →

Pratt's Thm $\Rightarrow U$ is strictly concave. $U' > 0$, $U'' < 0$.

FOC: a^* : optimal insurance

$$\pi U'(w - L + a^*(1-p)) (1-p) + (1-\pi) U'(w - pa^*) (-p) = 0$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{U'(g)}{U'(L)} = \frac{p(1-\pi)}{\pi(1-p)}$$

$$> 1 \quad (\because p > \pi)$$

Thus $U'(g) > U'(L)$

Since U is strictly concave ($U'' < 0$), we have

$$g < L$$

$$\Leftrightarrow w - L + a^*(1-p) < w - pa^*$$

$$\Leftrightarrow a^* < L.$$

Therefore, the optimal insurance is less than full insurance.

Q.E.D.

(ii) Claim a^* is an increasing fcn of L .

PF

$$\text{Let } F(a^*, L) \equiv \pi U'(w - L + a^*(1-p))(1-p) + (1-\pi) U'(w - pa^*) (-p) = 0$$

* →

Then by the implicit fcn thm,

$$\frac{da^*(L)}{dL} = - \frac{\partial F(a^*, L) / \partial L}{\partial F(a^*, L) / \partial a^*} = \frac{\pi U''(g) (1-p) (-1)}{\pi U''(g) (1-p)^2 + (1-\pi) U''(w - pa^*) (-p)^2} > 0,$$

since U is str. concave ($U'' < 0$).

Therefore a^* is an increasing fcn of L .

Q.E.D.

Local non-satiation + Walrasian demand.

Def \succeq on \mathbb{R}_+^L is strictly convex if for all $x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L$ we have if $y \succeq x$ & $z \succeq x$ & $y \neq z$, then $\alpha y + (1-\alpha)z \succ x \quad \forall \alpha \in (0,1)$.

Def \succeq on \mathbb{R}_+^L is locally non-satiated if $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L, \forall \epsilon > 0, \exists y \in \mathbb{R}_+^L$ s.t. $\|x - y\| < \epsilon \wedge y \succ x$, where $\|\cdot\|$ is the Euclidean norm.

Def Walrasian demand $x^*(p, M)$ is a set s.t.

$$x^*(p, M) = \{ x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L \mid px \leq M \wedge \nexists x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^L \text{ s.t. } (x' \succ x \wedge px' \leq M) \}$$

(a) Claim \succeq : str. convex + increasing \Rightarrow l.n.s.

pf Fix an arbitrary $x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L$ and $\epsilon > 0$.

Since \mathbb{R}_+^L is complete, $\exists y, z \in \mathbb{R}_+^L$ s.t. $y \succeq x, z \succeq x, \|y - x\| < \epsilon, \|z - x\| < \epsilon$ and $y \neq z$.

Since \succeq is complete and increasing, we have $y \succeq x, z \succeq x$.

Then by the str. convexity, for some $\alpha \in (0,1)$,

$$\alpha y + (1-\alpha)z \succ x.$$

Since \mathbb{R}_+^L is convex, $\alpha y + (1-\alpha)z \in \mathbb{R}_+^L$.

And

$$\begin{aligned} \|\alpha y + (1-\alpha)z - x\| &= \|\alpha y - \alpha x + (1-\alpha)z - (1-\alpha)x\| \\ &\leq \|\alpha y - \alpha x\| + \|(1-\alpha)z - (1-\alpha)x\| \\ &\quad (\because \text{Triangle inequality}) \\ &= \alpha \|y - x\| + (1-\alpha) \|z - x\| \\ &< \epsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Since x and ϵ are arbitrary, this completes the proof. Q.E.D.

(b) **Claim** If \tilde{x} is l.u.s, then $\forall x \in x^*(P, M), Px = M$.

Pf Sp's not. Then $\exists x^* \in x^*(P, M)$ s.t. $Px^* < M$.

Since \tilde{x} is l.u.s, $\forall \epsilon > 0, \exists x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L \cap B_\epsilon(x^*)$ s.t. $x \succ x^*$.

Since ϵ can be sufficiently small,

$\exists x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L \cap B_\epsilon(x)$ s.t. $x \succ x^* \wedge Px < M$.

This contradicts $x^* \in x^*(P, M)$. Thus $Px^* = M$. Q.E.D.

(c) **Claim** The following statement is not true:

" $\forall P \in \mathbb{R}_+^L, \forall M > 0$, if $x \in x^*(P, M)$ satisfies $Px = M$, then \tilde{x} is l.u.s."

Counter example:

$$L=1, P=1, M=1.$$

$$\tilde{x}: \forall x, x' \in \mathbb{R}_+,$$

$$x \tilde{x} x' \text{ iff } |x-2| \leq |x'-2|.$$

Then,

$$x^*(1, 1) \equiv \{x \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid x=1 \wedge (\nexists x' \in \mathbb{R}_+ \text{ s.t. } x' \leq 1 \wedge |x'-2| \leq |x-2|)\} \\ = \{1\}.$$

Thus, $\forall x \in x^*(1, 1), x=1$, i.e., $Px=M$ is satisfied.

But \tilde{x} is not l.u.s:

$$\text{Take } x=2 \text{ and } \epsilon > 0. \text{ Then } \forall y \in \mathbb{R}_+ \cap B_\epsilon(x), |x-2| \leq |y-2| \\ \Leftrightarrow x \tilde{x} y.$$

◦ Indirect utility fcn

□

Def Indirect utility fcn is $u^*(p, M) = u(x^*)$ where $x^* \in x^*(p, M)$ and $x^*(p, M)$ is the Walrasian demand for $p \in \mathbb{R}_+^L$; $M > 0$.

Def u^* is quasi-convex in p if $\forall \bar{u} \in \mathbb{R}, M \in \mathbb{R}_+$,
 $A(M, \bar{u}) \equiv \{p \in \mathbb{R}_+^L \mid u^*(p, M) \leq \bar{u}\}$ is convex, i.e.,
 $\forall p, p' \in A(M, \bar{u}), \forall \lambda \in (0, 1), \lambda p + (1-\lambda)p' \in A(M, \bar{u})$.

(a) Claim u^* is quasi-convex.

* pf Let $p, p' \in A(M, \bar{u})$.

Consider $\lambda p + (1-\lambda)p' = p_\lambda$.

$\forall x$ s.t. $p_\lambda x \leq M$,

$$p_\lambda x \leq M$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \lambda p x + (1-\lambda)p' x \leq \lambda M + (1-\lambda)M$$

\rightarrow at least, $p x \leq M$ or $p' x \leq M$ holds.

\rightarrow at least, $u(x) \leq u^*(p, M)$ or $u(x) \leq u^*(p', M)$ holds

(since x is affordable)

$p, p' \in A(M, \bar{u})$ implies

$$u(x) \leq \bar{u}$$

Therefore, $\forall x$ s.t. $p_\lambda x \leq M$, we have $u(x) \leq \bar{u}$.

This means that $p_\lambda \in A(M, \bar{u})$.

Q.E.D.

(b) Claim If u is quasi-linear, then u^* is linear in M on the domain of (p, M) where the Walrasian demand is interior.

pf See HW3 Q1 for v diff. case.

Consider a maximization problem:

$$(*) \begin{cases} \max_{x_1, \dots, x_L} & u(x_1, \dots, x_L) = x_1 + v(x_2, \dots, x_L) \\ \text{s.t.} & p x \leq M \\ & x \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

Since u is strictly increasing ($\because v$ is strictly increasing),
the BC holds w/ equality:

Thus (*) becomes

$$\max_{\{x_2, \dots, x_L\}} \frac{M}{P_1} - \frac{P_2}{P_1} x_2 - \dots - \frac{P_L}{P_1} x_L + v(x_2, \dots, x_L)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \frac{M}{P_1} - \frac{P_2}{P_1} x_2 - \dots - \frac{P_L}{P_1} x_L \geq 0$$
$$x_2, \dots, x_L \geq 0.$$

Here we are using $P_1 > 0$ since if $P_1 = 0$ then the Walrasian demand is not well-defined.

Focusing on (P, M) s.t. the Walrasian demand is interior,
we know that the all constraints are not binding.

Thus,

$$u^*(P, M) = \max_{\{x_2, \dots, x_L\}} \frac{M}{P_1} - \frac{P_2}{P_1} x_2 - \dots - \frac{P_L}{P_1} x_L + v(x_2, \dots, x_L)$$

Therefore, u^* is a linear fcn of M .

Q.E.P.

- Independence axiom
- Part of the proof of vNM Thm

Def \succsim on \mathcal{L} is continuous if $\forall L, L', L'' \in \mathcal{L}$,
 $A^+(L) \equiv \{\alpha \in [0,1] \mid \alpha L' + (1-\alpha)L'' \succsim L\}$ and $A^-(L) \equiv \{\alpha \in [0,1] \mid L \succsim \alpha L' + (1-\alpha)L''\}$ are closed.

Def Let $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_k\}$, $L_i = (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k)$, $i=1,2$.

Compound lottery $L_1 \alpha L_2$ is a lottery that puts a probability $\alpha \pi_i^1 + (1-\alpha) \pi_i^2$ on the outcome x_i for every $i=1, \dots, k$.

(a) \succsim satisfies the independence axiom if $\forall L, L', L'' \in \mathcal{L}$, $\forall \alpha \in [0,1]$, we have
 $L \succsim L'$ iff $\alpha L + (1-\alpha)L'' \succsim \alpha L' + (1-\alpha)L''$.

(b) Example of \succsim which does not satisfy (IA).

Let $k=2$. Consider \succsim on \mathcal{L} :

$$L \succsim L' \iff \min\{\pi_1, \pi_2\} \geq \min\{\pi_1', \pi_2'\}$$

Consider 2 lotteries

$$L = \left(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}\right), \quad L' = \left(\frac{3}{4}, \frac{1}{4}\right).$$

Then $L \succ L'$ since $\min\{\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}\} = \frac{1}{3} > \frac{1}{4} = \min\{\frac{3}{4}, \frac{1}{4}\}$.

Taking $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$ and $L'' = (0, 1)$, we have

$$\alpha L' + (1-\alpha)L'' \succ \alpha L + (1-\alpha)L''$$

since

$$\begin{aligned} & \min\left\{\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 0, \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1\right\} \\ &= \min\left\{\frac{1}{6}, \frac{5}{6}\right\} \\ &= \frac{1}{6} \\ &< \frac{3}{8} \\ &= \min\left\{\frac{3}{8}, \frac{5}{8}\right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, \succsim does not satisfy the (IA).

(c) **Claim** If Σ is continuous and satisfies (IA), then $\forall L_1, L_2, L$
 s.t. $L_1 \succ L \succ L_2 \exists! \alpha \in [0, 1]$ s.t. $L \sim L \alpha L_2$.

(pf) Since Σ is continuous,

$$A^+(L) = \{ \alpha \in [0, 1] \mid \alpha L_1 + (1-\alpha)L_2 \succeq L \}$$

$$\text{and } A^-(L) = \{ \alpha \in [0, 1] \mid L \succeq \alpha L_1 + (1-\alpha)L_2 \}$$

are closed.

Since $1 \in A^+(L)$ and $0 \in A^-(L)$, both are nonempty.

Clearly $A^+(L) \cup A^-(L) = [0, 1]$.

Thus, since $[0, 1]$ is connected, $\exists \alpha_L \in [0, 1]$ s.t. $\alpha_L \in A^+(L) \cap A^-(L)$,
 i.e., $L \sim L \alpha_L L_2$.

Next, prove the uniqueness of α_L

Sps $\exists \alpha, \alpha' \in A^+(L) \cap A^-(L)$ s.t. $\alpha \neq \alpha'$.

WLOG, let $\alpha > \alpha'$.

$$L \alpha L_2 = \beta L_1 + (1-\beta)(L \alpha' L_2)$$

$$\text{where } \beta = \frac{\alpha - \alpha'}{1 - \alpha'}$$

Note that $\beta \in [0, 1]$ since $\alpha > \alpha'$.

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} L \alpha L_2 &= \beta L_1 + (1-\beta)(L \alpha' L_2) \\ &> \beta (L \alpha' L_2) + (1-\beta)(L \alpha' L_2) \\ &= L \alpha' L_2, \end{aligned}$$

where the 2nd line holds by the (IA) and the fact that

$$L_1 \succ L \alpha' L_2$$

$$\text{given by } L_1 = L \alpha' L_1$$

$$\succ L \alpha' L_2 \quad (\text{by (IA), } L_1 \succ L_2).$$

But this contradicts that $\alpha, \alpha' \in A^+(L) \cap A^-(L)$, i.e.,

$$L \alpha L_2 \sim L \sim L \alpha' L_2.$$

Therefore, $\alpha_L \in A^+(L) \cap A^-(L)$ is unique.

Q.E.D.

◦ Dual Theory

◦ Examples of util. fcn which does not satisfy each property.

Def Walrasian demand $x^*(\cdot, \cdot)$ is a set s.t. for $P \gg 0$, $w > 0$,

$$x^*(P, w) = \{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid Px \leq w \wedge \nexists x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \text{ s.t. } u(x') > u(x) \wedge Px' \leq w\}$$

Def Hicksian demand $h(\cdot, \cdot)$ is a set s.t. for $P \gg 0$, $\bar{u} \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$h(P, \bar{u}) = \{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid u(x) \geq \bar{u} \wedge \nexists x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \text{ s.t. } Px' < Px \wedge u(x) \geq \bar{u}\}$$

Def $U: \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a quasi-concave utility fcn if $\forall x, x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n, \forall \alpha \in (0, 1)$

$$U(\alpha x + (1-\alpha)x') \geq \min\{U(x), U(x')\}$$

(i) Claim If U is continuous and locally non-satiated, then

$$h(P, \bar{u}) = x^*(P, e(P, \bar{u})) \text{ and}$$

$$x^*(P, w) = h(P, U^*(P, w)).$$

(pf)

Lemma 1: U is l.n.s $\Rightarrow Px = w, \forall x \in x^*(P, w)$

(pf) sps not. Then $\exists x \in x^*(P, w)$ s.t. $Px < w$.

Let $\varepsilon > 0$ s.t. $\varepsilon \leq w - Px$. Then $Px + \varepsilon \leq w$ or $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i(x_i + \frac{\varepsilon}{np_i}) \leq w$.

Let $\bar{\varepsilon} \equiv \min \frac{\varepsilon}{np_i}$.

Since U is l.n.s, $\exists x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ s.t. $\|x' - x\| < \bar{\varepsilon} \wedge U(x') > U(x)$.

But we have $Px' \leq w$ since

$$Px' \leq P(x + \bar{\varepsilon}e) \text{ where } e: \text{unit vector}$$

$$\leq Px + \varepsilon \leq w$$

This contradicts that $x \in x^*(P, w)$ □

Lemma 2: U is continuous $\Rightarrow U(x) = \bar{u}, \forall x \in h(P, \bar{u})$.

(pf) sps not. Then $\exists x \in h(P, \bar{u})$ s.t. $U(x) > \bar{u}$.

Let $\varepsilon = U(x) - \bar{u}$.

Since U is continuous, $\exists \delta > 0$ s.t. $\forall x' \text{ s.t. } \|x' - x\| < \delta, |U(x') - U(x)| < \varepsilon$

Let $x' \equiv \alpha x$ w/ $\alpha \in (0, 1)$. Clearly $P \cdot x' < Px$

But we have $U(x') > \bar{u}$ for α sufficiently close to 1 since

$$\|x' - x\| < \delta \Rightarrow |U(x') - U(x)| < \varepsilon$$

$$\Rightarrow 0 < U(x') - U(x) < \varepsilon \text{ or } 0 < U(x) - U(x') < \varepsilon = U(x) - \bar{u}$$

$$\Rightarrow U(x') > U(x) \geq \bar{u} \text{ or } U(x') > \bar{u}. \Rightarrow x \in h(P, \bar{u}). \square$$

Prove that $h(p, \bar{u}) \subset x^*(p, e(p, \bar{u}))$. (*)

Pick $x \in h(p, \bar{u})$.

Then we know $e(p, \bar{u}) = px$ (by def) & $u(x) = \bar{u}$ (by Lemma 2).

Sps not. Then $x \notin x^*(p, e(p, \bar{u}))$.

$\exists x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ s.t. $u(x') > u(x) \wedge px' \leq e(p, \bar{u})$.

$$\rightarrow u(x') > \bar{u} \wedge px' \leq px$$

Since u is continuous, $\exists x'' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ s.t. $u(x'') \geq \bar{u} \wedge px'' < px' \leq px$.

This contradicts that $x \in h(p, \bar{u})$. Thus $x \in x^*(p, e(p, \bar{u}))$.

$$\text{Also } u^*(p, e(p, \bar{u})) = u(x) = \bar{u} \quad \text{. (†)}$$

Prove that $x^*(p, w) \subset h(p, u^*(p, w))$. (**)

Pick $x \in x^*(p, w)$. Then $u(x) = u^*(p, w)$ (by def) and $px = w$ (by Lemma 1)

Sps not. Then $x \notin h(p, u^*(p, w))$.

$\exists x' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ s.t. $px' < px \wedge u(x') \geq u^*(p, w)$.

$$\rightarrow px' < w \wedge u(x') \geq u(x)$$

Since u is l.h.s., $\exists x'' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ s.t. $px'' \leq w \wedge u(x'') > u(x') \geq u(x)$

This contradicts that $x \in x^*(p, w)$. Thus $x \in h(p, u^*(p, w))$.

$$\text{Also } e(p, u^*(p, w)) = px = w \quad \text{. (‡)}$$

Prove that $x^*(p, e(p, \bar{u})) \subset h(p, \bar{u})$.

Pick $x \in x^*(p, e(p, \bar{u}))$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Then } x \in x^*(p, e(p, \bar{u})) &\subset h(p, u^*(p, e(p, \bar{u}))) && \text{by (†)} \\ &= h(p, \bar{u}) && \text{by (†)} \end{aligned}$$

Prove that $h(p, u^*(p, w)) \subset x^*(p, w)$

Pick $x \in h(p, u^*(p, w))$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Then } x \in h(p, u^*(p, w)) &\subset x^*(p, e(p, u^*(p, w))) && \text{by (‡)} \\ &= x^*(p, w) && \text{by (‡)} \end{aligned}$$

Thus we get

$$h(p, \bar{u}) = x^*(p, e(p, \bar{u})).$$

$$\text{and } x^*(p, w) = h(p, u^*(p, w)).$$

Q.E.D.

(ii) Ex of : ① U is not continuous $\Rightarrow x \neq h$

② U l.h.s. $\Rightarrow h$

① $n=2$.

$$U(x) = \begin{cases} x_1 + x_2 & \text{if } x_1 + x_2 < 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } x_1 + x_2 = 1 \wedge x_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} \\ 2 & \text{if } x_1 + x_2 = 1 \wedge x_1 > \frac{1}{2} \\ x_1 + x_2 + 1 & \text{if } x_1 + x_2 > 1 \end{cases}$$

Then U is not continuous.

Set $P = (1, 1)$, $\bar{u} = 1$. Then

$$h(P, \bar{u}) = \{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \mid x_1 + x_2 = 1\}, \quad e(P, \bar{u}) = 1.$$

$$x(P, e(P, \bar{u})) = \{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \mid x_1 + x_2 = 1, x_1 > \frac{1}{2}\}.$$

② $n=1$

$$U(x) = \begin{cases} x & \text{if } 0 \leq x < 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } x \geq 1. \end{cases}$$

Then U is not l.h.s.

Set $P = 1$, $w = 2$. Then

$$X(P, w) = [1, 2], \quad U^*(P, w) = 1$$

$$h(P, U^*(P, w)) = \{1\}.$$

(iii) Ex of : U : quasi-concave but not concave.

$$U(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } 0 \leq x < 1 \\ x & \text{if } x \geq 1 \end{cases}$$


$\forall x, x' \in \mathbb{R}_+$, $\forall \lambda \in (0, 1)$.

$$U(\lambda x + (1-\lambda)x') \geq \min\{U(x), U(x')\} \Rightarrow \text{quasi-concave}$$

But for $x = \frac{1}{2}$, $x' = \frac{3}{2}$, $\lambda = \frac{1}{2}$,

$$U\left(\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{3}{2}\right) = U(1) = 1$$

$$\frac{1}{2} U\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) + \frac{1}{2} U\left(\frac{3}{2}\right) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{3}{4} = \frac{5}{4} \Rightarrow \text{not concave.}$$



Claim u : quasi-concave $\rightarrow \mathcal{X}^*$: convex valued.

Ⓟ Take $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^*(p, w)$

Prove that $\alpha x + (1-\alpha)x' \equiv x_\alpha \in \mathcal{X}^*(p, w), \forall \alpha \in (0, 1)$.

Since $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^*(p, w)$, $u^*(p, w) = u(x) = u(x')$.

Since u is quasi-concave,

$$u(x_\alpha) \geq \min \{u(x), u(x')\} \\ = u^*(p, w).$$

Also, x_α is affordable:

$$px_\alpha = \alpha px + (1-\alpha)px' \\ \leq w.$$

Therefore, $x_\alpha \in \mathcal{X}^*(p, w)$.

Since x, x' are arbitrary, \mathcal{X}^* is convex-valued. Q.E.D.

- Lexicographic Preference and its utility representation

Def Lexicographic preference on $\mathbb{Q}_+ \times \mathbb{Q}_+$ is a preference \succeq s.t. $\forall x, y \in \mathbb{Q}_+^2$,

$$x \succeq y \iff x_1 > y_1 \text{ or } (x_1 = y_1 \wedge x_2 \geq y_2)$$

where $x = (x_1, x_2)$, $y = (y_1, y_2)$.

Def \succeq has a utility ^(function) representation $u: \mathbb{Q}_+^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ if $\forall x, y \in \mathbb{Q}_+^2$,

$$x \succeq y \iff u(x) \geq u(y).$$

Claim \succeq does not have a utility representation.

pf Sps \succeq has a utility rep. u , i.e.,

$$x \succeq y \iff u(x) \geq u(y).$$

Consider x, x' s.t. $x = (r, 1)$, $x' = (r, 0)$ where r is an arbitrary rational number.

By def of lexicographic pref, we have

$$x \succ x'.$$

Thus $u(x) > u(x')$.

Since $u(x), u(x') \in \mathbb{R}$ and \mathbb{R} is a complete space,

$$\exists p \in \mathbb{R} \setminus \mathbb{Q} \text{ s.t. } u(x) > p > u(x').$$

Similarly, consider y, y' s.t. $y = (r', 1)$, $y' = (r', 0)$ where $r' \in \mathbb{Q}_+$ s.t. $r' < r$.

We also have $\exists p' \in \mathbb{R} \setminus \mathbb{Q}$ s.t.

$$u(y) > p' > u(y').$$

But since we have $p > u(x') > u(y) > p'$,

we have $\forall r, r' \in \mathbb{Q}$, $\exists p, p' \in \mathbb{R} \setminus \mathbb{Q}$ s.t.

$$r > r' \implies p > p'.$$

X

◦ Corollary of Pratt's Thm

(a) Def Spc v is strictly increasing and twice differentiable.

Then Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion at wealth w is defined by

$$A(w) = \frac{-v''(w)}{v'(w)}$$

Def Risk compensation for v with a deterministic wealth w and a risk z s.t.

$E(z) = 0$ is defined by $p(w, z)$ s.t.

$$E[v(w+z)] = v(w - p(w, z)).$$

(b) Claim $A(w)$ is increasing in w iff $p(w, z)$ is increasing in w for z w/ $E(z) = 0$.

⊕ (Sketch: see 2007 spring QI.2 for the detail)

Take $\tilde{v}(w) = v(w + \epsilon)$, $\forall w$.

Then prove that $A_{\tilde{v}}(w) = A_v(w + \epsilon)$ and $p_{\tilde{v}}(w, z) = p_v(w + \epsilon, z)$.

Then apply the Pratt's Thm.

Q.E.D

Pratt's Thm The followings are equivalent: (v_1, v_2 : strictly inc & twice diff')

(1) $A_1(w) \geq A_2(w), \forall w \in \mathbb{R}$

(2) $p_1(w, z) \geq p_2(w, z), \forall w \in \mathbb{R}, \forall$ risky plan z w/ $E(z)=0$

(3) $v_1(w) = f(v_2(w)) \forall w \in \mathbb{R}$ w/ f : concave & strictly increasing

(pf) (1) \Rightarrow (3) : LN p.36

(3) \Rightarrow (2) : LN p.36

(2) \Rightarrow (1) :

Spc not. Then $A_1(w) < A_2(w), \exists w \in \mathbb{R}$

Thus by (1) \Rightarrow (3), $\exists f$ strictly concave s.t. $v_2(w) = f(v_1(w))$

For some z w/ $E(z)=0$,

$$E v_2(w, z) = v_2(w - p_2(w, z))$$

"

$$E f(v_1(w, z)) < f[E(v_1(w, z))] \quad (\text{by Jensen's inequality})$$

$$= f[v_1(w - p_1(w, z))]$$

$$= v_2(w - p_1(w, z)) \quad (\text{by def of } f)$$

Since v_2 is strictly increasing,

$$p_1(w, z) < p_2(w, z)$$

This is a contradiction. Thus $A_1(w) \geq A_2(w)$.

Q.E.D.

- Hicksian demand fcn.
- Slutsky matrix

Def $h: \mathbb{R}_+^n \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^n$ is a Hicksian demand if
 $h(p, \bar{u}) = \{h \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid u(h) \geq \bar{u} \text{ and } \nexists h' \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \text{ s.t. } u(h') \geq \bar{u} \wedge p h' < p h\}$

- (a) Claim h is monotonically decreasing in p :
 $[p - p'] [h(p, \bar{u}) - h(p', \bar{u})] \leq 0 \quad \forall p, p', \bar{u}$

(pf) By def of h (h is a fcn), $\forall p, p', \bar{u}$,
 $p h(p, \bar{u}) \leq p h(p', \bar{u})$,
 $p' h(p', \bar{u}) \leq p' h(p, \bar{u})$.

Adding the both sides gives us

$$[p - p'] [h(p, \bar{u}) - h(p', \bar{u})] \leq 0 \quad \square$$

- (b) Claim $D_p h(p, \bar{u})$ is negative semi-definite.

(pf) Define the expenditure fcn:

$$e(p, \bar{u}) \equiv p h(p, \bar{u}).$$

Prove that e is concave in p :

$$\begin{aligned} e(\lambda p + (1-\lambda)p', \bar{u}) &= [\lambda p + (1-\lambda)p'] h(\lambda p + (1-\lambda)p', \bar{u}) \\ &\geq \lambda p h(p, \bar{u}) + (1-\lambda)p' h(p', \bar{u}) \\ &= \lambda e(p, \bar{u}) + (1-\lambda)e(p', \bar{u}). \end{aligned}$$

* →

Prove that $D_p e(p, \bar{u}) = h(p, \bar{u})$:

(pf) It is easy to prove that h is HD 0.

So $\forall \alpha > 0$, $h(\alpha p, \bar{u}) = h(p, \bar{u})$, $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$

Differentiate by α : $p_i h'_i(\alpha p, \bar{u}) = 0$

Set $\alpha = 1$: $p_i h'_i(p, \bar{u}) = 0$

$\therefore D_p h(p, \bar{u}) P = 0$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Thus } D_p e(p, \bar{u}) &= h(p, \bar{u}) + D_p h(p, \bar{u}) P \\ &= h(p, \bar{u}). \end{aligned} \quad \square$$

(PF 2) Define $F(p) = p \overbrace{h(p, \bar{u})}^{e(p, \bar{u})} - p h(\bar{p}, \bar{u})$ for some $\bar{p} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^n$.
 By def of h , $F(p) \leq 0$
 and $F(\bar{p}) = 0$.

Then $DF(p) = D_p e(p, \bar{u}) - h(\bar{p}, \bar{u})$

Since \bar{p} is a soln to $F(p) = 0$,

$$DF(\bar{p}) = 0 = D_p e(\bar{p}, \bar{u}) - h(\bar{p}, \bar{u})$$

$$\therefore D_p e(p, \bar{u}) = h(p, \bar{u}) \quad (\because \bar{p} \text{ is arbitrary})$$

Since h is diff,

$$D_{\bar{p}}^2 e(p, \bar{u}) = D_p h(p, \bar{u})$$

And since e is concave, we have $D_p h(p, \bar{u})$ is negative semi-definite.

(c) Dual Theory:

$$\begin{cases} h(p, \bar{u}) = x^+(p, e(p, \bar{u})) \\ x^+(p, w) = h(p, u^+(p, w)) \end{cases}$$

Define $w = e(p, \bar{u})$

Then we have

$$\star \rightarrow D_p h(p, \bar{u}) = D_p x^+(p, w) + D_w x^+(p, w) \cdot x^+(p, w)$$

Thus the Slutsky matrix

$$S(p, w) \equiv D_p x^+(p, w) + D_w x^+(p, w) x^+(p, w)$$

is negative semi-definite.

Moreover, we have

$$\frac{\partial x^+(p, w)}{\partial p_i} + \frac{\partial x^+(p, w)}{\partial w} x^+(p, w) \leq 0 \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$$

Micro

F 2007	Allen	Rustichini	Werner*		
S 2007	Allen	Rustichini*	Werner		
F 2006	Allen	Rustichini*	Werner		
S 2006	Allen	McLennan	Rustichini	Werner*	
F 2005	Allen	Hurwicz	McLennan	Rustichini	Werner*
S 2005	Allen*	Hurwicz	McLennan	Rustichini	Werner
F 2004	Allen*	Hurwicz	McLennan	Rustichini	Werner
S 2004	Allen	Hurwicz	Richter	Rustichini*	
F 2003	Allen	Hurwicz	Richter*	Rustichini	
S 2003	Allen	Hurwicz	Richter	Rustichini	Werner*
F 2002	Allen	Hurwicz*	Rustichini	Werner	
S 2002	Allen	Rustichini	Richter	Werner*	
F 2001	Allen	McLennan	Richter*	Werner	
S 2001	Allen	McLennan	Richter	Werner*	
F 2000	Allen	McLennan*	Richter	Werner	
S 2000	Allen	McLennan	Richter	Werner*	

Macro

F 2007	Chari	Jones*	P.Kehoe	Perri	
S 2007	Chari*	Jones	T. Kehoe	Kocherlakota	
S 2006	Chari	Jones	T. Kehoe		
F 2005	Chari	Jones*	T. Kehoe		
S 2005	Chari*	Jones	T. Kehoe		
F 2004	Chari*	Jones	T. Kehoe		
S 2004	Chari*	Jones	T. Kehoe		
F 2003	Chari*	Jones	T. Kehoe		
S 2003	Chari	Jones	Prescott*		
F 2002	Chari	Jones	Prescott*	Kocherlakota	
S 2002	Chari*	Jones	Prescott	Kocherlakota	
F 2001	Chari*	Jones	Prescott	Kocherlakota	
S 2001	Jones*	T. Kehoe	Kocherlakota	Prescott	
F 2000	T. Kehoe*	Jones	Kocherlakota	Prescott*	
S 2000	T. Kehoe*	Jones	Kocherlakota	Santos	