The End of the Global Savings Glut and the Future of the U.S. Economy

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Introduction

The United States has borrowed heavily from rest of world since 1990s.

Recent European experience suggests low interest rates and successful debt auctions may not be good indicators of future.

What happens when the United States starts to repay debt?

What happens if foreigners stop lending suddenly rather than gradually?

Global savings glut

[O]ver the past decade a combination of diverse forces has created a significant increase in the global supply of saving — a global saving glut — which helps to explain both the increase in the U.S. current account deficit and the relatively low level of long-term real interest rates in the world today.

Ben Bernanke, 2005

A large literature seeks to explain savings glut

Example: Financial integration with asymmetric financial development (Mendoza et al., 2009; Caballero et al. 2008)

We focus on its long run consequences

What we do

- Interpret savings glut as shocks to rest of world's discount factor.
- Build model consistent with key facts about U.S. economy since 1992.
- Assess long-run implications of end to savings glut for U.S. economy.
- Emphasize reallocation effects on goods, services, construction sectors.

Exit scenarios

1. Gradual rebalancing

Demand for U.S. bonds falls slowly over time

2. Orderly sudden stop

Foreigners suddenly stop lending

Spain during 1992–1993 ERM crisis

3. Disorderly sudden stop

TFP drops when lending ceases

Mexico (1995), South Korea (1997), PIIGS (now)

Findings


End of savings glut has long-run consequences:

- Trade balance reversal.
- Real exchange rate depreciation.
- Reallocation to goods from construction.


Sudden stop causes changes to occur immediately.

Reallocation into goods is limited by services' export orientation and structural change.

Exit scenarios differ in short run but have similar long-run effects.



Real exchange rate, trade balance, and current account balance



Disaggregated trade balances

Model's in-sample performance

Model matches key facts about U.S. economy since 1992:

- 1. Trade deficit grew.
- 2. Trade balance dynamics driven by goods, not services.
- 3. RER appreciated.

Modeling the savings glut

Dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model with two countries, United States (US) and rest of the world (RW).

Key assumptions for modeling savings glut:

- RW's discount factor is same as that of US in long run.
- RW's discount factor varies over time (deterministically in some cases and stochastically in others) and is calibrated to match the path of the trade balance 1992–2011.

We could also calibrate RW's discount factor to match the RER 1992–2011.

Uncertainty and unexpected shocks

In 1992, agents expect economy to follow deterministic path without savings glut.

In 1998 savings glut unexpectedly starts and lasts until 2011.

During 1998–2010 agents assign a probability of 0.10 to the savings glut ending the next year.

After 2011, agents expect economy to follow deterministic path.

In the sudden stop exit scenarios a sudden stop unexpectedly occurs in 2015–2016.

In the disorderly sudden stop exit scenario there is a negative shock to productivity of 5 percent; in the orderly sudden stop exit scenario there is not.

Production in US

Domestic goods and services:

$$y_{djt}^{us} = \min \left[z_{gjt}^{us} / a_{gj}, z_{sjt}^{us} / a_{sj}, A_j \left(k_{jt}^{us} \right)^{\alpha_j} \left(\gamma^t \ell_{jt}^{us} \right)^{1-\alpha_j} \right], \ j = g, s$$

Armington aggregators:

$$y_{jt}^{us} = M_{j}^{us} \left(\mu_{j}^{us} (x_{djt}^{us})^{\zeta_{j}} + (1 - \mu_{j}^{us}) (x_{mjt}^{us})^{\zeta_{j}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\zeta_{j}}}, \ j = g, s$$

Construction:

$$y_{ct}^{us} = \min\left[z_{gct}^{us} / a_{gc}, z_{sct}^{us} / a_{sc}, A_c \left(k_{ct}^{us}\right)^{\alpha_j} \left(\gamma^t \ell_{ct}^{us}\right)^{1-\alpha_j}\right]$$

Investment good:

$$y_{it}^{us} = G\left(z_{git}^{us}\right)^{\theta_g} \left(z_{sit}^{us}\right)^{\theta_s} \left(z_{cit}^{us}\right)^{\theta_c}.$$

Households

Adult equivalent population:

$$n^{i} = \overline{\ell}_{t}^{i} + \frac{\widetilde{n}_{t}^{i} - \overline{\ell}_{t}^{i}}{2}, \ i = us, rw,$$

where \tilde{n}_t^i is population and $\overline{\ell}_t^i$ is working-age population.

US CPI

$$p_{cpit}^{us} = \frac{p_{gt}^{us} c_{g1992}^{us} + p_{st}^{us} c_{s1992}^{us}}{p_{g1992}^{us} c_{g1992}^{us} + p_{s1992}^{us} c_{s1992}^{us}}$$

Households in US

Maximize

$$E_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\beta^{us} \right)^t \left(\left(\varepsilon^{us}_{st} \left(\frac{c^{us}_{gt}}{n^{us}_t} \right)^{\rho} + (1 - \varepsilon^{us}) \left(\frac{c^{us}_{st}}{n^{us}_t} \right)^{\rho} \right)^{\frac{\eta \psi}{\rho}} \left(\frac{\overline{\ell}^{us}_t - \ell^{us}_t}{\overline{\ell}^{us}_t} \right)^{(1 - \eta)\psi} - 1 \right) / \psi \right]$$

subject to

$$p_{gt}^{us}c_{gt}^{us} + p_{st}^{us}c_{st}^{us} + p_{it}^{us}i_{t}^{us} + q_{t}b_{t+1}^{us} = w_{t}^{us}\ell_{t}^{us} + p_{cpit}^{us}b_{t}^{us} + (1 - \tau_{k}^{us})r_{kt}^{us}k_{t}^{us} - T_{t}^{us},$$

$$k_{t+1}^{us} = (1 - \delta)k_{t}^{us} + i_{t}^{us},$$

non-negativity, initial endowments \overline{k}_{1992}^{us} and \overline{b}_{1992}^{us} , no Ponzi schemes.

Households in RW

Maximize

$$E_0\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\beta^{rw}\right)^t \omega_t^{rw} \left(\left(\varepsilon^{rw}_{gt} \frac{c_{gt}^{rw}}{n_t^{rw}}\right)^{\rho} + (1-\varepsilon^{rw})\left(\frac{c_{st}^{rw}}{n_t^{rw}}\right)^{\rho}\right)^{\frac{\psi}{\rho}} - 1\right)/\psi\right]$$

subject to

$$p_{gt}^{rw}c_{gt}^{rw} + p_{st}^{rw}c_{st}^{rw} + q_t b_{t+1}^{rw} = p_{dgt}^{rw}y_{dgt}^{rw} + p_{dst}^{rw}y_{dst}^{rw} + p_{cpit}^{us}b_t^{rw}$$

non-negativity, initial endowment \overline{b}_{1992}^{rw} , no Ponzi schemes.

RW also has Armington aggregators for c_{gt}^{rw} , c_{st}^{rw} .

Bonds

Bonds pay off in US CPI baskets. If r_{kt}^{us} is the rental rate on capital, arbitrage implies

$$E_{t}\left[\frac{p_{cpit+1}^{us}}{q_{t}}\right] = E_{t}\left[\frac{(1-\tau^{us})r_{kt+1}^{us} + p_{it+1}^{us}(1-\delta)}{p_{it}^{us}}\right].$$

Real exchange rate

$$RER_{t} = \frac{p_{cpit}^{rw}}{p_{cpit}^{us}}$$

Government

Maximize

$$\left(g_{gt}^{us}\right)^{\varepsilon^{g}}\left(g_{st}^{us}\right)^{1-\varepsilon^{g}}$$

subject to

$$p_{gt}^{us}g_{gt}^{us} + p_{st}^{us}g_{st}^{us} = v_t GDP_t^{us}.$$

Government budget constraint:

$$p_{gt}^{us}g_{gt}^{us} + p_{st}^{us}g_{st}^{us} - p_{cpit}^{us}b_t^g = \tau_k^{us}r_{kt}^{us}k_t^{us} + T_t^{us} - q_tb_t^g.$$

Government debt:

$$b_t^g = v_t GDP_t^{us}.$$

Market clearing

Domestic production:

$$x_{djt}^{us} = y_{djt}^{us}$$
, $x_{djt}^{rw} = y_{djt}^{rw}$, $j = g$, s

US Armington aggregates:

$$c_{jt}^{us} + g_{jt}^{us} + x_{mjt}^{rw} + z_{gjt}^{us} + z_{sjt}^{us} + z_{cjt}^{us} + z_{jit}^{us} = y_{jt}^{us}, \ j = g, s$$

US construction:

$$z_{cit}^{us} = y_{dt}^{us}.$$

US investment:

$$i_t^{us} = y_{it}^{us}.$$

RW Armington aggregates:

$$c_{jt}^{rw} + x_{mjt}^{us} = y_{tjt}^{rw}, \ j = g, s.$$

Factor markets:

$$k_{gt}^{us} + k_{st}^{us} + k_{ct}^{us} = k_t^{us}$$
$$\ell_{gt}^{us} + \ell_{st}^{us} + \ell_{ct}^{us} = \ell_t^{us}.$$

Bonds:

$$b_t^{us} + b_t^g + b_t^{rw} = 0.$$

Calibration

U.S. input-output matrix for 1992

CBO estimates for government expenditure and debt


UN World Population Prospects

Armington elasticity of 3 for goods, 1 for services


Discount factor calibrated to 3 percent per year interest rate in balanced growth path


In base case, productivity growth of 2 percent per year in all sectors






Real exchange rate






Disaggregated trade balances





Sector-level employment growth



Real interest rates on US bonds


Trade balance







Disaggregated trade balance

Real exchange rate




Real GDP projections







Sector-level employment projections, gradual rebalancing



Total employment projections, rebalancing vs. sudden stop




Goods employment projections, rebalancing vs. sudden stop




Services employment projections, rebalancing vs. sudden stop







Suppose that we calibrate RW discount factor shocks to match RER




RW discount factor shocks to match RER



Real exchange rate counterfactual




Trade balance when targeting real exchange rate




Disaggregated trade balances when targeting real exchange rate

Suppose that productivity growth in goods in much higher than in services and construction.


Labor reallocation into goods is sensitive to assumptions about structural change; other variables are not.




Trade balance with structural change




Disaggregated trade balances with structural change




Real exchange rate with structural change




Total employment with structural change




Goods employment with structural change



Services employment with structural change



Construction employment with structural change




Sector-level employment growth

Summary and conclusion

Savings glut explains key facts about U.S. economy since 1992.

Exit scenario has small long-run implications.

Savings glut has large long-run implications.



Trade balance counterfactual: savings glut vs. no savings glut


Two puzzles

RER and trade balance:


In the data, the RER starts to depreciate in 2003 while the trade deficit starts to fall in 2007. In model they move together.

Interest rates and RER:

The model generates only a very small drop in the U.S. interest rate compared to that in the data. It does generate an appreciation in the RER comparable to that in the data.



Real exchange rate, trade balance, and current account balance



Real interest rates on US bonds